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Abstract 
My research topic is the ontology of causation in Aristotle, with a view to 
also making a contribution to contemporary philosophy. I offer a new 
interpretation of Aristotle's account of causation and perception. 
I argue that Aristotle understands the causal link in terms of a single 
complex entity which involves essentially two interdependent natures (e.g. an 
activity that grounds teaching and learning). Internally, such an entity has the 
same metaphysical structure as a line that grounds two vectors with opposite 
directions. But the causal entity, as opposed to the line and vectors, is itself 
ontologically dependent on the two substances that are in causal interaction. This 
is because the entity's two natures are the realisation of two interdependent 
potentialities of the two substances (e.g. for teaching and learning). 
Aristotle builds a causal bridge between substances out of mutually 
realised potentialities of the two substances. Their mutual realisation binds them 
together into a net of ontological dependencies which delineates the boundary of 
the causal entity. In my thesis I describe the multifarious ontological 
dependencies and argue that Aristotle has made a unique contribution to the 
history of the analysis of causation by offering an ontological account of it in 
terms of potentiality -actuality and ontological dependence. 
Furthermore, Aristotle puts to use his theory of causation to account for 
the metaphysical status of what we call after Locke secondary properties, e.g. 
colours, sounds etc. I reconstruct Aristotle's theory of secondary properties in the 
light of my understanding of his two -in -one metaphysical model. I put Aristotle's 
theory of causation as applied to his theory of perception to the test of whether it 
gives philosophical gains in contemporary philosophy in the field of the 
philosophy of mind. I engage with David Chalmers' arguments against 
Primitivism - which is a new contemporary account of the metaphysics of 
colours. Primitivism is the account of colours philosophically most alike to 
Aristotle's own one. I put forward my own original position on the metaphysics 
of colours inspired by Aristotle's theory of causation, arguing for the core 
Primitivist assumptions, while avoiding Chalmers' criticisms. 
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V 
The Argument of the Thesis: the Puzzle of Two Essences in One Substratum 
My thesis' project originates from the puzzlement and disagreement I 
discovered exist among Aristotelian scholars regarding the metaphysical analysis 
Aristotle gives of how causal powers are realised. 
Imagine a world where causal activity gives birth not just to the effect, but 
to the cause as well; where a cause depends for its existence on its effect. If you 
have found yourself in unfamiliar territory, this is Aristotle's world. Aristotle 
holds that one cannot be teaching if no one is learning. Being a teacher is as much 
of an achievement of the causal interaction as being a learner. Also, the colour 
green being manifested on an object's surface is as much of an achievement of the 
object -perceiver causal interaction as the perceiver's experience of seeing green. 
These achievements (colour manifestation, and colour experience) are 
multifariously mutually dependent. But they belong to different subjects (i.e. the 
object is green and the perceiver experiences green) which are in causal 
interaction. 
Aristotle's position on causation is a metaphysical puzzle that sets a 
challenge to ancient philosophy scholars. The challenge of solving this puzzle is 
my thesis research project. 
What makes Aristotle's position on causation so puzzling is that for him a 
causal activity involves two natures grounded in one single activity. This seems, 
prime facie, at odds with Aristotle's own non -relativistic metaphysics, which 
allows only one essence per substance Nevertheless, the textual evidence in the 
Physics and in the De Anima is uncontroversial and describes causal activities 
precisely as such a type of `entity', which I call `two -in -one'. 
My first step in tackling the problem is to understand what generates our 
metaphysical puzzlement with two -in -one entities. In chapter 1 of my thesis I 
establish that two -in -one entities violate one of the most fundamental principles in 
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Aristotle's metaphysics, namely that the number of an entity goes hand in hand 
with the number of its essence. Substances are for Aristotle paradigms of things 
that are one in number and one in essence. I verify that the one essence - one 
substance principle is consistently present in Aristotle's conception of substance, 
from its origins in the Categories all along to its development in Metaphysics V 8, 
and then to the central books of the Metaphysics, in particular in VII 2 and 3. By 
contrast, the metaphysical novelty of two -in -one entities is that they bring about 
the divorce of the number of the essence and the number of that in which the 
essence is instantiated. In order to shed light on Aristotle's extraordinary 
departure from his own `standard' metaphysical view, I contrast two -in -one 
entities with substances by analysing Met V 8, which is a pivotal text for 
understanding Aristotle's principles of substancehood, but has not received until 
now as much exegetical attention as other loci classici in Aristotle's Metaphysics. 
There is also another dimension to the novelty of two -in -one entities, 
which is that in the history of realist metaphysics before Aristotle there is no 
record that any other thinker had thought of divorcing the number of a substance 
from the number of the principle of substancehood, however this principle was 
conceived. Hence, the question of what type of entity two -in -one entities are and 
of what type of ontological unity they enjoy open a new path of investigation in 
Aristotelian scholarship. 
Two -in -one entities require a metaphysical account that nowhere Aristotle 
fully spells out and that has to be reconstructed from his most fundamental 
metaphysical principles regarding what it is to be a certain type of thing, what it is 
to be one, what it is to be the same with, and to be different from, something else. 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 of my thesis are devoted to the investigation of these 
principles. In particular, chapter 2 addresses the question of what the number of 
an entity is, namely what makes something into one entity. The most relevant text 
where to investigate this topic is Met V 6, where Aristotle sets out the various 
criteria for oneness he employs in his metaphysics. The investigation of the 
question of what the number of an entity is gives us the understanding of a range 
of possible Aristotelian criteria in play for accounting for the oneness of two -in- 
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one entities. (I will subsequently argue, in chapter 5, that it is the criterion of 
having a common material substratum that grounds the claim to oneness of two - 
in -one entities.) 
I then turn to examine the question of the twoness of two -in -one entities. 
Two -in -one entities comprise different beings, or natures, which are ontologically 
interdependent and require a mutual process of realisation. But the potentialities 
for the two natures belong, respectively, to two different substances, the agent and 
the patient of the causal activity, and so do, in consequence, the two natures 
themselves. Chapter 3 deals with the question of what the being of an entity is, 
and revolves around the examination of Met V 7, which is the chapter in 
Aristotle's Metaphysics devoted to the topic of being. I put forward a realist 
interpretation of the classification of beings in Met V 7, by contrast with the 
traditional interpretation according to which Aristotle sets out there different uses 
of the verb `to be'. Chapter 4 is an examination of the various criteria for 
sameness and difference Aristotle gives in Met V 9 and X 3, in order to gain 
understanding of what Aristotle means by saying that the two natures involved in 
two -in -one entitites are different in being, and yet have one and the same 
actuality. 
Equipped with the understanding of three key questions regarding the 
number, the being, and the sameness / difference of entities, I argue in chapter 5 
that there is a solution to the puzzle of two -in -one entities. With reference in 
particular to Phys III 3 and De An III 2, I reconstruct the metaphysical model that 
grounds two -in -one entities. I claim Aristotle uses this model to give a 
metaphysical account of all causal activities. From one point of view, a causal 
interaction consists in two objects realising two properties they possess in 
potentiality; from another point of view, the properties' mutual realisation 
establishes a bond between the two objects; this metaphysical bond is a physical 
activity process which is essentially characterised by two natures. Thus causation 
for Aristotle is a (bonding) entity that comprises an underlying activity that 
grounds two essential natures. 
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Finally, in chapter 6 I argue that Aristotle makes use of the two -in -one 
model in his theory of perception to give a philosophically sound account of the 
secondary properties such as colours and sounds as real properties of the objects, 
and yet dependent for their full realisation on being perceived by the perceiver. 
Aristotle's subtle realism about secondary qualities is not only of historical 
exegetical interest, but also relevant to the contemporary debate in the philosophy 
of mind. Among the contemporary theories of perception, Primitivism is in many 
respects a return to Aristotle's theory. I put Aristotle' account of secondary 
qualities to the test of the philosophical challenges that Primitivism has to address 
today, focussing in particular on the ontology of colours. I conclude by proposing 
my own account of the ontology of colours, which I call Constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism retains the fundamental Aristotelian insights that Primitivism 
also preserves, but without being vulnerable to the arguments that have been 
moved against Primitivism most notably by David Chalmers. 
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Chapter 1: Principles of Substancehood 
1. Early conceptions of substance Aristotle inherits from his predecessors 
There are two well -known chapters of the Metaphysics in which Aristotle 
gives an overview of other thinkers' doctrines about substance. These are Met V 8 
and VII 2. The two texts deal with the same topic, but considered from two different 
perspectives.' 
In Met VII 2 Aristotle reconstructs the status quaestionis on the investigation 
on substance at his time, in terms of the principles of substancehood that had been 
offered by some of his predecessors and by his contemporaries. Aristotle himself 
does not make any critical comment there on the received opinions he reports, nor 
does he include in the chapter his own views on substance. Rather, it is in Met VII 3 
that he engages critically, as I will argue later, in showing the inadequacy of Plato's 
conception of substance and in putting forward his own position as a solution to the 
difficulties he finds with the Platonic one. 
By contrast with Met VII 2, in Met V 8 it is my contention that Aristotle is not 
merely reporting other thinkers' views on substance; indeed, this is where the 
difference in perspective with Met VII 2 lies. Nor is Met V 8 a dialectical discussion 
of those views, in contrast for example with Met VII 3. Both the philosophical jargon 
and the conceptual tools Aristotle uses all throughout Met V 8 to explain the different 
conceptions of substance offered by other thinkers are very typically Aristotelian, as I 
will show through a detailed analysis of the text. I shall argue that in Met V 8 
Aristotle is making a transition from received opinions of his time on substance, some 
of which which he endorsed himself at an earlier point of his investigation, to new 
developments in his own position, which shall be more fully discussed in the central 
books of the Metaphysics. In Met V 8 we see Aristotle's conception for substance in 
the making, so to speak, in contrast but also partially in continuity with other 
conceptions that were available to him. Hence, Met V 8 represents a crucial bridge 
between different moments of Aristotle's investigation on substance.2 
I take no position here about the relative chronology between Met VII 2 and V 8. A recent study on 
the relative chronology of the various books of the Metaphysics in relation to other parts of Aristotle 
works is Dumoulin's (1986). 
2 The suggestion that Met V 8 represents a bridge between different stages of Aristotle's investigation 
about substance is made also by Irwin (1988: 554 -5). 
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In order to see the difference in perspective between Met V 8 and VII 2, let us 
first examine the content, the structure and the mode of presentation in Met VII 2. 
The chapter may be divided into four sections. In the first section, 1028b8 -13, 
Aristotle reports the opinion that substances are the physical bodies: e.g. living 
beings, plants, their parts, the four elements, the universe and the stars. The second 
section, 1028b16-8, is devoted to the view that substances are the bodies' limits, 
namely surface, line, point and unit. The third section, 1028b18-27, is about the 
position, attributed to Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates, according to which there 
are substances over and above the sensible ones. The fourth section, 1028b27 -32, is 
programmatic: Aristotle stresses the necessity of evaluating his predecessors' 
positions before proceeding with his own investigation. The first and the third 
sections of Met VII 2 are the most relevant for establishing a contrast of perspective 
with Met V 8. In the opening lines of Met VII 2, in close correspondence with V 8, 
Aristotle mentions that according to the most common opinion substances are: the 
natural bodies (Tà (pUQIKà ad para) corresponding to the simple bodies (Tà TE ànÀÖ 
ad)paTa) in V 8;3 plants and living beings corresponding to bodies in general and 
living things in V 8; and the parts of the sky corresponding to the stars in V 8. 
In Met V 8, 1017b13-4, it is clear that for something to belong to the first class 
of substances, the physical bodies, it has to satisfy the criterion of being a subject 
(únoKEipEvov), namely something of which everything else is predicated, and it is 
itself never predicated of anything. From now on, I shall refer to this criterion as the 
subjecthood principle, which I shall discuss in the following sections. 
Subjecthood Principle: 
C1nOVTa ó>r TaIJTa ÀMÿETQI OIJQia ÖTI où Kaer ÚnOKEIp£VOU ÀtYETQI àÀà 
KQTà TOIJTCt)V TC1 áÀÀa. 
All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but 
everything else is predicated of them. 
3 The terms (pUQIKÒ and ánAEI are used in this case as synonimous. See e.g. Phys IV 1, 208b8 -9. 
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The very same items mentioned as examples of substances in Met V 8 appear 
also in Met VIII 1, 1042a5 -12, and in De Caelo III 1, 298a29 -33.4 In Met VII 2 and 
De Caelo III 1 however physical substances do not appear to be for Aristotle 
intimately associated with being a subject (ùnoKEipEvov). 
In Met VIII 1 Aristotle lists once again the most commonly held views on 
substance at his time, but there he immediately adds, at 1042a12 -3, that substance is 
the essence and ÚnoKEipEvov - which interpreters consider to be his own position.5 
These remarks already offer some initial ground in support of the reading I 
propose for Met V 8; the subjecthood principle is genuinely Aristotelian, for it is 
employed in many other contexts in which Aristotle gives his own conception of 
substance. But in Met V 8 it is used to identify entities that are substances not for 
Aristotle but for other thinkers. More examples of this sort will be given in the 
course of the analysis of the whole chapter. 
It is illuminating to compare Met V 8 with the opening of VII 3, 1028b33 -6, 
where Aristotle prefaces his own investigation on substance by recalling four items 
which are thought to have a claim to being substance: essence, universal, genus and 
the substratum. It is an open question whether Aristotle intends to refer there to 
views held by other thinkers, or by himself, or both. There is evidence in some 
passages of his logical works that Aristotle has thought of the genus and the universal 
as substances. 6 But in the beginning of Met VII 3 Aristotle seems just to give a brief 
survey of well known accounts of substance of his time. 
4 Met VIII 1, 1042a5 -12: `Those generally recognized are the natural substances, i.e. fire, earth, water, 
air, etc., the simple bodies; second plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals; and 
finally the physical universe and its parts; while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects 
of mathematics are substances'. De Caelo III 1, 298a29 -33: `As substances I class the simple bodies - 
fire, earth, and the other terms of the series -and all things composed of them; for example, the heaven 
as a whole and its parts, animals, again, and plants and their parts'. 
5 Met VIII 1, 1042a12 -3: `But there are arguments which lead to the conclusion that there are other 
substances, the essence and the substratum'. Here the essence and the substratums seem to count as 
two distinct accounts of substance, but in a later passage in the same chapter, 1042a24 -31, Aristotle 
treats them as extensionally coincident, for he says that in the case of sensible substances, matter, form 
(i.e. the essence) and the composite are all substrata: `But now let us resume the discussion of the 
generally recognized substances. These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have 
matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that 
which, not being a 'this' actually, is potentially a 'this'), and in another sense the formula or shape (that 
which being a 'this' can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of these two, which alone is 
generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification, capable of separate existence; for of substances 
completely expressible in a formula some are separable and some are separable and some are not'. 
6 From an Aristotelian point of view, the genus may be thought to be substance because it is what best 
expresses the essence of something, along the lines of what Aristotle writes in Top VI 5; the universal 
may be thought to be substance because it is what is best knowable. See Top VI 5, 142b22 -9: `The 
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In Met VII 3, after the initial lines just discussed, we find Aristotle's exposition 
of his own view on substance, which is further developed throughout the central 
books of the Metaphysics. For the sake of mapping Met V 8 onto an ideal 
reconstruction of the development of Aristotle's doctrine of substance, I distinguish, 
in broad strokes, three stages in his investigation. In the first one, corresponding to 
his logical works, Aristotle characterises substance as the ultimate subject of all 
predications but also as substance -of- something else, namely as essence. In the 
second stage, corresponding to Met V 8, Aristotle reconstructs the status quaestionis 
on the investigation into substance, including in it both his own philosophical insights 
and the ones received from other thinkers. As a result of this examination, he 
concludes that no current account of substance is satisfactory. In the third stage, he 
returns to his initial intuitions that substance is the ultimate subject (which he 
explores and further develops in Met VII 3), and that substance is the essence of 
something (which he develops in Met VII 4 -6). 
Let us turn now to a detailed examination of Met V 8. The majority of 
commentators agree that Met V 8 is articulated into five sections: the first four 
correspond to different accounts of substance, and the last one is a recapitulation of 
the contents of the chapter. The chapter is traditionally regarded as having four parts: 
1) 1017b10 -4: substances are physical bodies; 2) 1017b14 -6: substance is the cause of 
being of something; 3) 1017b17 -21: substance is the limit of a body; 4) 1017b22 -3: 
substance is the essence of something; 5) 1017b23 -6: conclusion. 
More recently however new interpretative suggestions have been put forward. 
For instance, Duminil and Jaulin (1991: 187) assume that the final section is a 
recapitulation of what has been said in the chapter, but note that there Aristotle 
mentions only two accounts of substance, namely substance as subject and substance 
as form. From this they conclude that in the previous part of the chapter we should 
look for two, and not four, accounts of substance. They offer two ways of reading the 
chapter. 
On the first reading they offer, substance as ultimate subject of predication 
is the topic of the first section, and substance as form is the topic of the second 
section. In the second section Aristotle deals with three aspects of what it is to be 
genus is meant to indicate just this [namely, what something is], and is submitted first of the terms in 
the definition' (quote abridged). On this passage from the Topics, see also Sainati (1968: 91 -7). 
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substance in the sense of form (rather than three distinct accounts of substance), 
namely being the immanent cause of being for something (1017b14 -6); being the 
limit (i.e. what determines) of something (1017b17 -21); and being the essence of 
something. Duminil and Jaulin find support for this interpretation in the use Aristotle 
makes of particular formulas of transition for the different parts of the text. They note 
that at 1014b14 we read äÀÀov bÈ TpOnOv, which they claim separates the two main 
accounts of substance given in the chapter; while at 1017b17 and 21 we read gTI, 
which they take to express continuity in the exposition of three aspects of the second 
account of substance. However, without attempting any broad generalisation, contra 
Duminil and Jaulin I find throughout Met V evidence pointing to the opposite reading 
of the expressions ä ov bÈ TpÒnov and Éri. (I will come to this point below, p. 
21). 
On the second reading Duminil and Jaulin offer Aristotle investigates two 
main accounts of substance at the same time, one of substance as ultimate subject of 
predication and the other as form as stated above, and the two accounts are in fact 
distinguished only in the conclusion. In the section 1017b10 -6 the investigation is 
about the sensible substances, qua ultimate subjects of predication (e.g. the simple 
bodies, the composites, their parts, at 1017b10 -4) and qua forms (namely what is the 
immanent cause of something else's being, at 1017b14-6). In the other section, 
1017b21 -2, the investigation is about the definition of substance, both of its parts 
(1017b17 -21) and of the substance itself as a whole (1017b21 -22). But, contra 
Duminil and Jaulin this reading clearly appears superimposed on the text and the 
qualifications introduced in their interpretation of the section 1017b10-6 (`qua 
ultimate subjects of predication' and `qua forms') are not in Aristotle's text. 
An alternative reading of the structure of Met V 8 is offered by Dubois (1998: 
73 -80) who argues that the chapter consists in Aristotle's attempts to answer the 
question Ti ÉO-riv in relation to material beings. Dubois sees the chapter as divided 
into four sections: 1) 1017b10-4; 2) 1017b14-21; 3) 1017b21 -2; 4) 1017b23 -6. 
In the first section, 1017b10 -4, for Dubois Aristotle is investigating two aspects 
of what it is to be a substance, namely being the subject of the predication of 
accidents and being a composite with material parts. In the second section he is 
investigating what the immanent principles are that make a substance be what it is. 
The investigation there leads Aristotle to the account of substance of any given thing 
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as the cause of its being - which Dubois understands as the conditions for the 
existence of that thing (1017b14-6), and to the account of substance as form or 
essence - which is for Dubois the principle of individuation of things. Dubois' 
reasoning appears to be as follows: the principle of individuation is that in virtue of 
which each thing is what it is and what distinguishes one thing from the other, and 
this is for Aristotle the form of something, which is in Met V 8 identified with the 
external physical limit of the thing. Then the third section of the chapter, 1017b21 -2, 
is for Dubois a brief summary of the section immediately preceding, 1017b14-21. 
There for Dubois the expression TÒ Ti ?jjv ETval refers to the cause of being of 
something and hence to its conditions of existence, while the expressions Àóyoç and 
Òplapôç refer back to the limit and its function of being principle of individuation. 
Finally, the fourth section, 1017b23 -6, for Dubois is a recapitulation of the whole 
chapter in which Aristotle highlights the two main accounts he offers for substance, 
which are being an ultimate subject and being the form of something. With regard to 
the account of substance as being the form of something, Dubois takes Aristotle to 
specify in the final recapitulation, first, that the form of something is what we cognize 
about that thing, and second, that the form is the actuality of the substantial 
composite. Dubois sees these two last points expressed in the final line of the 
chapter: TOIOOTOV bÈ ÉKQOTOU el pow') Kai TÒ ETòoq, where popcprj alludes to the 
intelligibility and EIbOS to the actuality of forms. I disagree with Dubois' reading of 
the chapter. For not only is his interpretation not substantiated by what Aristotle 
actually says (in particular Dubois reads too much into the last line of the chapter, and 
does not offer any argument in support of his reading). His reading is unnatural, 
superimposed on the text, and nowhere does it take into account the actual transition 
formulas that Aristotle uses (e.g. at 1017b21 ËTI clearly suggests the transition to 
another item in the discussion, whilst Dubois takes it as the introduction of a 
conclusive remark). Later on, in section 2 of this chapter I will also question the 
assumption that Dubois and Duminil and Jaulin share, among other commentators, 
about the fact that the very last part of Met V 8, corresponding to 1017b23 -6, is a 
conclusive summary of the preceding part of the chapter. I will argue, contra the 
traditional interpretations, that the very last part of the chapter is in fact Aristotle's 
own account of substance. 
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1.1 Substance is physical body 
The first principle of substancehood Aristotle discusses in Met V 8 is found in the 
section 1017b10 -4. First Aristotle gives examples of things that on this principle are 
substances, at 1017b10 -4, and then spells out the principle according to which the 
aforementioned items are substances, at 1017b13 -4: 
Oúcria A£yETaI TCI TE OnAd a(x)para, O1ov yñ Kai nap Kai Úbop Kai 6aa 
TOIaûTa, Kai óAWS u1b1.1aTa Kai Tà ÉK TOOTWV aUVEcTC7)Ta 4156 TE Kai 
balpOvla KQi TCl pOpla ToaTWV' ánavTa ót TaaTa AÉyETaI oúJaia 6TI 011 Kae' 
Úf0KEIpÉVOU Aty£Tai áÀAà KOTÒ TOOTWV Tel âÀAa. 
Substances are: the simple bodies, which are to be understood as the four 
elements; the bodies that are constituted by the four elements, namely physical 
bodies, e.g. living beings, stars and planets; their material parts. 
Two preliminary textual remarks are in place here. The use of ánÁá cWpaTa 
to mean the four elements is documented by Bonitz (Index 76b15 -9). The meaning 
following expression 6aa TolaOTa is rather less clear and has been discussed by the 
commentators. E.g. Ross (1997: I, 310 and II, 226) believes Aristotle wants to refer to 
different species of fire, water, air and earth, on the grounds of what Aristotle says in 
De Caelo I 2, 268b26 -9: 
'End ót T(x)V acopen-WV TCl pÉV ÉoTIV C]nA0 TCI ô£ aIJVeETa >zK TOl1TWV ()Iva) 
b' CInAQ NÉV 6aa KIVIjaEWS CIpXr1V £XEI KoTCI (Pllaly, oTOV nap Kai yf-jv Kai 
Tel TOIITWV ail Kai TQ aUyyEVñ TolITOIC). (My emphasis). 
Bodies are either simple or are compounded of such; and by simple bodies I 
mean those which possess a principle of movement in their own nature, such as 
fire and earth with their kinds, and whatever is akin to them. 
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Ross's suggestion is however difficult to make sense of, and most importantly 
in other places in Aristotle's works there is evidence that he rules out the possibility 
that there may be different species of e.g. water. See Top I 7, 103a18 -23: 
änavTa yàp Tà TolaúTa Quyy£vñ Kaì napanMQla àAAIjAoIq EoiKEV ETVQI. 
nay la>v yelp úòwø navel Tain-òv Tw EïbEI AtyETaI bià Tò ËXEIV Tivà 
òpolòTnTa' Tò b' ànò Tñq aúTñS KprjvriS úbcop oÚbEVi äAAc.) blacp£pEl OM' 
rj T(i) ocpobpoTapaV £ÌVQI TIjV òpolòTfjTa, 150 où XcopiopEV mire, T6)V Kae' 
v Eiboq òncoo° úv AEyoptvc,ov. (My emphasis). 
For all such things seem to be of one family and to resemble one another. For 
the reason why all water is said to be specifically the same as all other water is 
because of a certain likeness it bears to it, and the only difference in the case of 
water drawn from the same spring is this, that the likeness is more emphatic: 
that is why we do not distinguish it from the things that in one way or another 
are called `the same' in view of unity of species. 
In conclusion, it seems best to read Öa'o TolaOTa in Met V 8 as a loose 
expression, intended to take the preceding statement to a higher level of generality, 
meaning that substances are the four elements in general and not just the ones 
explicitly mentioned in the text. 
The next item in the list of substances that Aristotle gives has also been much 
debated by the interpreters: this is the physical bodies in general and the composites. 
Among the ancient commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Met 373, 4 -5) notes 
that in this passage in Met V 8 living beings are reduced metaphysically to aggregates 
of the four elements. Alexander rightly points out that this is clearly a position 
Aristotle himself would not hold. And Alexander is committed in his interpretation to 
the assumption that Met V 8 in its entirety is an exposition of genuinely Aristotelian 
views. Alexander's way out of the difficulty his assumption generates is to interpret 
Aristotle's words to the effect that substances are either physical bodies, or what has 
a body (i.e. it is constituted by matter) and hence is not to be identified with a body. 
Finally, again on the literal reading of the text, the ancient and medieval 
commentators have found difficulties in interpreting the word balpòVla, which 
clearly Aristotle here uses to refer to the celestial bodies. Alexander of Aphrodisias 
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(In Met 373, 5 -8) shows awareness of the fact that in different grammatical forms this 
term may mean different things: in the masculine plural it refers to divine beings 
which have a body and a soul; in the neutral plural it refers to the celestial bodies. 
However, the later commentators, e.g. Aquinas, having lost direct knowledge of the 
ancient Greek, understand that Aristotle is actually referring to divine beings, gods of 
some sort, or possibly effigies of gods. Paul of Venice, relying on the commentaries 
on Aristotle by Aquinas and Albert the Great, expands on the first of Aquinas' 
suggestions that óaipóvia are gods of some sort by referring to the Platonic doctrine 
which has a place for those beings in the hierarchy of divines creatures. Paul also 
elaborates Aquinas second suggestion that óalpóvia might be objects of devotion by 
commenting that this type of devotion was practised by the Peripatetics.8 Clearly 
these medieval readings do not capture what Aristotle meant to say. It is only 
subsequently in the XIXth century with Bonitz and Schwegler that a good literal 
reading of the text is regained.9 Bonitz (In Met 243; Index 164a2O -23) quotes the 
opening of Met V 8 precisely to exemplify the use of alpóvia for celestial bodies, 
and shows that óalpòvla is to be taken as synonymous of agrpa on the ground of 
e.g. Phys II 4, 196b6 -7 where the two terms are used in a hendiadys. He also offers 
further confirmation from De Caelo I 2, 269a3O -2, where the celestial bodies are said 
to be divine. 
With a clear understanding of the literal meaning of the passage, we can turn 
now to the question of whether the substances mentioned as such in the beginning of 
Met V 8 are indeed substances on Aristotle's view, or rather in mentioning those 
substances Aristotle refers to a conception of substance different from his own. 
7 Aquinas In Met lib V lec 10, 241 [898]: "Et daemonia', idest idola, quae in templis posita colebatur 
pro diis. Vel daemonia dicit quaedam animalia rationabilia secundum Platonicos, quae Apuleius sic 
definit: Daemones sunt animalia corpore aerea, mente rationalia, animo passiva, tempore eterna'. 
8 Paul of Venice In Met ff. 70rb -va M, 182ra Pv: 'Quinymmo et daemonia, que apud Platonicos 
animalia aerea vocabatur, mente rationalia, iuxta diffinitionem Apulei, sic dicentis: `demones sunt 
animalia corpore aerea, mente rationalia, animo passiva, tempore eterna', licet secundum veritatem non 
sint talia animalia, neque talia aerea corpora intellectum habentia. Apud autem Peripateticos dicuntur 
templorum ydola importantia compositionem artis ex substantia et figura una cum intellectu, 
conferente oracula atque consilia. Daymon enim in greco sonat in latino `intellectum ". For one of the 
sources of Paul's interpretation see Albert the Great In Met lib V, tr 2 °, c 5, 241: `Et iuxta hoc dicuntur 
etiam substantiae daemonia. Daimon autem in Graeco in Latino sonat intellectum. Hic autem ponitur 
pro idolo; unde alia translatio habet idola, quod dicit substantiam compositam in arte'. 
9 See also Schwegler (1847: III, 215), who confirms that öalpôvla is commonly used for celestial 
bodies, as we find evidence e.g. in Plato: `Von óalpàvla gibt Alexander zwei Erklarungen, von denen 
die zweite die richtigere ist: áalpóvla TÓ OEÌa Abp. . TOIaÜTa Yelp Tà ácrrpa Kai Toimov pr pn, 
Schol. 701, b, 19...Auch Plato...stellt Tà An...-10V10 and Tà Ocia zusammen, z. B. Apol. 27 E'. 
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In Met VII 16 for instance Aristotle explicitly denies that parts of living beings 
and the four elements, mentioned in V 8, are substances; they are rather substances in 
potentiality, as it clear from 1040b5 -15: 
Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only 
potencies, both the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and 
when they are separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) 
and earth and fire and air; for none of them is a unity, but as it were a mere 
heap, till they are worked up and some unity is made out of them (quote 
abbreviated). 
Let us first assume as a working hypothesis the position that many 
commentators have taken especially in late antiquity and in the middle Ages, namely 
that in the very first part of Met V 8 Aristotle is indeed presenting one of his own 
conception of substance. Prima facie passages like the one just quoted from Met VII 
16 directly clash with this interpretation. One possible solution to this apparent 
inconsistency in Aristotle's work is to think of there being different conceptions of 
substance at different stages of an `ideal' development of Aristotle's doctrine. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Met 373, 11 -5) and Asclepius (In Met 319, 11 -2) are the 
first to suggest that the view on substance that is put forward at the beginning of Met 
V 8 belongs to an earlier stage in Aristotle's thought, before the central books of the 
Metaphysics, and very close to the Categories. 1 ° 
Alexander of Aphrodisias offers an interesting suggestion to bridge Met V 8 
and the Categories." In Met V 8 Aristotle mentions as substances parts of material 
bodies, and even their material constituents (i.e. the four elements). Alexander of 
Aphrodisias expresses concern on how is it possible in Aristotelian terms that they all 
count as substances. He finds as a solution that they are substances on the ground 
that they are indivisible (C1TOpOV) and numerically one according to the criterion of 
indivisibility derivable from Cat 5, 3b10 -13, (on which see also section 2 of this 
chapter): t2 
1° See Alexander In Met 373, 14 -5; Asclepius In Met 319, 12; Averroes In Met lib V tr 1° c 8 p 118r 
15D; Albert the Great In Met lib V tr 2° c 5 p 241; Aquinas In Met lib V lec 10 p 241 [898]; Paul of 
Venice In Met ff 70va M, 182ra Pv. 
11 It is striking that Alexander seems not to be concerned with the apparent contradiction between Mel 
VII 16 and V 8 on the issue that parts of animals are simple elements. 
12 For other occurrences of the term ÓTONov with same meaning as in the passage quoted above, see 
also Cat 2, 1135-6 and 3a38; also Bonitz Index 120a48 -53. 
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(láaa b: oúaia boKEi TóóE TI anNaivElv. tnÌ {JÈV oúv Tc15v npcwTtov 
oúal(OV àValJ(pIQßeTnTOV KOÌ àAneÉS tOTIV 0TI TObE TI an1JOÌVEI' CITOpOV 
yàp Kai £v àplApw Tò ónl\oúpEVÓV taTly. 
Every substance13 seems to signify a certain `this'. As regards the primary 
substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain `this'; 
for the thing revealed is individual [my translation: indivisible] and 
numerically one. 
In fact, in this first section of Met V 8 Aristotle himself does offer a criterion to 
explain why physical bodies, their parts, and even the elements, and this is at 
1017b13-4 the linguistic criterion according to which substances are ontological 
entities that are picked out by those terms that are the subjects of every predications, 
not themselves predicated of anything. This is the Subjecthood Principle (mentioned 
above). This criterion appears verbatim in many other passages of Aristotle's works: 
in the Categories, in the Metaphysics, in the Physics.14 
In order to understand the significance of the use of this criterion in Met V 8 I 
shall devote the next section to the analysis of its occurrence in Met VII 3. The 
reason why the analysis of Met VII 3 is of crucial importance to the current 
discussion is that there, I argue, Aristotle presents an application of the principle 
performed by his predecessors that for Aristotle leads to absurd consequences. This 
is because in Aristotle's view the principle by itself is necessary but insufficient for 
picking out what is truly substance, and needs to be combined with other criteria that 
something has to satisfy to count as a substance. 
At the beginning of Met VII 3, 1028b33 -7, we find three candidates for what 
substance is: matter, form and the compound. The three of them appear to satisfy the 
definition of substance as ultimate subject. Granted for the sake of argument, 
Aristotle tells us, that the subjecthood principle is indeed satisfied by all the three 
candidates, the next question to address is which candidate best qualifies as a 
substance. As the investigation proceeds in the second part of the chapter, 1029a10- 
26, the application of the subjecthood principle leads to what is maximally 
13 Here I take substance to mean `name of substance' as suggested by Ackrill (1963: 88). 
14 See e.g. Cat 5, 2a11 -3; 2b15 -7; 2b37 -3a1; 3a37; Met VII 3, 1028b36 -7; 1029a1 -2; 1029a8 -9; VII 13, 
1038b15; Phys I 2, 185a32. Other occurrences are mentioned in Bonitz In Met 243. 
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indeterminate, namely the matter, as the best candidate for substancehood. For 
Aristotle this result is however inadequate (Oû ¡Kav0v), unclear (äó flÀOV), and 
ultimately impossible (QbùvaTov). From these result Aristotle concludes that the 
subjecthood principle expresses only a necessary but not sufficient condition that 
something has to satisfy to count as substance. What I want to highlight for the time 
being on the ground of this sketchy presentation of Met VII 3 is the following: 
Aristotle himself makes use of the subjecthood criterion as a condition that something 
needs to satisfy in order to count as a genuine substance. However, clearly in Met VII 
3 Aristotle does not even consider the possibility that the subjecthood principle could 
lead to the identification of the physical bodies as substances, by contrast with Met V 
8. 
The provisional conclusion I want to suggest, which will be corroborated by 
further arguments in the course of the detailed analysis of Met V 8, is that the 
subjecthood principle is genuinely Aristotelian, but the results it leads to in Met V 8 
are not, and not any more than the results it leads to in Met VII 3 are. In the former 
case it leads to the physical bodies as substances, in the latter to matter as substance; 
neither of the two is a position Aristotle wishes to endorse. 
On the interpretation I suggest, the tensions that emerge in the first section of 
Met V 8 between what Aristotle says there and his position is in other parts of his 
works, is to be understood as generated by Aristotle's attempt to account for other 
thinkers' views through his own conceptual tools. An example of the tensions I refer 
to is the following. On the subjecthood principle, substances are not predicated of 
anything else. But at least some of the substances actually mentioned in the first 
section of Met V 8, the simple bodies, are said to be material constituents of 
something else; hence they are predicated of the composite they are constituents of. 
But this is an apparent inconsistency.15 
15 In fact for Aristotle the material constituents of something - as they enter into the constitution of that 
thing - are re- identified by the form of the thing they constitute, and could not possibly retain their 
own form, as it is argued e.g. in Met VII 7, 1033a16 -23: `And so, as there also a thing is not said to be 
that from which it comes, here the statue is not said to be wood but is said by a verbal change to be 
wooden, not brass but brazen, not gold but golden, and the house is said to be not bricks but bricken 
(though we should not say without qualification, if we looked at the matter carefully, even that a statue 
is produced from wood or a house from bricks, because coming to be implies change in that from 
which a thing comes to be, and not permanence). It is for this reason, then, that we use this way of 
speaking'. See also Met IX 7, 1049a18 -27. 
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1.2 Substance is the cause of being 
On the second account of substance in Met V 8, 1017b14 -6, substance is said to 
be `cause of being': 
äÀÀOV b> Tpónov Ö äV 6 aiTIov TOO ETVOI, ÉVUnQpXov ToiS ToloúTOiq 
óQa pei ÀsryETal Ka6' únoKEiNsrvou, day el tpuXel TCO UP. 
[We call `substance] that which, being present in such things as are not 
predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of 
an animal. 
In the passage just quoted we find a terminology that is typically Aristotelian. It 
is not a characterisation of substance that Aristotle would find adequate to express his 
own views on substance. Nevertheless it is open to interpretation whether Aristotle is 
just reformulating in his own terms a position held by other thinkers or expressing his 
own view; and in the latter case whether it is a view that he has held himself at some 
earlier stage of his investigation on substance before the central books of the 
Metaphysics. 
Those commentators, in late antiquity and in the Middle Ages, who believe that 
Aristotle is giving his own account of substance find puzzling that in this section of 
Met V 8 there is no mention of the soul as form or essence. It is a tenet in Aristotle's 
metaphysics that what is cause of being for something is the form or essence of that 
thing; the soul is so defined e.g. in Met VII 10, 1035b14 -6, and in De An II 1, 412a19- 
21, but not in Met V 8. In order to overcome this difficulty for the interpretation he 
supports, Alexander of Aphrodisias for example justifies the fact that Aristotle does 
not mention in the Met V 8 passage what we could call his `standard' definition of the 
soul as the formal cause of the living being in the following way. He suggests that in 
Met V 8 Aristotle wants to emphasise that the soul plays the role of the immanent 
cause of being peculiar to living beings; hence it is a sensible and en- mattered form 
(EvuAov 65O0.16 Alexander's point is however not persuasive, for three reasons. 
16 Alexander In Met 373, 21-5: óaa arvunápXovra Taiç oúaialç afrlá tally aúraiç Toi Eival ai 
Eial TatJTa Kai aúTà olJaiaç À£YEaeaI. Eitl Ó' ÔV !bl(WV TÓ TG)V (PIJaEI aUVEUT(i)TWV EÌör), Tatfra 
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Firstly, in the actual Aristotelian text there is no indication that the soul is treated by 
Aristotle as a special type of form. Secondly, Alexander's suggestion presupposes 
the hylomorphic analysis of substance that Aristotle develops in the central books of 
the Metaphysics and does not seem to have already available in Met V 8. The notion 
of substantial forms which are the cause of being of substances, and the merging of 
matter and form in the constitution of substance are themes that Aristotle introduces 
rather in Met VII 17. In a more correct perspective, the position Aristotle takes in the 
central books of the Metaphysics can be seen as anticipated to some degree in book 
V, but not presupposed. Alexander fails to see that even if the view on substance 
expressed in this part of Met V 8 were genuinely Aristotelian, yet, it would have to be 
located at an earlier stage of investigation than the one to which Alexander sees it as 
belonging. Thirdly, contra Alexander in the central books of the Metaphysics the 
attribution of substantial form to matter modifies it metaphysically and re- identifies it. 
The re- identification of matter by the substantial form is Aristotle's metaphysical 
solution to avoid that two forms survive in the same matter thereby undermining the 
unity of the substance. Alexander, in suggesting that the soul is a vuov EïbOÇ does 
not consider that for Aristotle this would be a threat to the unity of substance. 
A more promising line of interpretation seems to be that according to which in 
Met V 8 we find an early Aristotelian view on substance. This line first of all 
assumes that the first two sections of the chapter, up to 1017b 16, are to be read jointly, 
on the basis of the linguistic observation that this section of the chapter is introduced 
by the expression EiMov bÈ TpOnov, while the others begin with Sri. On this line of 
interpretation this stylistic variant indicates that the first and the second section of the 
chapter are closely connected, while the following sections introduce different items 
of discussion (by contrast with Duminil and Jaulin, who claim the expression äMov 
bL TpOnov separates the two main accounts of substance given in the chapter, namely 
substance as ultimate subject of predication and substance as form. See above p. 10) 
Reading the first two sections together, the first part of Met V 8 is to be taken as 
a reconstruction of the development of Aristotle's own early doctrine of substance. In 
the first place, corresponding to 1017a10 -4, substances are the physical bodies; 
Ó£ ÉOTI Tá (pUIKá KOÌ ÉVUÀO £iÖlj, áf)OÌáV ÉOTIV ÉV TOÌS ((íJOIç t}lU)(fj' öIá yáP TOt1TfiV ZGWO. KO' 
Éni TWV (PUaIK(.OV ÖÉ aWpáTCOV TÓ £ÌÖOS tKáOTGt) OÌTIOV TOO £ÌVOI Ó ÉOTIV. 
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subsequently, at 1017b14 -6, substance is the soul, for it is the cause of being of 
physical bodies. On this interpretation, Met V 8 is an intermediate stage of the 
investigation on substance, to be located - conceptually - in between the Categories 
and the central books of the Metaphysics. In the Categories the so called primary 
substances are merely the ontological items that correspond to the ultimate subjects of 
predication at the linguistic level. There is agreement among commentators that in 
the Categories the primary substances are primitive, not further analyzable items17 
that cannot be predicated of anything else (but only in so called unnatural 
predications where the logical subject does not coincide with the grammatical subject 
of the proposition). Hence, the first set of substances given in Met V 8 fits well 
within the Categories framework; whilst in the second section of Met V 8 Aristotle 
appears to discern a more complex internal structure in the substance, whereby a 
substance has in itself the cause of its being. This is a step forward from the 
Categories doctrine towards the central books of the Metaphysics doctrine, and 
especially Met VII 17.18 
The interpretation just presented raises a series of questions. Is the soul an 
ultimate subject? If it is, and yet it is something different from the living being as a 
whole, should we take it to be a part of the living being? How can Aristotle account 
for something substantial being in a substance, as the soul is said to be in the living 
being, and yet trying to preserve the substantial unity of the living being? 
A starting point for addressing these questions is to be found in Met V 18, 
1022a29 -32, where Aristotle says: 
Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of its parts; e.g. a 
surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself; for the 
soul, in which life directly resides (acv 6 flpd)Tn TÒ i;í v [>:OTlv]), is a part of the 
man. 
There Aristotle claims that the property of `being alive' is a property per se of 
`man' for it belongs primarily to the soul, which is a part of man. For the point I wish 
" Loux (1991: 35ff) has explored in depth this point in Aristotle's theory of substance and captures it 
in the so called Unanalyzability Thesis: there are primary entities, whose `what it is' has to be 
understood as not reducible to anything conceptually prior, hence it is not further analyzable. 
18 See also Met VIII 2, 1043a2 -4: `It is clear, then, from these facts that, since its substance is the cause 
of each thing's being, we must seek in these differentiae what is the cause of the being of each of these 
things'. 
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to make it is relevant to look at the series of equivalences Aristotle posits in Met V 18 
between what is expressed by the formulas: `that in virtue of which' (Ka8' 8), `in 
virtue of itself or per se' (Ka8' Clint) and `cause'. Aristotle says that the expression 
`that in virtue of which' has as many senses as the term `cause' (1022a19 -20) and its 
senses correspond to the senses of the expression `per se' (1022a24 -5). It follows 
that the expression `per se' has as many senses as the expression `cause'. On the 
basis of this equivalence, each of the senses of the expression `that in virtue of which' 
and `per se' can be taken to express a causal relation between the ontological items 
corresponding respectively to subject and predicate in a proposition. In particular, if 
that in virtue of which something is what it is, is in some sense its first recipient 
(1022a16 -17), then the first recipient is also that to which the properties of that thing 
belong per se (see also 1022a29 -32 quoted above). In the light of these remarks, we 
can now understand that in the example in Met V 8, 1027b16, and in V 18, 1022a32, 
the soul is that in virtue of which a living being is alive, hence it is the cause of being 
of the living being, for it is the first recipient of the property of being alive, namely it 
is that to which the property belongs per se. 
On this interpretation one is also able to explain why the account of substance 
as cause of being in Met V 8 is mentioned immediately after the account of substance 
as ultimate subject. What is the cause of being of something else, like e.g. the soul, is 
also an ultimate subject in the sense that it is the first recipient to which the essential 
properties in virtue of which something is what it is belong per se. 
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1.3 Substance is the body's limits 
The next conception of substance Aristotle presents in Met V 8 is given at 
1017b17 -21: substances are the bodies' limits,19 which are characterised as present in 
the bodies, circumscribing the bodies, and thereby determining them (i.e. making 
them be something determinate): 
ETI ÓQa Opla >VunQpXovTQ >OTIV EN/ ToÌç TOIOIJTOIS òpKOVTQ TE KQÌ TOÖE 
TI QnpaivovTa, joy ávalpouNÉv(Av aVaIpEÌTaI Tò May, dov ÉnlntboU 
Qrpa, wç cpaQi TIVES, Kai tninEbov ypappllç Kai Mc,oç O óp1611òç boKEi 
EÌVai TIM TOIOIJTOç (QVQlpoup£vou TE yàp OIJbÉV ErVOI, KQÌ Ópi4IV 
návTa) 
[We call 'substance] the parts which are present in such things, limiting them 
and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is 
destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the 
plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some 
to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits 
all things. 
To address the question whether this account of substance is to be taken as 
genuinely Aristotelian or not I shall first make some remarks concerning the position 
Aristotle takes on this view of substance in other passages of his works. 
In book IV of the Physics Aristotle engages in a critical discussion of the 
hypothesis that the bodies' limits are their forms, and so qua forms they are 
19 Aristotle does not use in this passage the term we would expect for limit, i.e. nOaç, but it is clear 
that this is what he referring to, also by comparison with other passages in which the same model for 
substance is described, e.g. Met XIV 3, 1090b5 -7 and Phys IV 8, 209b1 -5. The term papa to refer to 
mathematical and geometrical entities as substances appears to be used here by Aristotle loosely, as the 
commentators have noticed. See e.g. Alex In Met 373, 27 -9; Albert the Great In Met lib. V, tr. 2 °, c. 5, 
p 241; Ross (1924: I, 310); Duminil -Jaulin (1991: 189). Alexander of Aphrodisias for instance notes 
that the limits of bodies described as parts without any further qualification are ambiguous and could 
be understood as parts of the extension of the body; but that would not be the right way to take it, as it 
is clear e.g. in the case of surfaces. Alex In Met 373, 27 -31: Às yEI ói OÚTw TÒ ntpOTO -1-WV acoperrow 
oCialaç KQÌ Qi1TÒ ÀÉyEaOal, Om Kai papa KOIVÒTEPOV Ein6v OIITÓ, 64 ôvTa TWV TOO ad pOTOÇ 
blaaTrlpáTwv ptpq oúú yap ÉOTIV rl tnlcpáVEla ptpoç ToO O'CJIJOTOÇ OÚTcog CJç blalpEÌO0ai Eig 
airrrjV TOO ptvroi Àáyou OÚTOO paps &V LOT!, Kai TOIITrl ápiZ,ETaI TÓ °Zip. 600ç ói Kai el 
ypapprl npòç TO &IKpOVElav Excl. 
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substances. The conclusion he reaches in Phys IV 2 is a reductio ad absurdum of the 
hypothesis that the place of something, being what primarily contains and 
circumscribes the body, is therefore its limit and also its form. In Phys IV 4, 211b10- 
14, Aristotle also argues that the place, being what contains and delimits the body, 
seems to be its form, and there seems to be an equivalence between place, limit and 
form, but this is not correct, for place is the limit of the containing body not of the 
contained one. In both cases Aristotle takes into consideration, but finally rejects, the 
hypothesis that the limit of something (or more precisely the place of something as its 
limit) is the form of what it is limit of This gives us reason for not attributing to 
Aristotle the model on which the body's limit is its substance, in the sense of being its 
form. 
Aristotle has reasons for being interested in exploring the possibility of the 
limit being the form of the body. In the context of the Physics it is a sound 
assumption that a body is merely an extended entity, whose matter is by definition the 
interval of a magnitude. On this assumption what defines the interval of the 
magnitude, namely what makes it a determinate magnitude, is the form of the body. 
On the basis of this consideration there is ground for the hypothesis that the place of a 
body, by circumscribing the body's extension in space, is also its form. But from 
Aristotle's point of view the physical properties that characterise a bodily substance 
cannot be reduced to geometrical properties. What defines geometrically a substance 
does not express exhaustively also its physical characteristics, therefore cannot be its 
form. 
The various other passages in which Aristotle returns to the position that the 
bodies' limits are substances are within the framework of his refutation of Platonic 
and Pythagorian doctrines. For example, he gives arguments against the claim that 
lines are substances either in the sense in which the form of something is its substance 
or in the sense in which the matter is in Met XIII 2, 1077a31 -6,2° and also in De 
Caelo III 1, 299a2 -6, and in GC II 1, 329a21 -4, and attributes the position to Plato.21 
Another example is in Met XIV 3, 1090b5 -13, where he argues against the 
20 Met XIII 2, 1077a31 -6: `How can lines be substances? Neither as a form or shape, as the soul 
perhaps is, nor as matter, like the solid; for we have no experience of anything that can be put together 
out of lines or planes or points, while if these had been a sort of material substance, we should have 
observed things which could be put together out of them'. See also Annas (1976: 146). 
21 See e.g. Tim 53C -55C. 
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Pythagorians' claim that the physical bodies are constituted by numbers, which for 
Aristotle runs into the contradiction of deriving what has weight from what is neither 
heavy nor light.22 
With these considerations on the background, we can now turn to the Met V 8 
passage. The expression ÓpKovTQ TE KQÌ TOÒE TI agpaivovTa with reference to 
mathematical and geometrical entities is a hendiadys that Aristotle uses to express the 
idea that the limits circumscribe and at the same time determine that of which they 
are limits. The expression anpaivEly TOÖE TI is typically Aristotelian, and is found in 
numerous passages of Aristotle's works. However, its occurrence in Met V 8 is very 
peculiar, in the sense that, given the standard meaning of this expression for Aristotle, 
from his point of view it is not appropriate to characterise mathematical and 
geometrical entities. For limits, as well as numbers, are relational concepts; they do 
not by themselves express something determinate. 
The majority of commentators, ancient and modern, try to find a meaning for 
the expression QnpaivEiv TOÓE TI which can fit the context of Met V 8 and at the 
same time be consistent with Aristotle's doctrine. Among the ancient commentators 
Alexander of Aphrodisias for instance suggests three different possible readings. On 
the first one, the limit of a body means something determinate because, by marking 
its boundaries, distinguishes in space a body from everything else that surrounds it. 
Hence the limit signifies something determinate in the sense that it signifies that what 
is delimited by it is something determinate.23 On the second reading, signifying 
something determinate amounts to expressing the form in virtue of which something 
is what it is. Hence the limits are that in virtue of which the geometrical form of a 
body is determined and defined. But this second interpretation suggested by 
Alexander is inconsistent with what Aristotle says e.g. in Cat 8 where the external 
configuration of something is explicitly said to be that in virtue of which something is 
of a certain quality, and not that in virtue of which something is something 
determinate.24 In order to avoid this possible objection, Alexander indeed adds that 
22 See also Annas (1976: 209). I will return to the analysis of the passage below p. 30. 
23 Alex In Met 373, 25 -7: oúaiaç cprlaì À: yEQ6aI Kai öoa popla ÉvunOpXOVTO TIQIV dpiZ,£I TE mire] 
Kai TÓÓ£ TI EÌVaI aúTò arwaivcl 
24 Alex In Met 374, 6 -8: TÓÓ£ Öt TI OTipOÌVEIV £Ì1E TÒ nt paTa, ÓTI KaTÒ TOGTO ai popcpaì Tû)V 
aclpOT(WV, e]cp' c¿V TÒÓE -rive] ETVOI My£Tai, OTOV KÚ101, acpaipai. i KaTÒ Tal1Ta OÙ TOÒE áÀìÒ 
TOIÒÖE A y£TaI. The second reading suggested by Alexander collapses together two accounts of limit 
that Aristotle gives in Met V 17, which are the following: 1) `we call limit the form, whatever it may 
be, of a spatial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude' (I022a5 -6); 2) `we call limit the substance 
24 
the bodies are said, in virtue of their limits, not Toó£ but TOlovb£. In this way, 
however, Alexander makes the suggested reading for Qri Jaiv£Iv T0ó£ TI unclear. 
The impression is that Alexander is trying to fit within a single coherent framework, 
even at the cost of clarity, what is genuinely Aristotle's doctrine, namely that the 
formal configuration of something has to be understood as a quality of that thing, and 
what is not Aristotle's doctrine, namely the view that mathematical and geometrical 
entities are substances. Finally, on the third suggested reading, lines and surfaces 
mentioned in Met V 8 mean something determinate for they are themselves 
something determinate, since they have features on their own besides the fact that 
they are limits of bodies.25 Pace Alexander, this is not however a position that 
Aristotle would endorse, for, for something to have features on its own does not 
amount ipso facto to being something determinate in the sense of being a Tob£ TI. 
The exegetical suggestions put forward by Alexander have been taken up and 
expanded by modern interpreters: e.g. Ross (1924: I, 310) follows the first reading by 
Alexander and understands that the limits are a sort of individuation principle, 
`marking off individual from individual'. Kirwan (1971: 148) also adopts that 
reading and distinguishes two uses of opi4Iv, one to mean `to bound' and the other to 
mean `to provide a principle of individuation'. On the understanding that what 
Aristotle is saying is that surfaces, qua limits, act as boundaries to physical bodies, 
his point is that two physical bodies are T06-£ TI in case their surfaces are 
discontinuous, and they are discontinuous in case no line is part of both. Kirwan's 
interpretation combines together Alexander's first and third interpretative 
suggestions. 
Another very crucial piece of textual evidence in Met V 8 for addressing the 
question whether the account of substance given is to be taken as genuinely 
Aristotelian or not is to be found at 1017b18 -9: 
of each thing, and the essence of each; for this is the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge, of the 
object also' (1022a8 -9). Alexander's interpretation clashes with Cat 10a11 -16: `A fourth kind of 
quality is shape and the external form of each thing, and in addition straightness and curvedness and 
anything like these. For in virtue of each of these a thing is said to be qualified somehow; because it is 
a triangle or square it is said to be qualified somehow, and because it is straight or curved. And in 
virtue of its form each thing is said to be qualified somehow'. 
25 Alex In Met 374, 9 -11: Àa yci öÈ Tò ó E olipaivEIV TfjV tnI(pávEIav K4Ì TljV ypapp V' npòç yàp 
T(p ntpaTa E vaI Kai (Om TIVe oikEiav o paivciv ÖOKEÌ Kai oùciiay. 
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Ocra N6p1a] joy ávalpouNtvc,ov ávalpEiTal Tò óAov, oiov Énlntrbou Qfopa, 
Coq cpaQi TIVES, Kaì ÉninEbov YpaNNñS' Kai óAc,JS 6 6p16* boKEi ETvai 
riai TOI00T0S (CIVQIpOup£VOu TE Y6p ollb£v EiVQI, KQi nQvTa)' 
[Those parts] by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by 
the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of 
the line [are substances]; and in general number is thought by some to be of 
this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all 
things. 
Let us for the moment focus on the point that certain parts of the bodies, 
namely their limits, are such that eliminating them (by means of 6cpaipEQlç)26 implies 
the elimination of the whole they are parts of. E.g. eliminating the surface of a solid 
implies eliminating the solid, and eliminating the line which is the limit of the surface 
implies eliminating the surface. This is a new principle for substancehood in Met V 
8, which I call Elimination Principle, for it identifies as substance that the elimination 
of which implies the elimination of other things. Aristotle's account is very sketchy, 
and can be read as offering either of these two versions of the elimination principle: 
- Strong elimination principle: substance is that the elimination of which implies 
the elimination of everything else, e.g. numbers are substances; 
- Weak elimination principle: the substance of something is that the elimination of 
which implies the elimination of that thing, e.g. the geometrical entities are 
substances. 
By means of the weak elimination criterion different degrees of substantiality 
can be distinguished and ordered according to different degrees of ontological 
dependence. 
There are in Aristotle's works a few other passages in which the elimination 
criterion is mentioned as a way of identifying what substance is. For instance in the 
Protrepticus (Iamb Protr 6), where the conceptual framework is still quite Platonic, 
Aristotle introduces the following sequence of items ordered according to the 
elimination criterion: numbers, lengths, surfaces, solids. Here too, like in Met V 8, 
1017b20 -1, the first item in the sequence is numbers, presumably because via 
26 The only other occurrence of bvalp>r) with the same meaning is in Met XII 6, 1071a34 -5; see 
Bonitz Index 45b36 -7. It is a very rare use in Aristotle. 
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geometrical dimensions they give determination to every sensible thing. The 
elimination of numbers would imply the elimination of everything. Besides the 
Protrepticus, we find the sequence: units, points, lines, surfaces, bodies, also in Met 
III 5 and VII 2.27 
The elimination principle and the subjecthood principle appear to bear very 
different results in the investigation of what substance is. We need now to address 
the question of how the elimination principle relates to the subjecthood principle. Are 
both principles genuinely Aristotelian? Or is only one of them? Or is neither? 
The subjecthood principle in its application in Met VII 3 leads in the first 
instance to a multiplicity of candidates to be substance (without however clarifying 
which of them is substance in the fullest degree): essence, universal, genus and 
substratum. When applied the first time around, the principle proves to be not fully 
adequate precisely because it does not select a single type of entity as substance, but 
rather entities metaphysically very different. For matter, form and the compound all 
satisfy the condition of being subject of all predications, without being in turn 
predicated of anything else. In its second application later on in the chapter, the 
subjecthood principle leads to matter as that which is substance in the fullest sense. 
For Aristotle, both these results are to be rejected. 
Many contemporary commentators (e.g.; Schofield 1972: 97 -101; Stahl 1981: 
177 -180; Scaltsas 1985: 215 -40) have given a semantic interpretation of the 
application of the subjecthood criterion at 1029a20 -6, but if this interpretation is 
correct the way substance is identified in Met VII 3 would be only a reformulation of 
27 Met II 5, 1001b26-1002a1 I: `A question connected with these is whether numbers and bodies and 
planes and points are substances of a kind, or not. If they are not, it baffles us to say what being is and 
what the substances of things are. For modifications and movements and relations and dispositions and 
ratios do not seem to indicate the substance of anything; for all are predicated of a subject, and none is 
a 'this'. And as to the things which might seem most of all to indicate substance, water and earth and 
fire and air, of which composite bodies consist, heat and cold and the like are modifications of these, 
not substances, and the body which is thus modified alone persists as something real and as a 
substance. But, on the other hand, the body is surely less of a substance than the surface, and the 
surface than the line, and the line than the unit and the point. For the body is bounded by these; and 
they are thought to be capable of existing without body, but body incapable of existing without these. 
This is why, while most of the philosophers and the earlier among them thought that substance and 
being were identical with body, and that all other things were modifications of this, so that the first 
principles of the bodies were the first principles of being, the more recent and those who were held to 
be wiser thought numbers were the first principles. As we said, then, if these are not substance, there is 
no substance and no being at all; for the accidents of these it cannot be right to call beings'. Met VII 2, 
1028b16 -8: `Some think [that substances are] the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are 
substances, and more so than body or the solid.' 
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the very same criterion introduced by Aristotle in Met V 8, 1017b13 -4. I disagree 
with this interpretation, because I see an important discrepancy between Met V 8 and 
VII 3. In Met VII 3 the investigation is on the ultimate subject, i.e. the subject of 
every possible predicate, that of which everything else is predicated. The very idea of 
a subject of which everything else is predicated appears puzzling, and indeed 
Aristotle himself believes that defining substance as ultimate subject is not adequate 
(1029a9: oú yelp iKavòV), for it is not clear (1029a10: Ot1TÒ yelp TOOTO áó ÀOV), 
and furthermore it leads to something profoundly different from the other proper 
subjects, namely it leads matter (1029a10: Kai árTI ÙÀrÌ otiQia y'lyvEral). The 
elcpaipcalç method is at work both in Met V 8 and VII 3, but the results are 
metaphysically very different: in the former the ultimate subject turns out to be 
matter, which is something maximally indeterminate, and in the latter numbers, which 
are something maximally determinate. It seems plausible to explain this discrepancy 
in the following way. Aristotle does not ever endorse the elimination criterion 
propria persona, but only in the Protrepticus, which is an early work of Platonic 
inspiration.28 In Met V 8 Aristotle is reporting an account of substance he received 
from other thinkers, very probably from within Plato's Academy. 
It is well attested that within Plato's Academy the `progression' of dimensions 
(length, width and depth) and their various mutual dependencies, were after Plato one 
of the central topics of discussion, along with the discussion of the metaphysical role 
played by the One and the Diad.29 Some passages of Aristotle's Metaphysics (e.g. 
VII 2, 1028b16 -8; XIV 3, 1090b5 -7) attest that the Platonists discuss what type of 
dependence is illustrated by the sequence: line, surface, solid. Solids are limited by 
surfaces, and surfaces by lines, therefore a surface can exist without a solid, but a 
solid cannot exist without a surface, and a line can exist without a surface but not a 
surface without a line. This asymmetry suggests, for the Academics, that a certain 
ontological complexity corresponds to a certain logical dependency. Metaphysically 
simple entities are metaphysically and logically prior to metaphysically complex 
ones. For Aristotle however this tenet, of Platonic inspiration, does not hold true. 
For him, the equivalence between ontological simplicity and existence per se is not 
28 Furthermore, we do not know enough about the Protrepticus because it has come down to us only in 
a fragmentary state. 
29 In the following Aristotelian reconstruction of the Platonic doctrines I am guided by Annas' 
suggestions (1976: 41 -77). 
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compatible with the hylomorphic analysis of reality he holds (forms e.g. are simple 
but they do not exist if not instantiated). Furthermore, there is a more general 
difficulty with the Platonic view: numbers, which are mathematical entities, and 
magnitudes, which are geometrical entities, cannot be derived from the same 
principles, for the sequence of magnitudes should have as first item the point, and 
there appears to be no way to reach numbers by adopting the same procedure 
whereby the line follows the point, the surface follows the line, the solid follows the 
surface.30 The difficulty just pointed out emerges if one reads together the following 
passages from the Metaphysics (all quoted above): II 5, 1001b26- 1002a11; VII 2, 
1028b16-8 (where Aristotle mentions the sequence: units, points, lines, surfaces, 
bodies); and the third section of V 8 (where each elements is said to be immanent part 
of the following one, see 1017b17: pöpia £vunápXovTà). The idea that the unit is 
the substance of the point as its immanent part seems patently incoherent. One 
cannot make sense of it even in the light of the doctrines which seem to be the most 
akin to it, namely the Pythagoreans' ones. For the Pythagoreans there is a sense in 
which numbers are immanent in the sensible substances, but this should not be taken 
to mean that the unit is metaphysically immanent in the point.3 1 In order to make 
better sense of the position that Aristotle reports, one can take it to claim that the unit 
is prior to the point in the sense that the unit enters in the definition of the point. But 
this consideration only explains the step from the unit to the point, and it does not 
adequately account for the other steps in the sequence, for according to the 
elimination criterion each item is the substance of the one that follows in the 
sequence, and it is not only part of its definition. 
Let us consider another passage in which Aristotle talks about the elimination 
criterion, in Met V 11, 1019a1 -4. There Aristotle distinguishes two senses in which 
something is prior to something else. If x is prior to y ontologically, then (a) the 
elimination of x implies the elimination of y, and (b) the elimination of y does not 
imply the elimination of x. By distinguishing (a) from (b) Aristotle brings to light an 
asymmetry the elimination criterion relies on.32 In the light of this distinction, from 
30 For this point, regarding Speusippus in particular, see Cherniss (1962: 131 -3). 
31 I cannot enter the topic in this context, see e.g. Centrone (1999). 
32 See in Cat 5, 2b5 -6 the principle that determines the distinction of primary substances from their 
accidents, on the basis of the fact that the elimination of substances implies elimination of accidents, 
but not vice versa. 
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Aristotle's point of view those who endorse the elimination principle (in its original 
formulation) run into the difficulty of how to derive the point from the unit, which 
should be the substance of the point, because they conflate and do not distinguish 
between logical priority and ontological priority. Aristotle himself in Met XIII 2, 
1077a36 -b11, mentions that geometrical entities may be ordered according to a 
different degrees of ontological priority, but he denies that these degrees correspond 
to different degrees of substantiality. 
To recapitulate the results of the analysis given so far, the elimination 
criterion, briefly described in Met V 8, is a theoretical acquisition that Aristotle 
attributes to his predecessors, and that, from his own point of view, is inadequate as a 
principle of substancehood, because by this criterion numbers turn out to be 
substances. The analysis of the third section of Met V 8 provides evidence in support 
of the hypothesis that in this chapter Aristotle is reporting, but also to some degree 
modifying, an account of substance held by his predecessors who thought that 
mathematical and geometrical entities are substances, and numbers are what has the 
highest degree of substantiality. Aristotle does not agree with this account, even if 
apparently he has taken it into consideration with interest at least in an earlier stage 
before the central books of the Metaphysics. Evidence for this last point is to be 
found especially in the Protrepticus, but also in Met III 5, 1001b26- 1002a14, where 
the claim that mathematical and geometrical entities are substances is the first branch 
of the aporia XIV.33 
33 Met III 5, 1001b26- 1002a14: `A question connected with these is whether numbers and bodies and 
planes and points are substances of a kind, or not. If they are not, it baffles us to say what being is and 
what the substances of things are...the body which is thus modified alone persists as something real 
and as a substance. But, on the other hand, the body is surely less of a substance than the surface, and 
the surface than the line, and the line than the unit and the point. For the body is bounded by these; and 
they are thought to be capable of existing without body, but body incapable of existing without these. 
This is why, while most of the philosophers and the earlier among them thought that substance and 
being were identical with body...the more recent and those who were held to be wiser thought 
numbers were the first principles'. I follow Ross' way of numbering the aporia (1924: 246 -8). 
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22: 
1.4 Substance is essence 
The fourth account of substance given in Met V 8 is to be found at 1017b21- 
ËTI T0 Ti fly ETVOI, OÚ 6 A6yoç 6piap6S, Kai TOOTO OlÚQÌO AtVETOI 
EKOOTOU. 
The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance 
of each thing. 
The terminology in this passage is typically Aristotelian.34 The identification 
of the essence as the principle of substantiality is attested in many passages of 
Aristotle's works, and in particular in the logical works, especially in the Topics and 
in the Posterior Analytics, but also in the Metaphysics.35 This may already be taken 
as an indication once again that Met V, 8 has a bridging role between different stages 
of Aristotle's investigation. (More arguments in support of this point will follow.) 
Among the ancient commentators, Alexander (In Met 374,37 -375,13) remarks 
that in this account everything that has a definition, hence an essence, would have 
substantiality, even non substances. But this is an unwelcome result for Aristotle. To 
avoid it, Alexander resorts to the distinction between what is substance in the primary 
sense (Kupkkoç) and what is substance only in a qualified sense (0ÚK ánÀ(Ç). What is 
substance in the second account in Met V, 8, 1017b14 -16, is substance in the primary 
sense; it is what makes each of the sensible substances what it is, and it is its form 
(cpuOIKÒV ETb0S). What is substance in the fourth account, at 1017b21 -22, is 
34 Dubois (1998: 143 -4) places much importance on Aristotle's use of the terms T6 Ti 6jv ETVOI and 
6piapóç in this sentence. He holds that the fourth section of Met V 8 is intended to be a recapitulation 
of the two accounts of substance he takes Aristotle to have given in the earlier part of the chapter. 
Hence, he takes T6 Ti rjv ETVOI to express what he calls the `existential' characterisation of substance, 
and ópiopóç what he calls the `essential' characterisatioon of it. This interpretation however has no 
ground in the text. For Dubois' interpretation see also above p. 11. 
35 In the Topics see e.g. I 4, 101b19 -23; 5, 101b38; 8, 103b9 -10. Note that in the passages just quoted 
we find the term 6poç instead of dpiopóç, but this does not make any significant difference to the 
point. See also Bonitz Index 524b45. In the Posterior Analytics see e.g. II 6, 92a6 -10; 11, 94a34 -5. In 
the Metaphysics see e.g. VII 4, 1030a6 -7. 
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substance only in a qualified sense; it is what makes everything, even what is not a 
substance, to have an essence. 
Modern interpreters too comment on the connection between the second and 
the fourth accounts of substance in the chapter, but on the basis of considerations 
different from Alexander's. Bonitz (In Met 243 -4) and Ross (1924: I 310) for 
example note that what is substance in the fourth account satisfies also the previous 
two characterisations of substance in the chapter. In particular, the second and the 
fourth accounts are closely connected. E.g. the soul is mentioned in the second 
account in Met V 8 at 1017b16 as an example of substance qua the cause of being for 
living things. In Met VII 10, 1035b14 -6, the soul is defined as substance as the form 
and essence of living beings.36 Hence, the soul should count as substance also on the 
second and the fourth account of Met V 8. Furthermore, on the model of scientific 
explanation that Aristotle gives in the Posterior Analytic the essence of something, 
which is identified with the form, is said to be the cause of its being: the two accounts 
of substance distinguished in Met V 8 collapse into one in the Analytics. 
36 Met VII 10, 1035b14-6: >rn£ì öÈ Ij Tc7V wc,)V yJuXlj (ToOTo Op oiJQia TOO éNyJbXou) Ij KaTà Tòv 
ÀÒYOV OIJQiO Kai TÒ £ÌÖOg KOÌ TÒ Ti ñV £ÌVaI T(.J TOIGJÓ£ O'Ci)pOTI. 
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2. Aristotle's own conception of substance: Its origins (Categories); Its 
development (Metaphysics V 8); Its refinement (Metaphysics VII 3) 
The main difficulty in interpreting the final part of Met V 8, 1017b23 -26, 
consists in determining whether this section is meant to be a recapitulation and 
generalisation of what Aristotle has said so far (as it seems indicated by the transition 
formula: QUpt3aivEI ó)) or rather a further account of substance: 
QupßaivEl ór) KaTà óúo TpónoUS oúQiav À:ryEQBaI, TÒ 8' 
úIIOKEipEVOV EOxaTOV, Ö pnKtTI KQT' QÀÀOU À£yETQI, Kai Ö äv TÒÖE TI ÖV 
KQÌ X(.t)pIOTÒV TOIOIJTOV ó£ £Kà0T0U pop(pr) KQÌ TÒ £iö0q. 
It follows, then, that 'substance' has two senses, (A) ultimate substratum, 
which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a 
'this', is also separable and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing. 
Interpreters disagree on this issue. Modern commentators divide into two 
groups. Some commentators, like Bonitz (In Met 244), Ross (1924: I 310), Cherniss 
(1962: 364) and more recently Dancy (1975: 96), Polanski (1983: 57 -66) and Graham 
(1987: 216)37 hold that the section currently under examination coherently concludes 
the whole chapter. The reason is that whatever satisfies the final characterisation of 
substance as ultimate subject and is also determinate and separate, satisfies also the 
characterisations of substance given in the previous four accounts. Other 
commentators, e.g. Kirwan (1971: 148 -9) and Irwin (1988: 554 -5), have difficulty in 
seeing a conceptual connection between the first four accounts of substance in the 
chapter and the final characterisation of substance. 
I will first discuss the reasons why the first of the two interpretative 
approaches mentioned is unsatisfactory. I will concentrate on Polanski's 
interpretation, as the most significant representative of the first approach, according 
37 Graham (1987: 216) holds that Aristotle runs through the four accounts in the earlier part of the 
chapter as potential candidates to be substance, follwing the same method of invetstigation as in Met 
VII 3. Hence, there is a strong conceptual link between the earlier part and the final part of the chapter, 
which establishes what is for Aristotle substance. For Graham though Aristotle leaves un- stated some 
of the steps that lead him to the final conclusion, and this is why it is difficult for the interpreter to 
reconstruct Aristotle's reasoning. 
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to which the final section of Met V 8 is a recapitulation of the whole chapter. 
Polanski holds, as many other commentators do, that in the first part of the chapter, 
1017b10 -22 (which corresponds to the four sections I have distinguished so far), 
Aristotle presents accounts of substance given by other thinkers. The position that 
bodies are substances is generally shared in Aristotle's times, as it is also reported in 
several passages in the Metaphysics (e.g. VII 2, 1028b8 -16; VIII 1, 1042a6 -11; XII 1, 
1069a25 -30. Among these passages Polanski finds II 5, 1002a8 -12 (quoted above, p. 
32) the most relevant to V 8. There Aristotle mentions two accounts of substance. 
On the first one, bodies are substances, and everything that has a body is a substance. 
Polanski suggests supporters of this view are to be identified with the Ionian 
philosophers of nature (()U010À0y0i). In the second account, numbers are the 
principle of substantiality for everything. Supporters of this view are to be identified 
with the so called dialecticians in Magna Graecia; these are the Eleatics, the 
Pythagoreans, and the Platonists. For Polanski the first account in Met II 5 
corresponds to the first in V 8, and the second in II 5 to the third in V 8. Hence, from 
Met II 5 he claims we can infer whom the theories in V 8 are to be ascribed to. 
Furthermore, Polanski sees the second account in Met V 8 as the doctrine of 
substance held by those philosophers of nature who take the cause of being of each 
thing to be its nature (cf also Met V 4, 1014b35 -7). Polanski suggests that this 
account is the meeting ground for both philosophers of nature and dialecticians. He 
finds evidence for this suggestion in De An I 2. There Aristotle reports that both the 
philosophers of nature and the dialecticians take the soul to be cause of movement 
and of knowledge, hence to be cause of being of living things. Polanski finds further 
support for this in the order of exposition in Met V 8, where the account of substance 
as cause of being appears in between the account of substance as body by the 
philosophers of nature, and the account of substance as geometric and mathematical 
entity by the Pythagoreans, who are among the dialecticians. However, not only do 
these textual observations by Polanski appear to prove very little with respect to the 
point he makes about the second account of substance in Met V 8, but Polanski also 
fails to show the relevance of his suggestion about the second account in relation to 
the reading of the chapter as a whole. Finally, the fourth account of substance in Met 
V 8 is, for Polanski, to be ascribed to the Platonists, as he finds confirmed by textual 
evidence mainly in Met I 7, 998a34 -b6, in particular 988b4 -5: 
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áÀÀO T0 Ti 6V ErVOI 
ÉKàOTCx) TCWV äÀÀcov Tà an nap>rxovTai. On the basis of the remarks mentioned so 
far, Polanski (1983: 60 -1) proposes as a general interpretation of Met V 8 that 
Aristotle intends there to give a comprehensive, however sketchy, history of the 
metaphysics of substances. In Polanski's view, Aristotle highlights two main 
approaches to the problem of what substance is: the one is driven by the attempt to 
explain change and permanence (see the philosophers of nature), the other by the 
problem of individuation, in a broad sense (see the dialecticians). Within this 
interpretative framework, the final section of Met V 8 appears to be a coherent 
recapitulation of the contents of the whole chapter. In the final section the mention of 
substance as the ultimate substratum recalls the results of the investigations by the 
philosophers of nature (the substratum is what persists), while the mention of 
substance as something determinate and separate and hence maximally individuated, 
recalls the results of the investigations by the so called dialecticians. A careful 
textual analysis of Met V 8 however shows, as we have seen so far, that there is not 
enough support, pace Polanski, for the reading he suggests. 
Is there any other argument beside Polanski's to be given in support of the 
first interpretative approach to the final section of Met V 8? In order to answer the 
question, we need first to clarify what the supporters of that approach intend by 
saying what they do. There are indeed two ways of understanding the claim that the 
final section of the chapter may be a recapitulation of what Aristotle has said before. 
On the one hand, the four accounts of substance in the chapter fall under the final 
description of what substance is in a distributive way, namely what substance is 
according to each of the four accounts falls either under the description of substance 
as ultimate subject or under the description of substance as something determinate 
and separate (but not under both).38 Alternatively, what substance is according to 
each of the four accounts falls under both descriptions of substance given in the final 
section; hence substance is both the ultimate subject and something determinate and 
separate. 
Let us examine whether it is sound to take Aristotle to be saying that of all 
things that are substances according to the four accounts in Met V 8, some are TÒ A' 
ÚnOKEipEVOV ÉaxaTov but they are not TÒÖE TI and XcopIOTÒV, and others are TÒÒE 
38 See Cherniss (1962: 365): `The two meanings of oiJaia as únOKEiIEVOV and as TÓÖE TI and 
XwplOTòv are incompatible'. 
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TI and X(opl0Tòv but they are not T6 e' ÚnOKEipEVOV EOXOTOV. This interpretation 
seems to be ruled out on the ground that nothing is mentioned in the chapter that is 
only IJnOKEipEVOV s'rOXaTOV but not also determinate and separate. Within 
Aristotle's metaphysics matter is what we expect to play the role of ultimate 
substratum, which is neither separate nor determinate, but matter as such is not 
mentioned in Met V 8. In response to this difficulty Bonitz (In Met 244) and Ross 
(1924: I 310), note that the expression T6 e' t1nOKEipEVOV a=rGXaTOV may refer both to 
individual substances and subjects of predication of accidents, and to matter which is 
subject of predication of forms.39 If this is correct, then what is substance on the first 
account falls under the description of T6 O' ÚnOKEipEVOV ËoxaTOV with reference to 
being the subject of predication of accidents, while what is substance in the second, 
third and fourth account falls under the description of TôÖE TI and XcoploTòv. Some 
support for Bonitz's and Ross' interpretation is to be found in Met V 6 (see also 
comments ad locum in chapter 2), where water, which is one of the four elements, 
hence is a substance on the first account in Met V 8, is said to be T6 ËoXOTOV 
únOKEi[JEVOV. But overall it is not clear at all that Aristotle meant to include 
(implicitly) in Met V 8 matter too. 
On the other hand, is it sound to take Aristotle to be saying that what is 
substance in the four accounts in the chapter is both iùnoKEipEvOv ËO(OTOV and 
separate and determinate? The difficulty that this reading faces is that not everything 
mentioned in the chapter as a substance is also T6 e' únOKEipEVOV OXaTOV. 
Various scholars have offered interpretative solutions to this difficulty. For instance, 
among the ancient commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Met 375, 19 -24) 
addresses the question of how physical bodies, which are substance on the first 
account in Met V 8, can be bnOKEiIJEVOV LoxaTOV. In order to solve the difficulty, 
he assumes that every substance is a ünoKEiIEVOV but introduces a criterion for 
distinguishing different degrees for being a ÙnOKEi JEVOV, presumably on the basis of 
the consideration that if there is an ultimate degree (ËOXaTOV) there must also be 
39 The distinction between these two types of ultimate substratum is clearly expressed in Met. IX 7, 
1049a27 -b2, provided that one accepts, following Ross (ad locum) and Jaeger (ad locum), Apelt's 
conjecture at I. 1049a28 cab' oú instead of KaOoÀou which appears in the manuscripts and in Ps -Alex. 
(In Met 583, 26). Other commentators however, e.g. Gill (1989: 155 -161) and Witt (1989: 166), do not 
accept Apelt's conjecture and claim, but without persuasive arguments, that in that context Aristotle is 
distinguishing the substratum from universal, rather than two types of substratum. 
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other degrees lower than it. In Alexander's view, this criterion allows physical bodies 
to be to some degree a ÚnOKEipEVOV, but not an ultimate one. 
Among modern interpreters, Georgiadis (1978: 89 -91) tries to address the 
same difficulty as Alexander by putting forward a different reading of lines 1017b25- 
6. There we find a neuter demonstrative pronoun: TOIOOTOV. According to the most 
natural reading of the text this pronoun refers to substance qua something determinate 
and separate (1017b25: ö 6v TÒÒE TI 6V Kai XwpIOTÒV 6). On this reading, the 
expression TOIOOTOV óÈ ÈKàOTOU rj popcp) Kai TÒ ETòOÇ is epexegetic of the 
formula immediately preceding Ö 6V TOÒE TI 6V Kai XcWpIOTÒVf6. An alternative 
reading however is also possible, as Georgiadis argues. Georgiadis suggests the 
pronoun TOIOOTOV refers to the substance (1017b23: oúaiav), independently from 
any characterisation of it as both ultimate subject and something determinate and 
separate. Georgiadis offers the following translation of the text: 
It follows, then, that substance is said in two ways: 1) that which is both 
(a) the ultimate subject that is no longer predicated of anything else and 
(b) a this and a separable; substance is also 2) the shape of from of each 
thing. 
In Georgiadis' view Aristotle is distinguishing a sense in which substance is 
what plays the role of ultimate subject and is also separate and determinate, and 
another sense in which substance is the form of each thing. This reading is a viable 
alternative, but not a preferable one in my view because it takes the pronoun 
TOIOOTOV as referring to something distant in the order of exposition and also requires 
one to give the particle óÈ a meaning that does not seem to fit the context. Contra 
Georgiadis, the particle óÈ is here to be understood as connective with the value of 
continuity.4o 
Let us now turn to the second interpretation of the last section of Mel V 8, 
namely that this is a recapitulation of the whole chapter, hence whatever is substance 
in one of the previous four accounts is also TÒ A' IJnOKEipEVOV EOXOTOV and TÒÓE TI 
and xwpioTÒv. By this line of interpretation it is difficult to understand how the 
4Ö In support of my reading see Denniston (1996: 169): `öt for yàp, oúv (or 6r1), ñ. ai is not 
infrequently used where the context admits, or even appears to demand, yàp (or occasionally oúv or 
ó l). In such cases the writer is content with merely adding one idea to the other, without stressing the 
logical connection between the two, which he leaves to be supplied'. 
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mathematical and geometrical entities and that which is the cause of being of each 
thing can be a ÙnOKEiIEVOV. Furthermore, this interpretation appears to presuppose 
what Aristotle achieves at a later stage of his investigation on substance. In Met VII 3 
indeed it is clear that being an ultimate subject and being something determinate and 
separate are conditions that something has to jointly satisfy in order to count as 
substance; see e.g. 1029a27 -30: 
KQÌ yàp TÒ X(opIOTÒV KQÌ TÒ TÒó£ TI únQpXEIV óOKEÌ pÒÀIOTa 1 OÚQiQ, 
ólò TÒ EióOq KQi TÒ >rk Qp(POÌv ()Oda óÒaIEV QV ETval NQÀÀOV Tñq ÚÀrIS. 
Both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance. 
And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be 
substance, rather than matter. 
In Met VII 3 being determinate and separate are two criteria for 
substancehood which Aristotle adds to the subjecthood criterion, once the 
subjecthood criterion turns out to be by itself insufficient (see 1029a9). As it appears 
from 1029a27 -8, substance, once correctly identified, is the subject of which 
everything is predicated, but is not itself predicated of anything else; and it is also 
something determinate and separate. But there is an apparent discrepancy between 
Met VII 3 and V 8. For, in the latter Aristotle seems to distinguish - as if they were 
independent from each other - the two main criteria for substantiality, being an 
ultimate subject and being determinate and separate. While in Met VII 3 he presents 
the very same two criteria as jointly necessary for individuating substance. The 
criterion of being the ultimate 6nOKE1pEVOV if applied by itself picks out, as we see in 
Met VII 3, matter as matter -of -the- composites. The criterion of being TA-6,E TI and 
XCWpIOTòv by itself picks out the form, as we see in Met V 8, 1017b25 -6. According 
to which of the two criteria are composites substances? Composites are substances 
in the first account in Met V 8; being composite of matter and form according to the 
final section of Met V 8 they should both count as ultimate subjects of predication 
and as something determinate and separate. The question to address now is this: 
assuming that being separate and determinate are features of the form (see Met V 8, 
1017b25 -6), and that the composites too are separate and determinate, either the 
composites are somehow to be identified with the forms, in the sense that forms are 
38 
particulars,41 or alternatively the composites are something separate and determinate 
in a different sense from the one that applies to the forms. On this second hypothesis, 
the terms TÒbE TI and xclaploTÒv have two meanings that need to be distinguished, 
one adequate to characterise the composite and the other the form. Within Aristotle's 
metaphysics forms are conceptually separable (>+Òyw) from what they are forms of, 
while the composites are conceptually separable, but also separate in fact from other 
things; see e.g. Met VIII 1, 1042a26 -31. Analogously forms are said to be TÒÒE TI 
meaning that they are what is maximally determinate, while TÒÒE TI used for the 
composites has rather a deictic value, and points at the individual. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the last section of Met V 8 in 
relation to the previous part of the chapter, I turn now to the analysis of some other 
relevant passages in Aristotle's works in which we can discern the origin and 
development of the notion of being TÒÓE TI, pivotal in his account of substance. The 
interpretation I will argue for is that the notion of TÒÖE TI, literally `this something', 
is of Platonic origins. In the earliest stage TÒÓE TI for Aristotle is something that can 
bear the predication of opposite qualities (see e.g. Cat 5, 4a10 -36). I claim Aristotle 
learns from Plato that there needs to be something that plays that role: for Plato the 
role is played by the substratum- receptacle, for Aristotle by the TÒoE TI. In my view 
there is continuity between Plato and Aristotle in understanding the need in ontology 
for something that can bear the predication of the contraries. But Aristotle also adds 
to the Platonic notion of substratum the distinction between what belongs to it 
accidentally and what belongs to it essentially. Aristotle refutes by reductio ad 
absurdum the Platonic conception of matter as something that is supposed to be on 
the one hand completely un- determinate, but on the other a substance with some 
determination (`something', TI).42 Aristotle replaces Plato's conception of matter - 
which he finds absurd - with his own: matter is completely un- determinate but for 
this very reason cannot be a proper subject of predication. 
Aristotle connects the notion of TÒbE TI with that of indivisibility. 
Indivisibility is a central notion in Aristotle's characterisation of substances in the 
Categories. As we see in Cat 5, 3b10 -18,43 primary substances are by definition TÒÖE 
41 See Frede -Patzig (1988, 36ff.). 
42Aristotle takes the Platonic substratum to have substantiality; see e.g. Met VII 16, 1031b1 5-8. 
43 Cat 5, 3b10 -18: (1äQ0 bi okria Ó0K£Ì TÓÖ£ TI Oggpaiv£IV. Éni IJ V OÚV TWV npGJTWV oúai v 
ávap(plopflTgTOv Kai C ÀI16r * ÉOTIV ÓTI Tób£ TI OflpaiV£1' 6TOIJOV Op Kai a.V áp16I.4 TÓ 
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TI: they are something indivisible and one, by contrast with the secondary substances, 
which are divisible in the sense of being predicable of a multiplicity of subjects, each 
of which bears the name of the secondary substance that is predicated of it. Aristotle 
at no point in his metaphysical investigation severs the conceptual connection 
between being T0á£ TI and being indivisible. But he does hold, at different times, 
different views regarding the indivisibility of substances. I will attempt to account for 
Aristotle's views by deriving them from the different criteria for divisibility he offers 
in different parts of his works. 
From the analysis of all relevant passages, it appears that Aristotle admits at 
least two criteria of divisibility, the one irreducible to the other, which determine two 
different ways in which something can be indivisible, and therefore T0á£ TI. The first 
criterion for indivisibility, to be found in Cat 5, characterises secondary substances: 
(D.1) Y is divisible iff there is some X such that Y is predicated of X and X receives 
the name `Y'. 
Using this criterion, secondary substances are divisible, but primary substances are 
not. What is indivisible according to criterion (D.1) cannot however be taken ipso 
facto as Tóó£ TI. In particular from Cat 2, 1 b 6 -9, we learn that there are non - 
substantial entities that are indivisible and one in number, and not predicated of 
anything else, and yet they can be in more than one subject: 
ànÀwS áÈ Tà C1TOpa Kai ÉV 00aw KaT' oü£vòS 6noK£IpÉV0u À£yETaI, tv 
ÚnOK£Ip£V(x) áÈ >rVla °Úáb KWÀIJ£I dVQI ñ YQP TIS ypappaTIKf) TerV V 
, , , 
UnOK£I!£V(x) £oTIV. 
Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not 
said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in 
öfAoùpEVàv tOTIV. Énì 15i TEA, ÒEUTa pWV oÚGI& V cpaivETal Nrry 6poiWS TcT) OXrjpaTi Tfiq 
npoarlyopiaç TWE TI anpaívEIV, ÓTaV grin âvGpwnov i;Cilov OÚ pi v áÀn6£S yE, áÀÀà pöÀÀov 
noràv TI anpaivEI, -oú yàp Ëv ÉOTI T6 únoKEiIIEVOV carnEp rj npwTf oúaia, áÀÀà KaT6 noAÀc7.v 
à ávüpu noç MyETal Kaì T6 (wov `Every subsatcne seems to signify a certain `this'. As regards the 
primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain `this'; for the thing 
revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears 
from the form of the name - when one speaks of man or animal - that a secondary substance likewise 
signifies a certain `this', this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject 
is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things'. 
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a subject - the individual knowledge -of- grammar is one of the things in a 
subj ect.44 
In order to accommodate this point and to restrict indivisibility to substances 
only, the previous divisibility criterion needs refinement, as follows: 
(D.1.1) Y is divisible iff either there is some item X such that Y is said of X and X 
receives the name `Y', or alternatively Y is in X and X receives a name derived from 
Y. 
In other contexts Aristotle offers also a different way of expressing the very 
same conception of divisibility, with no reference to the Categories distinction 
between `being said of and `being in'. In his later works the distinction between 
these predicative relations is much less prominent; everything that can be predicated 
of something else is regarded as divisible; indivisibility is what distinguishes the 
universals from their proper subjects, i.e. the particular substances (see e.g. Post Anal 
I 22). (D.1.1) may then be reformulated thus to reflect Aristotle's use of a different 
terminology: 
(D.1.2) Y is divisible if there exists some X such that Y belongs (ilnápxEI) to X and 
X bears Y's name. 
By contrast, in the central books of the Metaphysics the hylomorphic analysis 
of substance and in particular the investigation of the ontological status of the forms 
brings about a radical change in the way Aristotle conceives indivisibility. The forms 
now are what is called indivisible and one.45 The new criterion can be formulated 
thus: 
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I will not discuss here in detail the interpretative issues that concern the passage in Cat 2 on which I 
base my formulation of (D.1.1). I read the passage following Owen (1965: 96 -105). I assume that 
indivisible is what cannot be further divided in species, and nevertheless may be in many things. My 
argument holds even if one takes the alternative interpretation of the passage suggested for instance by 
Ackrill (1963: 74 -6). If one follows Ackrill's interpretation, indivisible is what `is in' a single subject, 
as an universal which is instantiated in a unique individual. On Ackrill's reading of the passage, my 
claim may be reformulated thus: a secondary substance divisible according to (D.1) does not cease to 
be divisible even if there is only a single thing that falls under it, and a non -substantial entity divisible 
according to (D.1.1) does not cease to be divisible even if there is only one single thing it is in. 
45 See e.g. Met VII 8, 1034a5 -8; 10, 1035a30 -1, but also 10 -12 passim. 
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(IND.2) A substantial form X is indivisible if there is no principle of division intrinsic 
to X such as to allow X to have subordinate forms which are still called `X'. 
The notion of indivisibility expressed by the criterion (IND.2) derives from 
the procedure of diairetic definitions. According to this procedure the higher genera 
are divided in lower, or subordinate, genera on the basis of intrinsic principles of 
division until the indivisible species are reached.46 In the context of the Analytics and 
of other logical works, the criterion (IND.2) is employed to identify the ultimate 
species, while in the Metaphysics to identify the substantial forms, as we see for 
instance in Met VII 8, 1034a5 -8 and X 9, 1058b8 -10. 
To recapitulate, there appear to be two main conceptions of 
divisibility /indivisibility at work in Aristotle's works: (D.1.1) and (D.1.2), which I 
take as a single criterion formulated in two different ways, and (D.2). These criteria 
express respectively Aristotle's views at different stages of his investigation, in an 
early stage before the central books of the Metaphysics were written, and in the stage 
corresponding to the central books of the Metaphysics. The two criteria are not 
reducible one to the other; but do they contradict one another? Prima facie it seems 
so. For, on the basis of the first one, formulated as (D.1.2), every form is divisible, 
for it is predicated of other entities, whether substantial entities or not, which retain 
the name of that form. By contrast, on the basis of the second criterion (IND.2), every 
form is indivisible, because it does not admit subordinate forms which have the same 
name as the higher form. For Aristotle though the case of forms generates no 
contradiction between the two criteria. For, for him forms are not predicated of 
anything. The relation of predication (belonging) between the form and the matter of 
the composite is sui generis. For, the form, when predicated of the matter, modifies 
ontologically the subject of which it is predicated. It modifies it by re- identifying it, 
by changing the matter it is predicated of into matter- of- something.47 
It is clear from the previous analysis that different accounts of indivisibility 
are to be found in Aristotle's metaphysics; hence it is reasonable to expect that there 
are also different accounts of what it is to be TÓÖE TI, given the intimate connection 
between these two concepts. On one account the 11nOKEiIJEVOV is TOÒE TI, but not 
46 Because of space limits, I cannot expand on this topic here. I mention only the relevant texts in 
which Aristotle describes the procedure: Post Anal II, in particular chapter 13, and also Met VII 13. 
4' Within the limits of the present work, I can only mention this point without being able to expand on 
it. 
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everything that is a TOÓE TI is ipso facto a ÙnOKEipEVOV. Being a ÚnOKEÌNEVOV and 
being TObE TI are co- extensive only when the únOKEipEVOV is a subject of predication 
such that it receives the predication of the form (with the qualification given above) 
and it takes its name from the predicated form, and nothing else receives that 
predication and takes its name from it. The primary substances of the Categories for 
instance fall under this description. So, on this account, the ùnOKEiIJEVOV is 
something determinate (a subject) and hence a TÒÒE TI (see e.g. GC 13, 318b14 -18; 
Met VII 8, 1033b21 -4). But on another account the únOKEipEVOv is a substratum, 
hence un- determinate and not a TOÖE TI (see e.g. Phys I 7, 191a8 -14, De Caelo III 8, 
306b16-20). 
The coexistence, within Aristotle's metaphysics, of these two ways of 
conceiving the ÚnoKEipEVOV, as something un- determinate or determinate, provides 
some evidence in support of the hypothesis of the continuity between Aristotle's and 
Plato's thought on this issue. In the Timaeus, in the very well -known passage in 
which he introduces the receptacle, 49D -51B, Plato makes some conceptual 
distinctions that acquire particular importance from Aristotle's point of view. I 
cannot examine here the specific interpretative issues concerning that passage, nor the 
question of the receptacle. What is relevant to the Aristotelian questions at issue here 
is Plato's position concerning the use of expressions TOOTO and 166E on the one 
hand, and TOIOOTOV on the other. For Plato, the individual sensible realities, which 
are subject to constant becoming, are to be called `of a certain quality' (T0I011T0v) 
provided that they keep constant at least certain features in their becoming, but not 
`this' (TOOTO and T65E), because they are now one thing and then another (now 
TOGTO then äÚÀ0). Only the ÙnOKEiIEVOV of these individual realities can be 
properly said `this' (TOOT° and T6òE), because it always remains what it is. The 
example Plato offers to illustrate his conception of ÙnoKEIIJEVOV shows us that it does 
have a determinate nature: 
Now imagine that a man were to model all possible figures out of gold, and 
were then to proceed without cessation to remodel each of these into every 
other, then, if someone were to point to one of the figures and ask what it is, 
by far the safest reply, in point of truth, would be that it is gold; but as for the 
triangle and all the other figures which were formed in it, one should never 
describe them as "being" seeing that they change even while one is 
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mentioning them; rather one should be content if the figure admits of even the 
title "suchlike" (T01ofTov) being applied to it with any safety. 
The contraposition between `being something' and `being a qualitative 
determination' that Plato highlights in the passage above subsequently becomes an 
acquisition of Aristotle's metaphysics too. From Aristotle's point of view it is 
problematic to explain how the substratum can be something determinate (with its 
own characteristics that make it into a TÒbE Ti) and at the same time be what it is in 
virtue of something that is purely qualitative, namely the form (which, being purely 
qualitative, seems not to contribute to the ontological status of the substratum). In the 
Categories Aristotle solves this difficulty be saying that the primary substances are 
what they are, namely TÒoE TI, in virtue of the secondary substances. And secondary 
substances are not strictly speaking mere qualities. When a secondary substance is 
predicated of a primary one, this means that the primary substance not only possesses 
a certain quality, but is also of a certain type, and the type is determined by the 
universal which is predicated directly of the individual.4S Hence, already in the 
Categories Aristotle has available the conceptual tools that allow him to make use in 
his own theory of distinctions of Platonic origin, but without the inconsistencies that 
he finds in Plato. The interpretation I am suggesting may seem prima facie difficult 
to square with Met VII 8, 1033b19 -26, where Aristotle claims that the forms `sphere' 
and `house' are not `something determinate' (1033b22: TÒÖE 61 KOÌ c.bpIOptvOV OÚK 
ËOTIv) but rather express only a qualitative determination (1033b21 -22: TÒ TOIÓVÖE 
QripaiVE1).49 Hence the difficulty Aristotle finds with Plato's theory seems to affect 
his own too: some things have the ontological status of being TÔÖE TI in virtue of a 
purely qualitative characterisation. But a close examination of the passage in Met VII 
48 Secondary substances are predicated directly of the primary substances without the mediation of any 
other determination, but only, at most, of some aspect of the primary substance that takes the role of 
being the subject of predication. For example, the universal `white' is predicated of the individual 
body by being predicated of its surface, which is part of the body itself. See Cat 5, 3b13 -21. 
49 
See Met VII 8, 1033b19 -26: nóTEpov OúV LOTI TIç acpaipa napà Táaö£ ñ oiKia napà Tàç 
nXiveouç; rj o6451 6V nOT£ ÉyiyvETO, EI oúTwç jv, T66E TI, ÓÀÀa TÒ TOIovoE OrlpaiVEI, TÓÓ£ tit Kai 
ci)pIalJÉvov O1'.1K LOTIV, áÀÀò n01£Ì Kai yEWQ ÉK TOME TolovoE, Kai 6TOv yEWrje¡j, LOTI TÓÓE 
TOIÓVÓE; TÒ ÓÈ Ónav TÓÓ£, KaÀÀiaç fj Eu)KpáTgç, ÉariV wafEp acpaipa rl XaAKrj rjöi, ó Ó' 
6v8pu noç Kai TÒ 4T)ov wan£p acpaipa XaÀKrj 6Àcùç. 
'Is there, then, a sphere apart from the individual spheres or a house apart from the bricks? Rather we 
may say that no 'this' would ever have been coming to be, if this had been so, but that the 'form' means 
the 'such', and is not a 'this' -a definite thing; but the artist makes, or the father begets, a 'such' out of a 
'this'; and when it has been begotten, it is a 'this such'. And the whole 'this', Callias or Socrates, is 
analogous to 'this brazen sphere', but man and animal to 'brazen sphere' in general'. 
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8 shows that the forms mentioned there are Platonic Ideas, not Aristotelian substantial 
forms. Aristotle's argument in that context aims to show that the Forms are not 
individual things, contrary to what Plato holds, but universals. Forms qua universals 
have a classificatory function to perform, in so far as they express the belonging of 
what is generated to the very same species of the generatos (1033b22 -3: noic Kai 
YEVVQ £K TOME TOIOVÒE); what is generated is an individual of a certain type 
(1033b23 -4: ÖTav YEwrierl goT1 TObE TOIOVÒE).50 In this respect there is full 
convergence between what Aristotle says in Met VII 8 and in the Categories, for 
universals are predicated directly of the individual subjects and the predication 
expresses the fact that those individuals are of a certain kind; universals in Met VII 8 
are assigned a function analogous to the one of the secondary substances in the 
Categories. 
In conclusion, the expression TOÖE TI appears to be used by Aristotle at least 
in two different ways: on the one hand it refers to what is maximally determinate 
because it cannot be further divided, and on the other to what plays the role of 
ultimate subject of predication. In the stage of Aristotle's investigation that 
corresponds to the Categories the two meanings of the expression TÒÓE TI are not yet 
distinguished, for the primary substances are both the ultimate subjects of predication, 
and indivisible, hence maximally determinate. In a later stage, once Aristotle comes 
to recognise the fundamental metaphsyical role of matter and analyses substances in 
hylomorphic terms, the two meanings of the expression TOÓE TI come apart. The 
prevailing meaning in the later stage of Aristotle's metaphysical investigation is the 
meaning according to which TO&E TI is what is maximally determinate. In this later 
stage also, as we have seen, the indivisibility criterion (D.1.1) which focuses on the 
relation of predication and belonging between the substance and everything else, is 
substituted by (IND.2) which focuses on the ontological status of forms. The 
conceptual enrichment of what it means to be a TObE TI is parallel to the development 
of Aristotle's investigation on substance. In this respect, the very last section in Met V 
8 belongs to a very Aristotelian context of investigation, and is to be located, 
conceptually, after the Categories. For, Aristotle in Met V 8 has already drawn the 
distinction between being an ultimate subject and being something separate and 
50 On this interpretation, the pronoun TÓÖE refers in one case to the material substratum from which 
something is generated (ÉK TOl1ÖE) and in the other to the generated individual (TÓbE ToIÓvbE). 
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determinate. With regard to the four accounts of substance introduced in the first part 
of Met V 8, the last part of the chapter is not in my view a recapitulation of what 
Aristotle had said before, but rather a further development, a fifth account of 
substance: the genuinely Aristotelian account, which comes last in the order of 
exposition (and also in a possible reconstruction of a history of ideas, cf. 1017b23: 
O'uP(3aivEl órß) after the exposition of the received opinions that Aristotle inherits 
from his predecessors. The final section of Met V 8 points to, but does not offer yet, 
the metaphysical solutions of the central books of the Metaphysics. The interpretative 
difficulties it presents depend on its being at the same time the conclusion of the 
status questionis on results already achieved by Aristotle's predecessors, and the 
proposal of new theoretical achievements by Aristotle himself still to be fully 
developed. 
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Chapter 2: The Analysis of the Puzzle (I): The Number of an Entity 
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Introduction 
Met V 6 is traditionally regarded as having four parts, of unequal length, 
which begin respectively at 1015b16; 1016b6; 1016b17; 1017a3. 
The first part (1015b16- 1016b6) has two sections, the first devoted to `being 
one per accidens' (1015b16 -36), and the second to `being one per se' (1015b36- 
1016b6). What it means to be `one per accidens' is investigated in relation to 
particulars (1015b16 -27), and in relation to universals (1015b27 -36). On the other 
hand, what it means to be `one per se' is investigated in relation to what makes two 
(or more) things into one: i) physical continuity, whether natural or man -made 
(1015b34- 1016a17); ii) oneness in substratum, which Aristotle describes in terms of 
either identity of the material substratum (101617 -25) or identity of the genus 
(1016a25 -32); iii) indivisibility in notion (1016a32 -b23). 
The second part of the chapter (1016b6 -17) is rather brief, and is in fact 
merely a recapitulation of some of points Aristotle has made in the first part. 
The third part (1016b17- 1017a3) introduces the notion of `one' as numerical 
unit. This part has two sections: the first one (1016b17 -31) accounts for `being one' 
as being a unit for measurement and hence as being a principle for counting and 
ultimately for knowing; the second section (1016b31- 1017a3) mentions four different 
types of unity: i) oneness in number, ii) oneness in species, iii) oneness in genus, iv) 
oneness by analogy. 
The fourth part (1017a3 -6) is very brief and just lists three meanings for the 
term `many', defined by contrast with the three of the meanings given above for 
`being one per se'. 
What neatly divides the chapter into two main parts is the approach Aristotle 
uses in each of them for his investigation: in the first part he is concerned with things 
that are in various ways one, while in the second he seeks a definition of what it is to 
be one. This interpretative suggestion finds support in Met X 1 (a text with apparent 
parallelisms with V 6), where Aristotle himself makes the following methodological 
remark at 1052b1 -9: 
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b£i È KaTavo£iv öTI oilX ci)QaiITWç AnnTtov Ay£QBaI noià TE V Asry£TaI, 
KOi Ti ÉOTI Tà >vi £iV01 Kai Tiç allTOlJ Aóyoç. A:ry£TaI N>rv yàp Tò V 
TOQOUTOXWç, Kai ËKaOTOV ËOTOI ÉV TO6TWV, G7,J C1V lJnàpXn TIç TOIJTWV 
TCi)V TpOnWV' T0 b> £Vi £rval en- È IAN/ Tol1TWV TIVÌ £OTOI, bar ÖAA(x) Ô 
Kai paAAOV :ryyÚç TC-o ÓV01JaTi ÉOTI, Tñ bUVàp£I b' ÉK£IVa, c;:)Qn£p Kai n£pì 
OTOIX£i0U Kai aiTioU Ei 15:r01 A>ry£IV tni TE TOÌç npàypaQl 610pifÿ0VTa Kai 
TOO óvópaTOç ópov ànoblbóvra. 
But it must be observed that the questions, what sort of things are said to be 
one, and what it is to be one and what is the definition of it, should not be 
assumed to be the same. 'One' has all these meanings, and each of the things to 
which one of these kinds of unity belongs will be one; but 'to be one' will 
sometimes mean being one of these things, and sometimes being something 
else which is even nearer to the meaning of the word 'one' while these other 
things approximate to its application. This is also true of 'element' or 'cause', if 
one had both to specify the things of which it is predicable and to render the 
definition of the word. 
In the passage just quoted Aristotle explicitly distinguishes two methods of 
enquiry: the one consists in identifying those things in the world that fall under a 
certain concept, the other in giving a definition of the concept under investigation. 
The examples of concepts to which these two methods can be applied are: `one', 
`element', `cause'. Hence, it is sound to hold that in Met V 6 Aristotle is precisely 
following the course of enquiry described in X 1, and that different methods of 
investigation characterise the two parts of V 6, 1015b16- 1016b17 and 1016b17- 
1017a6 respectively. 
Modern commentators, e.g. Bonitz (In Met 233 -9), Ross (1924: I 300 -5), 
Kirwan (1971: 133 -40), and Dubois (1998: 57 -63) agree on the difference just 
mentioned between the first and the second part of Met V 6. By contrast, those who 
want to defend the internal cohesion of the chapter as a whole, e.g. in the middle 
Ages Aquinas, do not acknowledge this methodological difference and see the trait 
d'union in the conceptual distinction between `being one per se' and `being one per 
accidens'. So much so that for instance Aquinas in his commentary explains all the 
various meanings offered in the chapter for the terms `one' and `many' by reference 
to `being one per se'. Furthermore, Aquinas, in whose reading Aristotle gives in the 
49 
chapter two different series of meanings for `being one per se', suggests a 
philosophical justification for that, always in an attempt to give the most unifying 
reading of the text.5 t Aquinas' reasoning goes as follows: Aristotle has to consider 
first what we could call the factual conditions for something to be `one per se' (where 
by factual conditions I mean the concrete situations in which things appear in fact to 
be in their own right one) and then what we could call the logical conditions for 
something to be `one per se' (which follow from the definition of `one' as principle 
for counting, at 1016b18ff).52 
Such an interpretative approach, which aims to highlight the coherence and 
the argumentative links between different passages of the Aristotelian text, is 
characteristic of scholars in the middle Ages and well exemplified by Aquinas, and in 
a later stage of the history of the exegetical tradition becomes the established method 
of exegesis. For example Paul of Venice in the early XVh century in his commentary 
reconstructs Aristotle's chapter in the most systematic way. Already from the divisio 
textus we see that Paul of Venice is less committed than Aquinas to respecting the 
original structure of the text, and presents it as a series of philosophical points that are 
meant to exhaustively account for the notion of oneness: i) the distinction between 
`being one per accidens' and `being one per se' (see 1015b16ff.); ii) five meanings of 
`being one per se' (see 1015b36ff.); iii) the distinction between an improper and a 
proper sense of `being one' (1016b9ff); iv) unity by continuity or by achievement of 
perfect realisation (see 1016b11ff.); v) the distinction between an absolute and a 
relative sense of `being one' (see 1016b17ff.); vi) other four meanings of `being one 
per se' (1016b3 l ff.). 53 
51 Aquinas' reading however goes against the natural way of taking the text at 1016b31- 1017b3, 
according to which Aristotle does not introduce a second list of meaning of `being one per se', but 
rather different ways of counting. 
52 For Aquinas there are two moments to be distinguished in the investigation of the factual conditions: 
an analytic and a synthetic one, whereby first Aristotle distinguishes five meanings of `being one per 
se' (see 1015b36ff.), and then reduces them to a single notion, namely indivisibility (see 1016b3ff.). 
Aquinas finds in Aristotle's text the following five criteria for something to be one per se: i) natura 
continua, ii) subiectum totum indifferens forma secundum specie, iii) unume genus, divisum in 
opposites derentiis, iv) definition unius indivisa a definitione alterius, v) intellectus intelligens 
quidditatem omnino indivisibilis. See In Met V, 1.7 [848] p. 230, and I. 8 [866] pp. 234 -5. It is 
interesting to note that Aquinas, and Paul of Venice after him, considers uniqueness of material 
substratum and uniqueness of genus on the one hand, and uniqueness in definition and in intellection 
on the other hand as different principles that explain how different things are made into one. The same 
distinction is made also by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary (In Met 366, 25ff). 
53 Respectively: In Met f. 6Orb M, 172va Pv; f. 64ra M, 176ra Pv, f. 64va M, 176vb Pv, f. 64vb M, 
177ra Pv, ff. 6Orb -67va M, 172va -179rb Pv. 
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1. Accidental Oneness 
In the first section of Met V 6 (1015b16- 1016b6) Aristotle distinguishes items 
that are one per accidens from items that are one per se. I will first offer an account 
of the former ones, namely the accidental composites, and attempt to give an the 
explanation of what it means for these beings to be one. 
The section 1015b17 -36 contains two sub -sections. This is confirmed, at the 
linguistic level, also by the presence of a weakly adversative formula for the 
transition from one sub -section to the other (1015b23 -4: 0poicoq ó TpÒfOV Tlvà), 
noted already by the ancient commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Met 362, 
31 -3) and Asclepius (In Met 313, 35 -6). Aristotle first discusses what sense of being 
`one per accidens' applies to accidental composites such as `artistic Coriscus' (which 
is a composite of a substance and an attribute), and `artistic and just Coriscus' (which 
is a composite of one substance and two attributes). Then, he focuses on what sense 
of being `one per accidens' applies to two or more distinct items which make up a 
single Coriscus' and `Coriscus' (where one items is 
contained within the other), and `artistic Coriscus' and `just Coriscus' (where one 
item largely overlap with the other). 
At 1015b20 there is a divergence between the text edited by Ross and the one 
edited by Jaeger. Ross, following Alexander's commentary (In Met 362, 18) and in 
view of 1015b26, but without support from the manuscripts' tradition, adds 
<KopioKoç> after pouaiKÒS, so that the second example offered by Aristotle is: the 
artistic and the just are `one per accidens' respectively with artistic Coriscus and just 
Coriscus.54 By contrast, Jaeger does not print <KopicKoç> after IJOUQIKÒÇ, hence 
the second example given by Aristotle reads: the artistic and the just are `one per 
accidens' with artistic and just Coriscus.55 This textual point is relevant for the 
interpretation one gives to the whole section of Met V 6 we are considering. For, if 
one accepts Ross' reading, one can still hold that Aristotle is exploring in two ways 
the notion of accidental unity, but the two ways are not kept distinct in the examples 
54 Reale (1997: 205) translates the text adopting this reading, and so have recently done two French 
commentators: Duminil -Jaulin (1991: 40 -1) and Dubois (1998: 53). 
55 Kirwan translates the text without Ross' addition (1971: 35). 
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that Aristotle gives. In fact on this reading Aristotle (oddly) alternates examples of 
monadic unity with examples of dyadic unity. This observation has been made also 
by Kirwan (1971: 134) and White (1971: 177 -97 and 1986: 475 -94), who complain 
that Aristotle does not actually group in a clear way his examples here.56 
To clarify the terms of the discussion, and shed light on the exegetical problems 
we are addressing, let us turn to the origin (at least in terms of a conventional point of 
reference) of the distinction between the oneness that characterises a single entity 
with an intrinsic complex structure (monadic unity) and the oneness that applies to 
two or more distinct entities related in some way to each other (dyadic unity). These 
distinctions were first introduced in the course of the debate on the principle of 
individuation that took place in the first half of 1950's between Lukasiewicz, 
Anscombe and Popper (1953: 69 -120). The debate is devoted to general philosophical 
questions, and only Lukasiewicz and Anscombe can be taken as directly contributing 
to Aristotelian scholarship; however various philosophical insights put forward in that 
debate have been employed by Aristotelian scholars for achieving a philosophically 
deeper understanding of Aristotle's texts. 
The expression `principle of individuation', that as Popper notes has no 
equivalent in Aristotle's philosophical jargon but rather comes from the medieval 
interpreters of Aristotle,57 refers to that in virtue of which a certain thing is what it is 
by being one and identical to itself and at the same time different from everything 
else apart from itself. Lukasiewicz argues the principle of individuation is the form, 
and cannot be matter. Matter is totally un- determinate (according to the well known 
and much debated definition by Aristotle in Met VII 3, 1019a20 -6).58 Hence, matter 
cannot be what distinguishes one individual thing from another by making it identical 
to itself and different from any other thing. Furthermore, even if one grants that 
matter can explain the identity in time of an individual thing, this cannot be true over 
56 White argues that Aristotle is not able to keep conceptually distinct the different senses of the 
expression `X and Y are one', and also merges together the notions of unity and identity in time. For a 
discussion of White's criticism of Aristotle, see Miller (1973: 483 -90) and Matthews (1982: 231). 
57 E.g. Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles lib. II c. XLIX. 
58 Met VII 3, 1019a20 -26: `By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a 
certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. For there is 
something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the 
predicates (for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, while substance is 
predicated of matter). Therefore the ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a 
particular quantity nor otherwise positively characterized; nor yet is it the negations of these, for 
negations also will belong to it only by accident'. 
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time, for the matter that constitutes a concrete individual is subject to change over 
time.59 Contra Lukasiewicz, for Anscombe it is the matter, and not the form, that is 
for Aristotle the principle of individuation, for matter distinguishes the individuals 
belonging to the same species, as we learn from many passages, e.g. Met VII 8.60 
Anscombe expresses the majority view among the commentators.61 Popper on his 
part sees in Lukasiewicz and Anscombe two different and complementary approaches 
to the investigation of what is the principle of individuation. For Lukasiewicz the 
principle of individuation is the principle in virtue of which any given individual is 
something which is one (although it may be a complex intrinsic structure, and be 
composed of different parts). For Anscombe on the other hand the principle of 
individuation is the principle in virtue of which two or more individuals - each of 
which is one and identical to itself - are distinct from each other.62 In the first case 
the emphasis is on the structure of the single individual, and on the unity of the 
multiplicity of parts which constitute the individual. In the second case, the emphasis 
is on the mutual relations (identity and difference) between a multiplicity of 
individuals which share the same form. For Popper both matter and form play the 
59 Lukasiewicz's position has been recently discussed by Charlton (1994: 50). See also note 61. 
60 Met VII 8, 1034a5 -8: `And when we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these 
bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), 
but the same in form; for their form is indivisible'. 
61 Anscombe's position has been recently supported with new arguments by Gill (1994: 55 -71). Gill 
reckons the difficulties that every attempt of identifying the principle of individuation either with form 
or with matter leaves unresolved. `So the dilemma is this: either the account of particularity is 
explanatory but applies to all particulars indifferently without illuminating their difference, or the 
account differentiates the particulars but is not explanatory, because it presupposes the very thing that 
it meant to explain' (59). Gill herself holds what she calls a weak individuation thesis, which 
corresponds to the second horn of the dilemma she outlines. Namely, she takes Aristotle to have 
chosen, somehow arbitrarily, matter as principle of individuation of everything else, along the lines of 
what he says in Met VII 8, 1034a5 -8 and V 6, 1016b31 -5. But she also takes Aristotle to be aware of 
the partial inadequacy of this choice, as he indicates for instance in Phys V 4. In fact, for Gill Aristotle 
tends to use different principles of individuation according to the context of investigation: at times 
discontinuity of matter, at times the form, at times spatio -temporal location etc. This is what explains 
the seeming inconsistency of the textual evidence. Against this interpretation, and in support of the 
thesis that form is the principle of individuation of substance, is Charlton (1994: 45 -50), who writes: 
`Those who think we derive our identity from our matter mostly think this is Aristotelian doctrine. I 
have argued that this is not stated in the passages usually invocated, such as 1016b31 -33 and I034a5- 
8...Matter is not ToÖE TI, not `this something' (implied at Met VII, 1029a27 -30), or at least not in itself 
(De An II, 412a7) or in actuality (Met VIII, 1042a27- 8)...A mere quantity of matter, whether ordinary 
or prime, has not enough unity to play the role of that form from which a substance derives its 
identity'. 
62 Here is how Popper (1953: 100 -1) formulates the two questions that the principle of individuation is 
supposed to answer, for Lukasiewicz and Anscombe respectively: `How is it that any one individual, 
although `composite', i.e. consisting of many parts is a unity rather than a plurality?...How is that two 
or more individuals (even if qualitatively indistinguishable) can be counted - each counting exactly as 
one - and therefore be distinguished ?'. 
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role of the principle of individuation, in different respects: the form by guaranteeing 
the unity and self -identity of the individual, the matter by making each individual 
different from the others. The form is the principle that unifies many parts into a 
single whole for the constitution of a single individual, while matter is the principle 
that allows one to distinguish many individuals that are qualitatively the same. 
In the light of these conceptual distinctions, we are in the position to say that 
Met V 6, and in particular the first section 1015b17 -36, Aristotle follows two lines of 
investigation. The composite resulting from a substance and its accident is first 
examined from the point of view of the resulting whole and its intrinsic structure, and 
afterwards from the point of view of its constituents. Following the first line, 
Aristotle is interested, from the point of view of ontology in what is the principle of 
individuation of accidental composites, and from the point of view of language in 
what is the monadic use of the predicate `being one per accidens'. Following the 
second line, he is interested, from the point of view of ontology in what is the 
principle in virtue of which two or more items they are accidentally identica1,63 and 
from the point of view of language in whether there is a count name that applies to 
them together. 
By contrast with the interpretation I am suggesting along the lines of Popper's 
remarks on the principle of individuation, other modern commentators, e.g. White 
and Kirwan in the early Seventies, find precisely in this section of Met V 6 reasons 
for claiming that Aristotle is not able to keep clearly distinct the question of the 
intrinsic unity of a single item from the question of the identity between numerically 
distinct items.64 In his interpretation White explains Aristotle's confusion between 
the monadic and the dyadic use of the predicate `being one per accidens' as due to the 
ambiguity of all sentences of the form `X and Y are one' (occurring e.g. at 1015b17- 
63 Cp Met V 9, 1017b27- 1018a4 and commentary ad locum. 
64 White (1986: 184 -7): `Aristotle doesn't mark the contrast, but it is initially tempting to say that...we 
can distinguish between a one -place use and a two- (or more -) place use... When we look more closely, 
we see that it is not very sharp at all in his examples...There are some signs, then, that Aristotle is not 
keeping separate the use of ̀ X and Y are one' to mean that they are in some way identical from its use 
to say that they make up an unitary entity.' Kirwan (1971: 113 -5): It appears at first as if the 
discussion of coincidental unity deals with type 2 questions [sc. questions of the form `what are the 
conditions under which x and y are one and the same thing, and not different things ?']: for e.g. 
`Coriscus' and `the artistic' can be used as designation of the same thing, and Aristotle actually slips 
into talking of sameness at b27. But the appearance is misleading. b23 says that the artistic and 
Coriscus are one `because one coincides in the other'; these items, then, are regarded by Aristotle as 
different things, whose relationship of coinciding combines them into a kind of unity.' 
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18 and 19 -20), which may mean `X is (in some respect) identical to Y' but also `X 
and Y together constitute something of a certain kind'.65 
White (1986: 189 -97) reconstructs a broader framework for the questions about 
unity that Aristotle addresses in Met V 6, which he sees as part of Aristotle's response 
to Plato's position on the identity through time of the Ideas. For White the question 
Aristotle wants to address is this: Given any item X (whether it is universal or 
particular) taken into consideration in two different moments in time ti and t2, what is 
the principle in virtue of which X at ti and X at t2 are identical? In modern terms the 
question may be formulated also thus: are X at ti and X at t2, taken as segments of a 
spatio -temporal continuum, parts of the same continuum or not? If we express 
Aristotle's position in response to this question using the same modern terminology 
and concepts, it amounts to saying that X at ti and X at t2 are two different things, for 
they are different segments of the spatio- temporal continuum, and yet they are in a 
sense the same thing, qua parts (segments) of the very same spatio- temporal 
continuum, which is itself one. White finds what Aristotle says about identity in Met 
V 6 sound if applied to the issue of identity through time of substances, but 
inadequate to explain whether, given an entity X at time t seen from two different 
viewpoints vi and v2, X(vi) and X(v2) are the same thing or not. 
By contrast, Code claims that Aristotle's solution to the question of the identity 
of substances through time can be extended to also answer the question of their 
identity at one given time, on the basis of the following reasoning. Given two 
segments of a spatio- temporal continuum, they are one in a two- places use of the 
predicate `to be one', if they overlap with each other, and they are one in a one -place 
use of the predicate `to be one', if they overlap with the same spatio -temporal 
continuum. In both cases it is a necessary condition for identity that either one of the 
two segments is a portion of the other (namely that the spatio -temporal continuum 
overlaps with the one or the other segment),66 or that both segments are a portion of 
65 White (1986: 184 -7): `I want to focus [upon sentences of the form `X and Y are one] since my 
hypothesis is that Aristotle is led into serious difficulties largely, though not exclusively, by an 
ambiguity of such sentences. One may take `X and Y are one' either to mean that X is somehow 
identical with Y', that they are the same thing of a sort, or else that they together make up one thing (of 
a sort) which has them as its constituents...He does not explicitly distinguish the one -place and the 
two -place uses of ̀ one' there are cases where one- and two -place seem interchangeable' (italics in the 
original). 
66 For instance one of the two segments is `the artistic' and the other is Coriscus, and the spatio- 
temporal continuum is Coriscus. 
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the same continuum (namely neither of the two segments overlaps with the entire 
continuum).67 Given these assumptions, the temporal limits of the segments provide 
the criteria for distinguishing identity in time from identity through time: if the limits 
coincide, the identity between the segments is only at a given time; if the limits do not 
coincide at all the identity between the segments is only through time; if the limits 
coincide only partially there is identity at a given time only for the temporal interval 
in which the limits coincide. 
To recapitulate the conclusions of the line of interpretation held, in a variety of 
versions, by White, Kirwan and Code, Aristotle is not able to keep distinct the notions 
of monadic and dyadic unity; for, he confuses two different temporal perspectives, the 
diachronic and the synchronic ones. In answer to the criticism that these interpreters 
move against Aristotle, it has to be noted that, at least in Met V 6, which is the main 
text in which the interpreters find Aristotle supposedly confused, there is no mention 
of any temporal parameter. Hence, it does not seem appropriate to accuse him of a 
temporal perspectives' mistake, for temporal perspectives in fact are not even in play 
in Met V 6. 
What is the ontological status of those things, e.g. TÒ pOUO1KÓV, that for 
Aristotle count as `one per accidens' according to the classification in Met V 6? 
There is first of all disagreement to be registered among modern interpreters on the 
meaning of the expression Aristotle uses, which is the neuter nominalized adjective. 
There is a line of interpretation, held for instance by Mignucci and Williams," 
according to which the referent of the neuter nominalized adjective is an ontologically 
simple item, e.g. a person identified through a particular description - through one of 
its accidental properties, e.g. her being musical. According to other commentators 
however, for instance Lewis and Matthews,69 the nominalized adjective in the neuter 
denotes an ontologically complex item, namely the accidental composite constituted 
by a substance and one or more accidents belonging to it. This is what Matthews 
67 For instance one of the segments is `the artistic' and the other is `the just' and the continuum is 
Coriscus. 
68 Mignucci (1985: 57 -97), and also Williams (1985: 63 -80). Williams suggests understanding all 
Aristotelian expressions made out of the neuter nominalized adjective as Russellian definite 
descriptions. For Williams, as much as Russellian definite descriptions do not denote anything by 
themselves, but contribute to the meaning of the sentence in which they appear in virtue of their 
intrinsic predicative structure, so the neuter nominalized adjective does not denote directly anything, 
but has an accidental descriptive content. 
69 Lewis (1982: 85 -140), and also Matthews (1982: 223 -40). 
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calls a `kooky object'. Matthews speculates that Aristotle develops this `kooky object 
doctrine' in answer to sophistic arguments based on possible ambiguities in the use of 
terms like `one' and `identical', and to epistemic paradoxes debated at the time.70 
The main difference between the two lines of interpretation is the following. If 
the nominalized adjective in the neuter refers to the substance by itself, then the 
adjective appearing in the nominalized expression and any other predication that has 
the nominalized adjective as a logical subject are in fact predicated of one and the 
same ontological subject, which is one in being (TaúTa KOTÒ Tip/ oúaiav)71 but 
under two or more descriptions. On the other hand, if the nominalized adjective 
refers to the accidental composite as a whole, then there will be only incidental 
identity (but difference in being) between the subject to which the adjective appearing 
in the nominalized expression belongs to and the subject of the predications. 
I find reasons to embrace the interpretative suggestion made by Lewis and 
Matthews in my reading of Met V 6, 7 and 9. In my view in the first section of Met 
V 6, 1015b17-36, which is parallel to the first section of V 9, 1017a7 -22, Aristotle 
discusses the ontological status of accidental composites. An accidental composite 
can be defined, along the lines of Lewis' suggestion, through the primitive relation of 
composition between to different types of being `per se',72 namely a substance and an 
accident, which originate a trans -categorial `being per accidens'.73 Furthermore, in 
the constitution of an accidental composite there are two relations in play, which are 
expressed, respectively, by the predicates `being one per accidens' and `being 
70 Matthews quotes for example Met VI 2, 1026b15 -8: `For the arguments of the sophists deal, we may 
say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question whether 'musical' and 'lettered' are different or the 
same, and whether `musical Coriscus' and `Coriscus' are the same, and whether 'everything which is, 
but is not eternal, has come to be', with the paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has 
come to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come to be musical, and all the other 
arguments of this sort; the accidental is obviously akin to non -being'. 
71 The equivalence between substance (oúaia) and being (Tò Eivoi) is found in many passages in 
Aristotle's works; see Bonitz Index 544a26 -38. 
72 See Met V 7, 1017a22 -30. 
73 Matthews calls this trans -categorial being a `kooky' object. A kooky object is constituted by items 
belonging to different categories and does not belong itself to any category. It depends on the 
ontological level on the substance that constitutes it together with the accident, and cannot be a 
subject, at the linguistic level, of other predicates, but only indirectly, in virtue of its constituent 
substance. Matthews (1982: 224 -5): `Aristotle's picture of an accidental unity is that of an ephemeral 
object - an object whose very existence rests on the accidental presence, or com- presence, of some 
feature, or features, in a substance. Accidental unities exist, he supposes, only in a accidental sense of 
the verb `to be' that they can say to be (Metaph. VI 2)...Aristotle suggests that standard definite 
descriptions like `the musical man' and `the man in the corner' pick out kooky objects...For ourselves, 
we suppose that, in a suitable context, the expression `the musical man' might simply pick out 
Coriscus, and that the expression `the man in the corner' might simply pick out Socrates'. 
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identical with per accidens'. An accidental composite has a complex intrinsic 
structure, whose unity depends on the fact that an accident belongs to a substance and 
thereby constitutes something which is one (in a monadic sense). An accidental 
composite is `identical per accidens' with the substance on which it depends 
ontologically, however it is not `identical per se' neither to the substance nor to the 
accident (or accidents) that constitute it.74 Furthermore, an accidental composite may 
also be one with something else (in a dyadic sense). 
There are various ways in which an accident may belong to the substance in 
constituting accidental composites. Both in Met V 6 and 7, Aristotle considers two 
cases: the one in which an accident is predicated of a substance and the one in which 
an accident is predicated of an accident and only indirectly of a substance.75 From 
these two cases, four types of accidental unity can be derived: i) substance and 
accident; ii) accident and accident; iii) (substance and accident) and (substance and 
accident); iv) (substance and accident) and substance. 
The first type is the fundamental one, as Ross (1924: I 301) also notes, and all 
the others can be reduced to it, even in the case in which there are only two accidents 
involved. For, the ontological status of the accident is such that it is always 
predicated of a subject, and it can be a subject of the predication of another accident 
only if both accidents involved belong to the same substance - otherwise an infinite 
regress in the chain of predications would be generated, as Aristotle argues in Met IV 
4.76 
74 This way of understanding accidnetal composites finds confirmation, as Matthews (1982: 225) notes, 
also in the fact that the generation and destruction of an accidental composite or kooky object do not 
coincide with the generation and destruction of the substance form which the composite is 
constituted...In this context [sc.: Phys. I 7, 190a17 -21] the not -musical is the not -musical person 
(rather than non -musicality) and `the unmusical' is the unmusical person. What Aristotle is telling us is 
that, when the man becomes musical, the man survives but each of these kooky objects perishes: the 
not -musical (one), the unmusical (one), the unmusical man'. 
75 In Met V 7, 1017a21 -2, Aristotle mentions also the case in which the substance is predicated of an 
accident (e.g. `the artistic is a man'). This type of predication is called in modern term un- natural, for 
the grammatical subject of the sentence does not coincide with the logical subject. Already Asclepius 
(In Met 313, 34), among the ancient commentators, notes that, given a substance and an accident, they 
may be predicated of each other Kalil cpùaiv fi nap() cpúaiv, namely with the grammatical subject 
coinciding with the grammatical one, or with the two not coinciding. 
76 Met IV 4, 1007b2 -13: `For an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are 
accidents of the same subject. I mean, for instance, that the white is musical and the latter is white, 
only because both are accidental to man. But Socrates is musical, not in this sense, that both terms are 
accidental to something else. Since then some predicates are accidental in this and some in that sense, 
those which are accidental in the latter sense, in which white is accidental to Socrates, cannot form an 
infinite series in the upward direction; e.g. Socrates the white has not yet another accident; for no unity 
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Aristotle adds a corollary at 1015b28 -34, in which he considers the case in 
which the subject of the predication of an accident is a genus or a universal:77 the 
resulting composite is analysable either in terms of `direct' composition of the genus 
(or universal) and the accident (e.g. `Man is musical') or in terms of the belonging 
both of the genus (or the universal) and the accident to a third thing, namely the 
individual substance (e.g. `Coriscus is a man and musical'). As Aristotle notes, 
however the latter case is not perfectly analogous to the one in which two accidents 
belong to a single substance, for the genus is intimately involved in the determination 
of the substance, while the accident is only a state (Ékiç) or affection (ná905) of the 
substance.78 
can be got out of such a sum. Nor again will 'white' have another term accidental to it, e.g. 'musical'. 
For this is no more accidental to that than that is to this. 
77 Among the modern commentators, Dumoulin (1991: 179) makes the point that in this passage 
Aristotle uses with the term Ka0aou, instead of EÎ OÇ, meaning `species', for he wants to use 
exclusively the term Eiöoç to mean `form'. Contra Dumoulin however, in the same chapter, e.g. at 
1016a18, EÌboç clearly refers to the species (TÒ ùfOKEÌIJEVOV TC9 EÏÖEI EÌVOI OÖIQ(popOV). The term 
Eióog appears elsewhere too in the Metaphysics to have two possible referents: e.g. in III 3, 998b13 -23, 
it means `species' and in 4, 999b16 -7 it means `form'. 
78 For the meaning of gig and náüoç in Met V, see chap 20 (in particular 1022b10 -2) and 21 (in 
particular 1022b15 -19) respectively. Since Aquinas (In Met lib V, lec 7 [847], 230), the explanation of 
the two terms is standardly given is that IF,IS is an accident that persists in the subject, and nb6oç is a 
temporary affection of the subject. 
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1. Oneness per se 
The notion of `being one per se' is discussed in the section 1015b36- 1016b6 in 
Met V 6; three accounts are given:79 
i) Oneness by continuity, 1015b36- 1016a17: 
TCt)V bÈ Kae' ÈaUTÒ Ëv A£Yoptvcov Tà p v AÈY£TaI TW QUV£Xñ £TVOI 
Of things that are called one in virtue of their own nature some are so called 
because they are continuous. 
ii) Oneness in substratum, 1016a17 -32: 
ii.i) material substratum, 1016a17 -24: 
ÉTI ÚAAOV TpÒnOV Ëv AÈYETOI Ti TÒ ÚnOK£iI.J£VOV T() EÏÓ£I ETvaI 
áölá(popov 
Things are called one in another sense because their substratum does not 
differ in kind; 
ii.ii) genus, 1016a24 -32: 
AÈY£Tal Ô' ÉV KOÌ WV TÒ YÈVOÇ V ölacpÈpov TaÌÇ áVTIK£IpÈVaIS 
bia(popaiç 
Those things also are called one whose genus is one though distinguished by 
opposite differentiae. 
iii) Oneness by indivisibility, 1016a32 -b6: 
iii.i) indivisibility in notion: 
ET! bÈ Ev *ETCH öe(AV Ò Àòyoç Ò TÒ Ti 6v £îval Atycov bblaip£Toç npòç 
äÀAov TÒV ôfoúvTa [Ti 6v gym] TÒ npäypa 
Two things are called one, when the definition which states the essence of one is 
indivisible from another definition which shows us the other. 
iii.ii) indivisibility in general, 1016b3-6: 
Ök.oç ôÈ (i0V rj VÒnQIç 6ó1aip£T0ç V00110'a TÒ Ti ñV £IVaI, Kai prj blJvaTal 
X(,opiQQI ATE XpÒVCt) pljT£ TOnW pIjT£ AÒYcp, iJQAIOTa Tal1Ta ËV, KOi 
TO6T(AV 60'a 011Qial' 
79 Ross notes that the three accounts Aristotle gives of `being one per se' may be grouped according to 
a different criterion, by taking the first one as concerning oneness in quantity (Tw novw) and the other 
two concerning oneness in quality (TW aci). Reading the text in this way highlights the parallelism 
between it and Met X 1, in particular 1052a34 -5. 
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In general those things the thought of whose essence is indivisible, and cannot 
separate them either in time or in place or in definition, are most of all one, and 
of these especially those which are substances. 
As all the commentators have noted, this section of Met V 6 shows apparent 
parallelism with X 1, 1052a19-bl: 
i) Oneness by continuity, 1052a19 -21; this section corresponds verbatim to 
Met V 6, 1015b36- 1016a17, namely to this first account of `being one per 
se' 
ii) Oneness by complete realisation of the form, 1052a22 -8; this section 
corresponds to V 6, 1016b11 -17, namely to the last lines of the summary 
Aristotle gives of the arguments given in the whole section concerning 
`being one per se' 
iii) Oneness by indivisibility, 1052a29 -bl; this section corresponds to V 6, 
1016a32 -b6, notwithstanding some differences, the most significant of 
which is that in X 1 Aristotle introduces a further distinction between 
indivisibility in number and indivisibility in form. 
In Met X 1 uniqueness is not mentioned as a criterion for `being 
one per se', but in its place we find oneness by complete realisation of the form 
(1052a22 -3: £TI TOIO1TOV KQi 1QÀOV TÒ òOV KQÌ ÉXOV -rive] pop(* KQi E7SOS, 
pQÀIOTQ b' ET TI (Om TOIOIJTOV KQi ß.J1) ßÌQ). 
I proceed in the following sections to discuss each of the accounts of oneness 
per se in Met V 6 in turn. 
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2.1 Oneness by continuity 
In Met V 6, 1015b36- 1016a17, Aristotle first offers examples of things that are 
said to be `one per se' because of their continuity. The first two examples are cases 
of dyadic oneness (a bundle of things tied together; two wooden planks glued 
together) and the other two of monadic oneness (a bent line; an organic body with 
different parts). Aristotle distinguishes different degrees of oneness, depending on 
whether the continuity is by nature (cpùaci) or man -made (TÉXvn).ß° Oneness by 
continuity is defined by Aristotle in terms of sameness of movement: in Aristotle's 
words, a body made out of different parts counts as one if its natural movement is 
such that the different parts necessarily move with one and the same movement.81 In 
this context, Aristotle explains sameness of movement in terms indivisibility in time; 
at 1016a5 -6 we read: 
QuvEX>rç ò>r MyErai oú KivriQiç pia KaA' aürò82 Kai pri OTÒV TE Wwç pia 
E' oú áòlaipEToç, áòiaipEToç ö>r KaTà Xpòvov. 
A thing is called continuous which has by its own nature one movement and 
cannot have any other; and the movement is one when it is indivisible, and it is 
indivisible in respect of time. 
This remark is to be understood in the light of other passages in the Physics (e.g. 
V 4, 227b27 -35, and VIII 8, 262a1 -5) where Aristotle claims that movement is one if 
the following three conditions are satisfied: the thing in movement is one, the place 
where the movement happens is one, and the time at which the movement takes place 
is one. 
Aristotle offers a definition83 of what it means to be continuous in Phys V 3, 
227a11 -13; all the commentators refer to it as a text difficult to square with Met V 6: 
8° The same distinction is found in Met X 1, 1052a19 -21. 
81 Another context in which Aristotle accounts for oneness in terms of oneness of movement is Phys V 
4, 228a12 -23: `Since every motion is continuous, a motion that is one in an unqualified sense must 
(since every motion is divisible) be continuous, and a continuous motion must be one'. 
82 Ka6' aÙ7ò here means simply `due to the nature of the thing'. See Bonitz, Index 728a46 -8. 
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A>ryco b' gym a'UVEX£S ÓTQV TaIJTÒ yarVnTal Kai ÉV T0 ÉKaTÉpoU n£paç o'rq 
änTovTal, Kai CoQnEp QripaivEl Toúvopa, Quv>rXr1TaI. 
A thing that is in succession and touches is 'contiguous'. The 'continuous' is a 
subdivision of the contiguous: things are called continuous when the touching 
limits of each become one and the same and are, as the word implies, contained 
in each other. 
Commentators have found the criterion for continuity at work in Met V 6 at 
odds with the one in Phys V 3. The exegetical approach favoured by ancient and 
medieval commentators is to add to what Aristotle says in the various passages on the 
topic of continuity appropriate qualifications which render all the passages part of a 
coherent and unified doctrine. By contrast, modern commentators, since Bonitz, 
acknowledge the variety of claims Aristotle makes on the same topic, and explain 
them in terms of what the context of investigation is in each case. 
Among those who follow the first approach, the ancient commentators 
Alexander (In Met 363,16ff.) and Asclepius (In Met 324, 15ff.) take Aristotle to use 
the term `continuous' in Met V 6 occasionally in a loose way, with a generic meaning 
(KOIVOT£poV), which allows even a bundle to be continuous, by contrast with the 
proper meaning (Kupiwç) of the term as it is used in Phys V 3. The same distinction 
is to be found in some medieval commentaries, e.g. the one by Albert the Great.84 By 
contrast, Aquinas introduces a different distinction between what is continuous in 
virtue of its intrinsic structure (continua secundum se), and what is continuous in 
virtue of something else (continua secundum aliud).85 In the later Scholastic 
tradition, the interpreters introduce other various distinctions, in an attempt to give 
consistency to the Aristotelian texts. For instance Paul of Venice attributes to 
Aristotle both the distinction between continua secundum se and continua secundum 
83In the Physics passage Aristotle indeed prefaces what he is going to say about the meaning of being 
continuous with the formula Àaryw ó , which is for him a technical expression to introduce a 
definition. 
ßa Albert the Great (In Met lib V tr 1°, c. 7, 223-4) comments thus: `Continua autem dicuntur 
communiter quocumque modo ad unum copulata...Continuum vero in natura unum dicitur, cuius 
motus, qui secundum se finis est, est unus...Hic autem est, sicut in his que De principiis motum 
animalium disputavimus, qui est ab immobili uno'. 
85 Aquinas (In Met, lib V, 1. 7, [849-853], 231): 'Sed continua dicuntur aliqua dupliciter. Quaedam 
enim sunt continua...per aliud, quaendam secundum se'. 
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aliud (which actually comes from Aquinas), and also the distinction between 
secundum se reflexa and secundum se non reflexa, which he makes up himself.86 
Furthermore, Paul integrates what he takes to be Aristotle's own position with 
Averroes analysis of it. So Paul integrates in the Aristotelian account four more ways 
of being continuous suggested by Averroes: per ligamen, per conglutinationem, per 
indivisibilitatem, per motum; the first two man-made and the other two by nature, the 
fourth being proper to celestial bodies.87 Finally, concerning the type of continuity 
that celestial bodies enjoy, Paul adds a further distinction between two meanings of 
the notion of `common limit', namely the limit that two contiguous things share: the 
common limit may be intrinsic or extrinsic to the nature of the things that are 
contiguous, thereby defining two more types of continuity. 
On the other traditional line of interpretation, followed e.g. by Bonitz, Ross and 
more recently Dubois,88 the discrepancies between different Aristotelian texts, and in 
particular between the criteria for continuity at work in Met V 6 and Phys V 3, are to 
be solved by reconstructing different contexts of investigation that explain why 
Aristotle holds different positions. According to this interpretation, in Met V 6 the 
definition of being continuous is simply not an issue, for there Aristotle is concerned 
only with classifying different ways in which something can be `one per se' and 
being continuous is just one of those. The investigation of what it means to be 
continuous is rather to be found in the Physics. 
86 Paul of Venice (In Met, ff. 61rb -vb M, 173va -174ra Pv): `Contra predicta movet Philosophus 
dubium, probans quod nec fasciculum lignorum neque animal est continuum secundum se per 
diffinitionem continui, que est quod continuum est illud cuius motus est unus secundum se...Pro 
solutione huius difficultatis Aristoteles ponit duas distinctiones de continuo, quarum prima est hec: 
quedam sunt continua secundum se et quedam sunt continua secundum aliud...Secunda distinctio est 
quod terminorum secundum se quedam sunt reflexa, et quedam non sunt reflexa...Ex hiis 
distinctionibus habetur solutio difficultatis, nam diffinitio continui est intelligenda de continuo 
secundum se, et non de continuo secundum aliud, et non est intelligenda de continuo habente 
reflexionem, sed de continuo non habente reflexionem'. 
87 Averroes In Met, lib V, tr. 1 °, c. 6, t. c. 8E -K, f. 111rb -vb. See also Paul of Venice, In Met, ff. 61vb- 
62ra M, 174ra -b Pv. 
88 Bonitz (In Met, 235): `Notionem continui subtilius exponit Phys. V 3, notione motus, quae non 
necessario cogitatur in notione continuitatis, non adscita...Eiusdem libri proximo capite V 4 subtilius 
definit qui motus sit unus...Hoc loco, ubi unitatem motus non ipsam explicat, sed ad definiendam 
continuitatem adhibet, in diffinitione minus accurata acquiescit'. Ross (1924: 1, 302): `The continuous 
is better defined in Phys V 3 without reference to movement, which is not really an element in the 
notion'. Dubois (1998: 58 -9): `Si l'on se reporte au chapitre de la Physique où Aristote définit par 
comparaison le contact, le contigu et le continu (V, 3), on remaquera que, à la différence du texte V, le 
continu est défini sans référence au mouviment. Il semble d'ailleurs que, pour Aristote, le mouvement 
n'est pas en soi un élément de cette notion'. 
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A different position from all the others is Kirwan's, who notes that in Met V 6 
Aristotle uses the term `continuous' with three different meanings (1016a1: 
continuous in virtue of contact between the parts; 1016a5: continuous in virtue of 
sameness of movement of the parts; 1016a7: continuous in virtue of one's own 
nature). Kirwan complains and there is not enough evidence for us to understand 
what connections Aristotle sees between them. 
Aristotle mentions, perhaps intentionally, more than one definition of 
`continuous'...This definition [sc.: in Phys. V 3, 227a11 -13] is echoed in the 
distinction at 1016a7 between `continuous in its own right' and `in contact'; but 
at al a bundle, whose parts are merely in contact, is called continuous. a5 
interposes yet a third definition: `that whose change in its own right is one and 
cannot be otherwise...But Aristotle gives no rules for distinguishing these cases 
...It is hard to see what arguments would count for or against these proposals, 
but we can certainly object to his connection between them (1971: 302). 
In answer to Kirwan's comment I propose to read 1016a5 as a sketchy 
presentation of the generic account of continuity Aristotle wants to use in this chapter, 
and to read the two other passages as referring to different degrees of continuity 
(higher for things that are continuous per se and lower for things that are continuous 
by contact). As my own contribution to the traditional debate on the discrepancy 
between Aristotle's definition of the continuity in terms of sharing a physical limit in 
common (Phys V 3) and in terms of moving in virtue of a single movement (Met V 
6), I suggest that in Met V 6 there is indeed no definition of continuity. Aristotle 
appeals there just to common sense understanding, and intentionally avoids defining 
properly what being continuous amounts to. The reason why he does this, I take it, is 
not to introduce in the context of the investigation on oneness further philosophical 
issues. The main difference between the reading that most interpreters agree on and 
the one that I suggest in the viewpoint form which I propose to examine the question 
of the relation between Met V 6 and Phys V 3. From my point of view, there is no 
contraposition between two different definitions of continuity. Rather, Aristotle in 
Met V 6 substitutes the definition of continuity given in Phys V 3, which is not free 
from difficulties (as Aristotle may be aware), with a simpler, intuitive account, which 
facilitates his primary purpose of investigating oneness. In support of the 
interpretation I put forward, I make some more general remarks on first of all 
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Aristotle's conception of continuity. I take as the first textual evidence to consider 
Phys VI 2, 233a24 -6: 
bIX* Yelp MyETQI Kai Tò NriKOS Kai ò XpóvOq änElpov, Kaì óAcoS nth/ T6 
QUVEXtS, FjTOI KaTel blaipEQIV £O)(QTOIS. 
For there are two senses in which length and time and generally anything 
continuous are called 'infinite': they are called so either in respect of divisibility 
or in respect of their extremities. 
As Wieland argues (1962: 351 -99), in Aristotle's metaphysics there is a single 
notion of continuum which has two fundamental aspects expressed, the one by the 
definition of the continuum in terms of parts sharing a common limit (see e.g. Cat 6, 
5a1 -14, Met X 12, 1069a5 -8, and Phys V 3, 227a11 -13) and the other by its definition 
in terms of its divisibility ad infinitum (see Phys III 1, 200b20 and VI 1, 231 a24 and 
231b12ff; VI 2, 232b25). The two definitions give different but complementary 
descriptions of the continuum. The first describes the continuum from the point of 
view of its constituents and their mutual relations, and gives the conditions under 
which a multiplicity of things is together a continuum, and can be individuated as one 
something.89 The second definition takes the point of view of the continuum as a 
whole and describes its internal structure: saying that it is divisible ad infinitum 
amounts to saying that it is not composed by any indivisibles, as Aristotle puts it in 
Phys VI 1, 231b12. The description of the continuum that Aristotle gives in the 
Physics is however problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it is circular, as Wieland has 
already pointed out (1993: 69). The continuum is defined by the divisibility of the 
parts which are in their turn continuous and that can be individuated only one in 
relation to the other, for their limit by definition is common. Furthermore, the 
definition of common limit seems to have more appropriate application to 
mathematical rather than physical entities.90 For, in the case of a continuous 
89 In this case the common limit is not any more an actual limit, but at most a potential one. 
90 This is a point of disagreement between Ross (1936: 70) and Wieland (1993: 366, n 53); I find more 
persuasive Ross' arguments than Wieland's. Ross thinks that `The firmness with which he rejects any 
suggestion that a line can be divided without remainder into points, a period of time into moments, or a 
movement into infinitesimal jerks - and this at a time when thinkers of repute believed in all these 
things - seems to me to indicate that he had a more mathematical turn of mind than he is usually 
credited with'. 
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mathematical entity, one can think of the internal limit common to the constituent 
parts as a limit in potentiality - so that the unity of the entity as a whole is not 
compromised. By contrast, in the case of physical entities, in Ross' words (1936: 69), 
`two things cannot strictly speaking be continuous, since an extreme of one thing 
cannot be identical with an extreme of another thing alongside of it in the space'. 
Assuming that Ross is right, this is a further discrepancy between the definitions of 
the continuum in the Physics and in Met V 6, for in the latter the continuum is 
described by reference to oneness of movement, which is to be understood as 
movement of a rigid body. This means that Aristotle is thinking there of a physical, 
rather than a mathematical model. 
Recapitulating the two main differences between the Physics and the 
Metaphysics accounts of the continuum, in my view in the Physics Aristotle provides 
a proper definition of the continuum and refers to a mathematical model, whilst in the 
Metaphysics he offers only an intuitive description and refers to a physical model. In 
the light of these considerations, one can conclude that they are two different 
definitions, which I suggest is not legitimate to compare on the grounds of more or 
less accuracy. On the interpretation I suggest in Met V 6 Aristotle introduces a 
different, more intuitive account for the continuum, by reference to movement, for the 
reasons given above; notwithstanding the fact that the type of movement that 
accounts for continuity in Met V 6 is supposed to be itself continuous - which is a 
petitio principi.91 
Finally, it remains to clarify the observation that Aristotle makes in the last part 
of the section of Met V 6 under examination. Aristotle takes a geometrical line as an 
example of something that is one, on the ground that it is continuous. With reference 
to that example he observes at 1016a12 -7 that different degrees of oneness can be 
distinguished according to the fact that the line is straight or bent, but also he adds a 
prima facie puzzling remark, namely that the bent line is one and not one at the same 
time: 
91 See Phys V 4, 228b1 -8: `Motion, therefore, that is in an unqualified sense continuous and one must 
be specifically the same, of one thing, and in one time. Unity is required in respect of time in order that 
there may be no interval of immobility, for where there is intermission of motion there must be rest, 
and a motion that includes intervals of rest will be not one but many, so that a motion that is 
interrupted by stationariness is not one or continuous, and it is so interrupted if there is an interval of 
time'. 
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KQi eÌ £úeEÌa TñS K£KaNp£VnS NáÀÀOV ËV' TIjV bÈ KEKaNpÉVnV Kai ÉXouO'aV 
YCOVÌav KOÌ play Kai oú piav À£yopEv, ÓTI ÉVb£XETaI Kai pll &Na -rely 
KÌVnQIV aúTñq EÌVQI KQi áp' TfS b' Eúe£iaq ad C1Na, KOÌ oúb£v pÓplov 
ËXOv pÉY£eoS T0 NÈV rjpEpET T0 bi KIVETTOI, GJQII£p TñS KEKaNptVnS. 
And the straight line is more one than the bent; but that which is bent and has an 
angle we call both one and not one, because its movement may be either 
simultaneous or not simultaneous; but that of the straight line is always 
simultaneous, and no part of it which has magnitude rests while another moves, 
as in the bent line. 
To understand what Aristotle means, we should think as Kirwan also suggests 
(1971: 135 -6) that everything, in so far as it is something, is something one, and in 
this sense to predicate of something that it is one is just to say in a sense that is what it 
is, according to what Aristotle says e.g. in Met. X 2, 1054a13 -9: 
That the one, then, in every class is a definite thing, and in no case is its nature 
just this, unity, is evident; but as in colours the one -itself which we must seek is 
one colour, so too in substance the one -itself is one substance. That in a sense 
unity means the same as being is clear from the facts that its meanings 
correspond to the categories one to one, and it is not comprised within any 
category (e.g. it is comprised neither in 'what a thing is' nor in quality, but is 
related to them just as being is); that in 'one man' nothing more is predicated 
than in 'man' (just as being is nothing apart from substance or quality or 
quantity); and that to be one is just to be a particular thing. 
From this point of view, something can be an x, e.g. a bent line, and yet be at the 
same time a multiplicity of ys, e.g. the segments that constitute the bent line, namely 
can be one and yet have a complex intrinsic structure. 
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2.2 Oneness in substratum 
The second account of `being one per se', namely oneness in substratum, is 
discussed by Aristotle in the second section of Met V 6, 1016a17 -32, which has two 
sub -sections, the first beginning at 1016a17 on oneness in material substratum, and 
the second beginning at 1016a24 on oneness in genus. The close connection between 
these two sub -sections has been noted, among modern commentators, by Ross (1924: 
I 302), Kirwan (1971: 137), and Duminil and Jaulin (1991: 172), on the basis of 
different textual evidence. Ross notes that at 1016b8 -9, the section which contains a 
brief recapitulation of the topics already discussed, Aristotle mentions only three 
criteria for `being one per se' (namely continuity, oneness in species and indivisibility 
in notion),92 and that in the transition in the text between oneness in material 
substratum to oneness in genus at 1016a24 there is no use of the formulaTI, which 
Aristotle uses throughout Met V to space out different items in the series of accounts 
he gives for each notions. Kirwan, in support of the thesis of the close conceptual 
connection between oneness in material substratum and oneness in genus, quotes Met 
V 28, 1024b8 -9, where Aristotle takes matter and genus as equivalent in the 
following respect: 
`Genus' then is used...as matter; for that to which the differentia or quality 
belongs is the substratum, which we call matter.93 
92Met V 6, 1016b8 -9: Tà i5È npthTwÇ XEydpEva Êv wv rl oúQia pia, pia ói ovvEXEiç ij 65EI r"i 
Àóyq.) 
93 Bonitz (Index 798a59 -b1) takes the two passages from Met V 6 and 28 as offering examples of the 
very same meaning of únOKEipEVOV, which he defines as `genus quasi material per differentiae 
determinatur'. Aristotle's commitment to the equivalence of genus and matter would require futher 
investigation, which cannot be carried out within the limits of the present work. It would also require 
reference to Aristotle's theory of definition in the central books of the Metaphysics. In a very brief 
outline, the background to the claim that matter and genus are equivalent is Aristotle's claim that the 
thing to be defined and its definition are isomorphic. Each definition is a formula, and a formula has 
parts, so that by isomorphism the thing defined must have parts too. The question is whether the 
formulas that express the parts of the thing defined are included in the formula that expresses the thing 
as a whole, hence whether it is necessary to find what makes the thing defined and the definition one 
and many at the same time, namely what is their unifying principle. Within the framework of the 
traditional model of definition by genus and species, the question becomes how to explain how genus 
and differentia, which are distinct elements, jointly constitute a unified definition. Aristotle tackles this 
problem at different points, providing different solutions at different times (see e.g. Met VII 12, 
1038a5 -9 and VIII 3, 1043b10 -3). Finally in Met VIII 6 he proposes to assimilate matter and genus on 
the one hand, and differentia and form on the other, so that the unity of the definition reflects and 
expresses the unity of substance. 
69 
In the light of these considerations, oneness in species and oneness in genus 
may be regarded as both involving oneness in substratum, in the former case the 
material substratum, in the latter the substratum of specific differences. 
On the basis of the classification proposed by Aristotle, two (or more) things are 
said to be `one per se' first of all because their material substratum does not bear 
specific differences (at least detectable by the senses).94 There are two possible cases. 
In the one case, a mass term such as e.g. water is said to be `one per se' (in a monadic 
sense), for no perceptible differences can be detected in its proximate substratum, or 
in other words the substratum is macroscopically homogeneous. While in the other 
case two or more entities such as e.g. oil and wine and all the other liquids95 are said 
to be `one per se' (in a dyadic sense) because they have a common ultimate 
substratum, or in other words they are homogeneous only at a microscopic level. 
Furthermore some things are said to be `one per se' because they fall under the 
same genus; we could say they share the same genus, even though diversified by 
opposite specific differentiae. Aristotle gives two accounts of how the genus plays 
the role of unifying principle: `one per se' on the one hand, at 1016a24 -9, the ultimate 
species which fall under the same genus, on the other, at 1026a29 -32, the sub - 
determinations of a genus which belong to the same genus and furthermore belong to 
it in virtue of the very same properties. The distinction between two accounts is clear 
from the examples given by Aristotle: horse, man and animal fall under the same 
genus, which is animal, but they are different in species; by contrast isosceles and 
equilateral not only fall under the same genus, which is figure, but also they do so in 
virtue of the very same properties, because they are both triangles. 
There is reason to think that the section of the chapter in which the second sense 
of `being one per se' is introduced is textually corrupted; hence, it has been amended 
by the editors. The most interesting textual issue is about the expression TÒ 
94 Precisely this reference to sensible perception runs out the possibility that the substratum here 
mentioned could be understood as prime matter, for prime matter, as Aristotle says Met VII 3 is not 
perceptible, for it does not have any sensible property. 
9s Aristotle uses the terms in this example of XUNo1 and TO TgKTei, (literally what can be liquefied). For 
the assumption that the ultimate substratum of all that can be liquefied is water, see e.g. Met V 4, 
1015a10, and V 24, 1023a28 -9. For the assumption that in particular oil and wine are a mixture of 
water and air, and water and earth respectively, see e.g. Meteor V 5 and 10, in particular 388a34 -b11. 
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ÒVWTtpW TOÙTG.w at 1016a30.96 The editors disagree over the authenticity of this 
expression: Ross prints it as part of the text but marks it as dubious, whilst Jaeger, 
following Christ, wants to expunge it. Let us suppose, by hypothesis, that TÒ 
QVWT>rpW TOÙTWV is part of the text; how should we understand it? Both Ross 
(1924: I 303) and Kirwan (1971: 137) take it as epexegetically connected to TÒ am 
y>rvoç at 1016a29.97 In the example that Aristotle gives TÒ áVWTtpW TOIJTWV, 
namely the higher genus, is `figure', its sub -genus is `triangle', and the infimae 
species are `isosceles' and `equilateral'. What does the pronoun TOi1TWV refer to? 
There are two possibilities: it refers either to the infimae species (isosceles and 
equilateral) as Kirwan understands it, or to the sub -genera (triangle and other 
subgenera of figure) as Ross understands it. Ross's explanation is the following: 
"Sometimes they are said to be the same in respect of the higher genus (if they 
are infimae species of their genus), viz. of the genus above the genera of which 
the proximate genus is one ". TÒ QVWT>rpW TOIJTWV, which it seems best to read 
with Alexander, is epexegetic of TÒ ÒVW yarvoç and To0TWV it seems, must 
mean the proximate genus and its co- ordinate genera; otherwise áivWTtpW 
Toi1TWV would have to mean not `above these' but `higher above these', which 
it cannot mean'. 
By contrast Kirwan's explanation is this: 
"The genus above is called the same ": i.e. x and y are the same G if both of 
them are F and G is the genus of F. "If they are the last forms of the genus" 
seems to stipulate (i) that `x' and `y' mark places for form- (i.e. species -) 
descriptions rather than proper names and (ii) that the species be the infimae 
species of x and y. It is not clear why either of these conditions is necessary. 
"That which is further above these" may be a gloss and must in any case 
explicate `the genus above', sc. G. If these are the last forms, i.e. x and y, 
96 There are a few more variations in the edition of the text to be mentioned, but they do not 
substantially change the way to read it. By contrast with Ross' edition, which I take as point of 
reference, Jaeger adds the plural genitive ow at 1016a28 (for Alexander reads the text in this way, and 
by analogy with 1018a6 and 1018a29, and the declarative conjunction 671 at 1016a29 9by analogy 
with 1016a23, 1016a26 and 1015b29). Furthermore, Jaeger reads TÒ instead of TÒ at 1016a30, 
rejecting the correction that Bonitz had proposed and Ross accepted on the basis of Alexander's 
commentary. In my view it is preferable to read Ross' text, which is the closest to the manuscripts 
tradition, and makes good sense without the interventions proposed by Jaeger. 
97 Kirwan (1971) actually translates the passage as if TÒ ÓVWT£pW TOIITWV was part of the text, 
although it mentions in a footnote to the translation (37) and in the commentary (137) that the 
authenticity of the expression has been questioned. 
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"further above" must mean `at one remote above'. The Greek word, the 
comparative of `above' need not mean so much (it can be a synonym for 
`above'), but Ross's claim that it "cannot mean" `higher above' seems rash. If 
he is right, "these" must refer, as he says, to F and its co- ordinate genera. 
Neither Ross's nor Kirwan's reading is however fully satisfactory. For it seems 
unlikely that the comparative ävwT>rpco would be used to express `two -levels higher' 
and most probably is used loosely to mean just `higher'. This is the weakness of 
Kirwan's interpretation. It is equally unlikely though that TOÚTCÙv refers to other 
sub -genera of `figure' which are not mentioned, and that in any case would not have 
any argumentative function. This is the weakness of Ross's interpretation. If then 
both interpretations according to which the expression TÒ ävcOT:rpco TOÚTCOV is part 
of the genuine Aristotelian text appear to be ruled out, it is plausible to take this 
expression as a gloss, which is indeed a possibility that Ross and Kirwan too take into 
consideration and Jaeger very strongly supports. If it is a sort of note added by some 
reader, then it might have been made up on the line of reasoning that Ross too 
suggests, namely as a reminder of the fact that TÒ ävco *0ç, namely figure, is the 
proximate genus of triangle and other types of plain figures. Notwithstanding the 
textual difficulties just mentioned, the point Aristotle is making in the passage is 
anyway clear: of the two senses in which two or more items can be said to be `one per 
se' in virtue of their oneness in genus, the stricter sense may be clarified by a 
comparison between the following examples: 
(General schema) (Example 1) (Example 2)98 (Example 3)99 
Genus Animal Animal Plain Figure 
Sub -genus Mammal Mammal Triangle 
Infimae species Man Horse, Man, Dog Isosceles, Equilateral 
Individuals Socrates, Plato 
98 See Met V 6, 1016a27. 
99 See Met V 6, 1016a30 -2. 
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Two individuals belonging to the same infima species (Socrates and Plato, ex. 
1) are `one per se ' in a strict sense because they fall under the same genus (Animal), 
and they fall under the same genus via the fact that they fall under the same species 
(Man). In the same way, two infimae species belonging to the same sub -genus 
(Isosceles, Equilateral, ex. 3) are `one per se' in a strict sense because they fall under 
the same genus (Plain Figure), and they fall under the same genus via the fact they 
fall under the same sub -genus (Triangle). In other words, Socrates and Plato fall 
under the genus Animal because they are both men, hence they are `one per se' in a 
strict sense; analogously, isosceles and equilateral fall under the genus Figure because 
they are are both triangles, hence they are `one per se' in a strict sense. It has to be 
noted that the Isosceles and the Equilateral are not specific differences of the genus 
Figure. If they were, they would be sub -genera of Figure, rather than, as they are, 
differences of Triangle. This is proven by the fact that being equilateral does not 
imply being a triangle (e.g. a square is also equilateral) but only being a plain figure. 
In this sense the case of triangles is different from the case of animal species (ex. 2): 
Horse, Man and Dog belong to the same genus above them (Mammal) each in virtue 
of its own specific differences. In this case then being for instance a horse implies 
being a mammal and at a higher level being an animal, according to the standard 
model of definition that Aristotle adopts for instance in Met VII 12. 
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2.3 Indivisibility 
The third sense of being `one per se' introduced at 1016a32 -b6 concerns those 
entities whose definition is the same. Here are Aristotle's words at 1016a32 -4: 
gTI >r EN/ MyEral öQCOv 6A6yoS 6 T6 Ti 6v dval Asryc,ov óblaipETOç npòS 
äk\ov Tòv briAoúvra [Ti iiv Eival] T6 npáyNa 
Two things are called one, when the definition which states the essence of one is 
indivisible from another definition which shows us the other. 
Some preliminary textual remarks are necessary. Ross and Jaeger agree in 
expunging [Ti Ijv Eival] at 1016a34. Furthermore Jaeger ad locum notes that in the 
commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Met 366: 9 -10) there is no references to 
the expression Tòv fÀoOvTa [Ti fñv Eíval] T6 npâypa; nevertheless Jaeger does not 
think we should take the passage as interpolated. In support of retaining the 
aforementioned line in the original text e.g. Duminil and Jaulin (1991: 173) note that 
the verb 6060) is often used by Aristotle, especially in the Topics (e.g. V 4, 133a6; 
VII 3, 140a34; VIII 2, 152b39) precisely to to mean `to give the definition of 
something'. 
The section of the chapter we are examining may be divided into three parts, 
which start respectively at 1016a32, 1016b1, 1016b3. 
The first part (1016a32) concerns the indivisibility in notion between two 
entities, where indivisibility is here to be understood as lack of distinction from 
something else, and hence as indivisibility in a dyadic sense. Aristotle gives two 
examples of things that are `one per se' in a dyadic sense in virtue of having 
undistinguishable notions: what is subject to growth and what is subject to 
diminution, and two or more plain figures of the same type having different 
dimensions. In both cases, the entities in the examples are distinguishable in virtue of 
the fact that they have more or less matter (intelligible matter in the case of 
geometrical entities, see Met X 3, 1054b3 -7), but this is only an accidental not an 
essential feature of theirs. 
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In the second part, 1016b1 -3, Aristotle is concerned with the topic of different 
degrees of indivisibility, hence of oneness. The individual is what enjoys the highest 
degree of indivisibility, for it is the object of a single act of intellection and has a 
unique location in space and time. 
In the third part, 1016b3 -6,10° Aristotle recapitulates in general terms the notion 
of indivisibility that has been put at work so far in the chapter - which is different, as 
we will see in a moment, from the one that is at work in the second part of chapter, 
1016b17-1017b3. 
Before coming to it, Aristotle gives in the rather heterogeneous section 1016b6- 
17 a series of remarks which partially repeat what he has already said in the previous 
sections of the chapter devoted to `being one per accidens' and `being one per se'. 
Two sub -sections may be distinguished. The first mentions a series of accounts of 
`being one per se' and `being one per accidens', some of which were already 
introduced in the first part of the chapter (1015b16- 1016b6), along with various 
accounts of what it means to be many, which Aristotle will discuss later in the chapter 
at 1017b3 -6. 101 The second sub -section presents two main senses in which 
something be said explains the relevant criteria, and offers an 
example for each case. 
In the beginning of the first sub -section (1016b6 -8) Aristotle mentions four 
accounts of accidental unity. Many things are `one per accidens' if they do (nOiEiv), 
possess (£XEIV), are affected by (naOXEIV) or are related to (npòç TI cival) something 
which is one. The first three however describe a metaphysically weak type of unity 
and have no correspondence with the accounts of `being one per accidens' Aristotle 
gives in this chapter at 1015b16 -34 (nor with the various accounts of `being per 
accidens' in Met V 7, 1017a7 -22). Only the fourth account may be taken as referring 
100 I take this part of the chapter connected with the two previous ones, even though thematically it 
might seem to be more connected with the general recapitulation Aristotle gives at 1016a6 -17, because 
of the presence of yàp (1016b4) which clearly indicates that the following sentence is connected to the 
preceding one. 
101 The first sub -section is introduced by oúv which usually introduces a consequence and a conclusion 
of what has just been said before. Despite this linguistic indicator, from a conceptual point of view 
however the list of accounts of `being one per se' and `being one per accidens' does not follow or 
derive neither from the passage immediately preceding (where Aristotle discusses oneness because of 
indivisibility) nor from the previous part of the part of the chapter, for , as I will show more in detail 
later, there is no precise correspondence between the various accounts discussed in the previous part of 
the chapter and the ones mentioned in the summary. The commentators have not offered solutions to 
this difficulty. Among the modern interpreters, Kirwan (1971: 138) for instance describes 1016b6 -11 
as puzzling, but does not offer exegetical suggestions. 
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to the fact that all types of accidental unity may be reduced to the inherence of one or 
more accidents to one substance, according to what Aristotle says also in Met V 7, 
1017a19 -22. At 1016b8 -9 Aristotle proceeds to claim that to be one in the primary 
sense (npciJTc)Ç) means to be one KQTà oúai v, i.e. to have one and the same 
substance. Interestingly, Aristotle further differentiates three criteria for sameness of 
substance: continuity (QUVEXEiá), which I take as material continuity, hence oneness 
in substratum; species or form (Elba); definition (%0yW).102 There is clearly only a 
loose correspondence between this and the previous part of the chapter (1016a17 -32). 
However, there is also a strong parallelism between this part of Met V 6 and X 1, 
where oneness in form / species is also mentioned as a criterion for `being one per se' 
(1052a22 -8). Finally, in the last part of this sub -section (1016b9 -11) Aristotle 
mentions three meanings of `being many', defined by contraposition to the previous 
three accounts of `being one per se'. 
In the second subsection (1016b11 -7)103 Aristotle briefly summarizes the two 
main meanings of `being one per se' which correspond to two different degrees of 
unity. There is a rather generic sense in which anything may be said to be one 
that it has a continuous matter, and another sense, which is more 
fundamental, in which only what is a whole, i.e. has its own form fully realised, is 
one (1016b12 -3). The first case is illustrated by Aristotle with the example of the 
102 Mignucci (1985:57 -97) suggests that identity and unity in being (Karà TrlV o úaiav) between two 
items may be understood in two ways. Saying that two given items are identical in being, may mean 
either that the linguistic expressions that denote them have the same sense or that they have the same 
reference. On the first account, two given items are identical in being if they are denoted by linguistic 
expressions which have the same sense. On the second account, two given items are identical in being 
if they are denoted by linguistic expressions that refer to things that have the same definition, namely 
that are one in species and in number. Mignucci quotes Met V 6, 101669 -11, as an example of the 
latter case. He takes Aristotle to be saying that on the assumption that items that have one definition 
are `one per se', hence one in being and denoted by linguistic expressions having the same sense, then 
items that are denoted by expressions having different senses cannot be one in number. Mignucci takes 
Aristotle's expression àplepOûpEV cbç nAEiw at 1016610 to mean `we consider distinct in number'. 
This interpretation however is not consistent e.g. with Met V 6, 1016b32 -3, where Aristotle reduces 
oneness in number to oneness in material substratum. Contra Mignucci, it gives better sense to read 
Aristotle's expression in a distributive way. Namely, for each of the criteria given (continuity, oneness 
of form, oneness of definition) whatever does not satisfy the criterion is a multiplicity. Aristotle does 
not commit himself here to say which, if any of those, is the criterion which determines plurality in 
number. 
103 In the very beginning of this sub -section, TI instead of £nEÌ is a correction by Bonitz (In Met 237) 
on the basis of the manuscript T (which is considered very authoritative) and Alexander of 
Aphrodisias' conjecture (In Met. 368, 7 -15). Ross and Jaeger ad locum edit the text following Bonitz. 
By contrast Schwlegler (1847: 209 -10) does not want to substitute Énd with ÉTI on the ground that ÉTI 
usually, and especially in Met V, has the specific function of introducing a new meaning for the term 
under examination, but no new meaning is introduced at 1016b11. 
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parts of a disassembled shoe that are randomly disposed although contiguous in 
space; the second with the example of a circular line.10¢ Wholeness (öÀOV) is 
explained by Aristotle in terms of oneness in form; this crucial tenet emerges also in 
the following parallel passages (my italics) :'05 
i) Met 6, 1016b11 -17: 
While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we 
do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form; e.g. if we saw the parts of a 
shoe put together anyhow we should not call them one all the same (unless because of 
their continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to 
have already a certain single form. This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one, 
because it is whole and complete. 
ii) Met V 26, 1023b27 -36: 
For (a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good as a whole (which 
implies that it is a kind whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it contains many 
things by being predicated of each, and by all of them, e.g. man, horse, god, being 
severally one single thing, because all are living things. But (b) the continuous and 
limited is a whole, when it is a unity consisting of several parts, especially if they are 
present only potentially, but, failing this, even if they are present actually. Of these 
things themselves, those which are so by nature are wholes in a higher degree than 
those which are so by art, as we said in the case of unity also, wholeness being in fact 
a sort of oneness. 
iii) Met X 1, 1052a22 -8: 
That which is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still higher 
degree; and especially if a thing is of this sort by nature, and not by force like the 
things which are unified by glue or nails or by being tied together, i.e. if it has in itself 
the cause of its continuity. A thing is of this sort because its movement is one and 
indivisible in place and time; so that evidently if a thing has by nature a principle of 
movement that is of the first kind (i.e. local movement) and the first in that kind (i.e. 
circular movement), this is in the primary sense one extended thing. 
104 Kirwan (1971: 139) comments on this example by Aristotle by noting that a straight line would be 
not less complete, formally, than a circular one, according to what Aristotle himself says in Met V 16. 
Contra Kirwan's remark though, in Phys VIII 9 (in particular 265a28 -b1) movement along a circular 
line is said one and continuous, whilst movement along a straight line is not. Heath (1970: 206) notes 
that the same characterization of the circular line as continuous given by Aristotle e.g, in Meteor 111 3 
373a4 -5 is given by Euclid I Def 15. 
1°5 
I limit myself to a synoptic presentation of the passages, for I cannot examine the issue in more 
depth in this context. 
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From the comparison between the passages just quoted, it appears that 
wholeness and oneness in the highest degree in fact characterise substances, as 
Aristotle claims in Met V 6, 1016b3, because i) their matter is quantitatively 
determined and continuous; ii) their form is one, hence the parts are present only in 
potentiality and subordinate to the form of the whole; iii) the union of matter and 
form is by nature, and not artificially created, for the substance has in itself the 
principle of its own unity. 
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3. The one as a count principle 
The second part of Met V 6 covers two topics: what it is to be a count principle 
(1016b17- 1017a3), and what the various meanings of the term `many' are (1017a3- 
6). In the very beginning (1016b17 -8) of the section devoted to the one as count 
principle, the text is unfortunately corrupted. I will first of all briefly consider how 
the modern editors Ross, Jaeger, and also Schwgler in the XIXth century resolve this 
difficulty: 
T i Tòòá ávì Eivai ápXñ Tivi áOTIv ápi6poú Eivai (Ross) 
T 2 Tòòá ávì Eivai OA <TOÚ>Tivi áOTIv ápi6p6) Erval (Jaeger) 
T 3 Tòòá ávì Eivai ápxr) Tivi áOTiv apiepoú Eivai (Schwegler) 
The two main differences between the editions just quoted are about the 
variants: áp)(ñ (T 1) and ápXI (T 2 and T 3); 6plOp00 (T 1 and T 3) and ápiOp4 (T 
2). The variants chosen in T 1 are based on the manuscript Ab and are accepted by 
the majority of the modern commentators. The text, if read in this way, gives the 
following sense: 
- `To be one is to be a starting point of number' (Ross) 
`To be one is a kind of origin of number' (Kirwan) 
` L'essenza dell'uno consiste nell'essere un principio numerico (Reale) 
`L'essence de l'Un est d'etre une sorte de principe numérique' (Dubois) 
The variants printed in T 2 are more widely attested in the manuscripts (E, J 
and t). The reading ápxñ finds support in Alexander's commentary (In Met 368, 15 -6) 
and also in the analogy between this case and the other two occurrences of the same term 
at 1016b19 and 20. The insertion of <TOG> is justified by Jaeger on the basis of the 
consideration that being one is being the principle of any number. Modern commentators 
translate the line thus: 
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`Being one is the origin of being a certain number' (Kirwan) 
- `L'être de l'un est d' être principe d'un nombre quelconque' (Duminil and 
Jaulin) 
Finally, T 3 finds support in Asclepius' commentary (In Met 316, 4). 
Schwegler offers the following translation for it: 
`Das Einseyn ist Prinzip des Zahlseyin' 
Schwegler's interpretation is very close to Jaeger's. It is plausible that Jaeger 
might have agreed with Schwegler's interpretation, but found T 3 a text difficult to 
read (literally translated it would mean: `the being of the one is for anything being 
principle of number'). Motivated by Schwegler's understanding of the passage, 
Jaeger might have wanted to reconstruct a text, T 2, which gives the same sense as T 
3, but where the sense is more perspicuous to the reader. 
According to what text one reads, of what 
Aristotle says are possible: 
I 1 (reading T 1): being one is to be a certain kind of count principle 
I 2 (reading T 2): being a number is to be the principle of a certain kind of number 
If one accepts Ross' text, understood according to I 1, then the first claim in 
Aristotle's argument is that the one is a count principle only in a certain sense (Tlvi). 
This could mean two things: either that the one is a count principle in the sense that 
Aristotle specifies a few lines later in this chapter and also in Met X 1,106 namely the 
one is principle of knowledge of any quantity, for measuring is counting n times the 
chosen unit; or that the one is the origin of number only in a certain sense, because it 
is at the beginning of the series of numbers, but it is not itself a number (see e.g. in 
106 Met X 1, 1052b20 -4: `For measure is that by which quantity is known; and quantity qua quantity is 
known either by a 'one' or by a number, and all number is known by a 'one'. Therefore all quantity qua 
quantity is known by the one, and that by which quantities are primarily known is the one itself; and so 
the one is the starting -point of number qua number'. 
80 
Met XIV 1).107 In fact, in Phys IV 12, 220a27 -8, Aristotle says: `The smallest 
number, in the strict sense of the word 'number', is two'. 
If, on the other hand, one reads Jaeger's text, understood according to I 2, the 
one is the origin of the number, in one of its meanings. Aristotle distinguishes two 
meanings of the term `number' (see e.g. Phys IV 11, 219b5 -7): number is both what 
is counted / countable and that with which we count. The relevant meaning for the 
point made in Met V 6 is `what is counted / countable'. 
Let us now consider the overall argument that Aristotle is putting forward in the 
passage where the controversial text belongs to. The argument may be reconstructed 
in three steps: i) the one is the unit of any measurement;t08 ii) the unit of measurement 
is that in virtue of which we know; iii) the one therefore is principle of knowledge.109 
Counting is possible only when there is available a count name N that is 
attributed to an item x if and only if x falls under the concept C expressed by N, and 
vice versa of any item x that falls under the concept C it must be true that x is a N. 
The determination of the unit of measurement and of the appropriate count name is 
relative to the type of items that one wants to count.110 For, for Aristotle every 
number is the number -of- something (see Met XIV 5, 1092b19 -20), in two senses. A 
number depends, for its existence and definition, on that which is counted, for each 
number is defined by the unit of measurement taken n times, and the unit of 
measurement is defined in its turn as a part, however small one wishes, of what is to 
be measured. In other terms, a unit of measurement may be chosen arbitrarily but 
must be homogeneous with that which it is a measurement of, and it is precisely in 
virtue of this relation of homogeneity that the unit of measurement is the principle of 
107 Met XIV 1, 1088a6 -8: `Thus it is natural that one is not a number; for the measure is not measures, 
but both the measure and the one are starting -points'. See also Annas (1976:39). By contrast, for an 
argument to the effect that within Aristotle's doctrine the one and the zero are numbers, see Jones 
(1972: 110 -3). 
108 For the same point see also Met V 15, 1012a12 -3; X 1, 1052b16 -19; XIV 1, 1087b33 -4. 
109 See also the definition of `principle' that Aristotle gives in Met V 1, in particular at 1013a14 -5: ÉTI 
60EV YVWOTÒV TÒ npäyla fl bTOV, Kai dun QPXn À y£TOI TOO npQypaTOS. 
'lo See e.g. Met XIV 5, 1092b19 -20: `The measure must always be some identical thing predicable of 
all the things it measures, e.g. if the things are horses, the measure is 'horse', and if they are men, 'man'. 
If they are a man, a horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps 'living being', and the number of them will 
be a number of living beings. If the things are 'man' and 'pale' and 'walking', these will scarcely have a 
number, because all belong to a subject which is one and the same in number, yet the number of these 
will be a number of 'kinds' or of some such term.' For Aristotle's claim that numbers are always 
numbers -of- something, by contrast to the Platonic conception of numbers as separate entities, see 
Annas (1976: 357), Hussey (1983: 176 -84), Jones (1972: 111 -2). 
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knowledge of what is measured." It is now clear what Aristotle means at 1016b20- 
3: 
apXn oÚV TOO yvc>JaToú r1EpÌ ÈKQOTOV Tò V. OÙ TQÚTà ÖÈ Év IIQQI TOTS 
yÈvEQI Tò s`rv. äv6a pv yàp biEQIS Ev6a IM Tò cpcovñEV äcpcovov ßàpouS 
bÈ ËTEpov Kaì KlvrjQEwS äM0. 
The one, then, is the beginning of the knowable regarding each class. But the 
one is not the same in all classes. For here it is a quarter -tone, and there it is the 
vowel or the consonant; and there is another unit of weight and another of 
movement. 
On the reconstruction of Aristotle's argument I am suggesting, 11. 1016bI7 -8 
make better sense in Ross' edition, reading OA as qualified by TIVi: the one is not a 
number, but is the unit for measurement of numbers. The unit of measurement must 
satisfy two conditions: it has to be homogeneous with what it measures, as I have 
discussed so far, and it has to be assumed as indivisible, as Aristotle says at 1016b23- 
4. There is an important difference between the notion of indivisibility Aristotle uses 
in this part of the chapter, and the one that he makes use of to define the third account 
of `being one per se' in the previous part of the chapter. The unit of measurement is 
indivisible in an absolute sense; by contrast the entities that are `one per se' are 
indivisible only in a relative sense. An item x is indivisible in an absolute sense in 
case there is no principle of division internal to x that allows x to be divided in parts 
that are called themselves x. This notion of indivisibility is well exemplified in Cal 5, 
3b10 -3 with reference to the primary substances (as mentioned in chapter 1): 
Every substance seems to signify a certain `this'. As regards the primary 
substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain `this'; for 
the things revealed is individual and numerically one. 
An item x is indivisible only in a relative sense in case it is divisible in parts 
which maintain the same name as the whole, but do not derive from an internal 
principle of division in x. For example: the species `Man' is indivisible in an absolute 
See Met X 1, 1053a24 -7: `The measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured; the 
measure of spatial magnitudes is a spatial magnitude, and in particular that of length is a length, that of 
breadth a breadth, that of articulate sound an articulate sound, that of weight a weight, that of units a 
unit.' 
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sense because there is no divisive intrinsic difference which allows the species `Man' 
to be divided in sub -species which maintain the denomination `man'; but it is 
divisible in a relative sense, for there are individual men, in which the species may be 
conceptually divided, who maintain the denomination `man'. 
In Met V 6, 1016b23 -4, Aristotle adds that what is indivisible in an absolute 
sense is indivisible either according to quantity or according to form.112 This latter 
criterion, namely the qualitative one, is introduced so that there can be a unit for 
measurement for movement too, as Kirwan (1971: 139) too points out. In Phys V 4 
we read that each movement is quantitatively divisible, hence the unit for measuring 
movement, which for the principle of homogeneity has to be itself a movement, is 
divisible according to a quantitative criterion, but is indivisible according to a 
qualitative criterion.113 In Met V 6 Aristotle only mentions the two criteria for 
indivisibility, and to illustrate qualitative indivisibility offers the example of: the unit, 
the point, the line, the surface and the solid (1016b24 -31). These geometrical entities 
are ordered according to their degree of divisibility in one or more directions (or no 
direction at all, like in the case of the unit and the point)114 according to the same 
classificatory system Aristotle uses in De Caelo I 1, 268a7 -8115 
To briefly recapitulate, in the first section (1016b17-31) of the second part of 
Met V 6, Aristotle characterises the essence of the one as being a unit of 
measurement, homogeneous with what is measured and intrinsically indivisible; 
hence principle of knowledge of reality. By means of the appropriate unit of 
measurement, it is possible to identify what is measured, by similarity with something 
that is already known, i.e. the unit of measurement, and classifying it under a count 
name and a universal concept. Measuring is for Aristotle a fundamental 
112 See also Met X 1, 1053a18 -20: `Thus, then, the one is the measure of all things, because we come to 
know the elements in the substance by dividing the things either in respect of quantity or in respect of 
kind'. 
113 Phys V 4, 227b20- 228a20: `Motion is one in an unqualified sense when it is one essentially or 
numerically: and the following distinctions will make clear what this kind of motion is. There are three 
classes of things in connexion with which we speak of motion, the 'that which', the 'that in which', and 
the 'that during which'. I mean that there must he something that is in motion, e.g. a man or gold, and it 
must be in motion in something, e.g. a place or an affection, and during something, for all motion takes 
place during a time. Of these three it is the thing in which the motion takes place that makes it one 
generically or specifically, it is the thing moved that makes the motion one in subject, and it is the time 
that makes it consecutive: but it is the three together that make it one without qualification.' 
114 What differentiates the unit from the point is that the unit has no position in space, the point does. 
115 De Caelo 11, 268a7 -8: MEyt6ouq ót Tò IAN/ Fcp' ÊV ypappei, T6 ö' Éni öúo énincòov, Tò ö' ßnì 
Tpia ßwia 
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epistemological process. But, if this reading is correct, the way Aristotle's line of 
argumentation continues in the following section of the chapter (1016b31- 1017a3) 
seems not to follow a coherent development. Aristotle seems to conclude the 
discussion by introducing various types of oneness: i) oneness in number, ii) oneness 
in species, iii) oneness in genus and iv) oneness by analogy. The text allows two 
interpretations: Aristotle is presenting either different ways of counting or different 
accounts of being one, in the sense of being identical (TaiTÒ). On the former 
reading, what Aristotle is saying here is part of the preceding argument; on the latter, 
the order of exposition seems not to correspond to the line of reasoning Aristotle is 
following: why do we find here another series of types of oneness? To address this 
exegetical problem I will first give a fuller explanation of the two possible 
interpretations, then weigh their plausibility also in the light of other textual evidence, 
and finally show the variety of conclusions that different commentators at different 
times have derived from the passage. As a preliminary sample, Ross (1924: I 340) 
for instance highlights the correspondences between this section and the previous 
parts of the chapter. Dubois holds that this is a crucial passage where Aristotle claims 
the and to be one.116 By contrast, Kirwan believes this 
section does not tie in with the rest of the chapter, and Dumoulin even suggests that 
the section is a summary of the previous part of the chapter and not originally part of 
the text.117 
The first possible interpretation of the passage is that the four accounts of `being 
one' Aristotle introduces at 1016b31- 1017a3 correspond to different ways of 
counting, namely different ways of identifying the unit: in relation to matter, species, 
genus, analogy. This interpretation fits well in the framework of Aristotle's 
philosophy of mathematics; for, for Aristotle the unit of measurement is an ordinary 
physical entity which is taken, arbitrarily, to be indivisible for the sake of being the 
unit for measurement.118 From this perspective, Aristotle's exposition follows a 
116 Dubois (1998: 178): `On ne considérara donc pas le paragraphe 1016b31- 1017a3 comme intrusive, 
à la manière de Kirwan (p. 139); il montre au contraire, comment les catégories de l'être sont aussi 
catégories de l'un, puisque l'ordre et la structure interne de ces catégories dépendent de leur degré de 
divisibilité.' 
117 Kirwan (1971: 139): `This paragraphe seems intrusive. The senses it lists are, unlike many many 
which have preceded, all senses in which `one' means `the same'...not `single ". Dumoulin (1991: 
180): `Le dernier paragraphe (1016b31 et suiv.)...semble postérieur (car il reprend dans une nouvelle 
énumération le genre et l'espèce qui figuraient plus haut).' 
118 See e.g. Met XIV2, 1089b34- 1090a2, and also Annas (1976: 37). 
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coherent thread. He first describes in general terms what a unit of measurement is, 
and then gives different accounts of it, which ground different ways of counting. 
There is a natural connection between the sections 1016b17 -31 and 1016b31- 1017a3; 
furthermore the latter is well placed as a conclusion of that part of the chapter, 
1015b16- 1017a3, that concerns oneness, for it recapitulates some of the accounts of 
`being one per se' which have been discussed before (oneness in substratum and in 
species), and introduces two new accounts, oneness in genus119 and oneness by 
analogy. 
On the second possible interpretation, the various types of unity mentioned in 
the section 1016b31- 1017a3, express relations of identity between two or more items; 
Aristotle is here examining the notion of identity, following the same classification of 
meanings in Met V 9, 1018a5 -9, and X 1, 1054a32 -b3. This is why the section 
appears not to tie in with the second part of Met V 6. On this reading, this passage 
should rather be interpreted in the light of evident similarities with other passages of 
the Metaphysics on the same topic: 
Met V 6, 1016b31- 1017a3: 
Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by 
analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose definition is 
one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies. 
Met 9, 1018a5 -9: 
Some things ... are the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that which is 
one by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one either in kind or in 
number, and those whose essence is one, are said to be the same. Clearly, therefore, 
sameness is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it 
is treated as more than one, i.e. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we treat 
it as two. 
Met X 3, 1054a32 -b3: 
`The same' has several meanings; (1) we sometimes mean 'the same numerically'; 
again, (2) we call a thing the same if it is one both in definition and in number, e.g. 
119 Here genus to be understood as the highest genus, as in Phys VII 1, 242a67- 242b42, where Aristotle 
introduces, in relation to movement, a classification of types of identity analogous to the one in Met V 
6 (in the Phys only the account of oneness by analogy is missing). Identity in genus is explained by 
Aristotle at 242b35 thus: `[something] is generically the same if it belongs to the same category, e.g. 
substance or quality'. 
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you are one with yourself both in form and in matter; and again, (3) if the definition 
of its primary essence is one; e.g. equal straight lines are the same, and so are equal 
and equal -angled quadrilaterals; there are many such, but in these equality constitutes 
unity. 
The close similarity between the three passages above suggests that the passage 
in Met V 6 is to be interpreted as a brief discussion on the topic of identity, rather 
than as a further step in the argument Aristotle has started developing in the section 
1016b17 -31. Aristotle is listing various meanings of `one', taken in the sense of 
`identical per se' rather than various ways of counting. On this interpretation, it 
remains to be analysed now what are the various meanings of `being one' in the sense 
of ̀ being identical': 
i) oneness in number 
ETI bÈ TÒ J V KQT' áplepoV :rOTIV EV... apiBp p v wv rj Uri pia 
ii) oneness in species 
Tel bÈ KOT'EiòOÇ... EÏÖEI b' ciw ò Aoyoç ciç 
iii) oneness in genus 
Tá ö KQTà ó' Gi)V TñÇ KaTfjyopiaÇ 
iv) oneness by analogy 
TÒ bÈ KOT' ávaÀoyiay...KaT' ávaÀoyiav bÈ òaa EXEI cbç äMAo npòç äÀAo 
The first three accounts of oneness are a fundamental three -fold distinction for 
Aristotle which he defines as early as in Top I 7, 103a6- 14,120 where we find: 
a) identity in number 
apiepw pèv cLv òvòpara nAcicù TÒ bÈ npáypa EV 
b) identity in species 
EibEI bÈ óoa nAcic) övra áôlácpopa KaTÒ TÒ EiÒÒÇ tom 
c) identity in genus 
yÈvci...TaúTà 6o-a ÚnÒ TaÚTÒ yÈvoç ÈOTiV 
Regarding (i), interpreters find it difficult to reconstruct a coherent and unified 
framework for the various definitions of being one in number that Aristotle provides 
120 Top I 7, 103a6 -14: `We generally apply the term numerically or specifically or generically - 
numerically in cases where there is more than one name but only one thing, e.g. 'doublet' and 'cloak'; 
specifically, where there is more than one thing, but they present no differences in respect of their 
species, as one man and another, or one horse and another: for things like this that fall under the same 
species are said to be 'specifically the same'. Similarly, too, those things are called generically the same 
which fall under the same genus, such as a horse and a man'. 
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in his works. Two main interpretations have been proposed: on one of them, the 
different definitions belong to different stages of Aristotle's investigation and signal a 
development in his views on the topic. On the other interpretation, Aristotle has only 
one account for what it is to be one in number, and the different formulations are to 
be explained according to the different contexts in which they are presented. 
The first interpretation is supported for instance by Loux (1991: 93), who 
reconstructs an `ideal' line of development in Aristotle's thought, in three phases 
which correspond to the three definitions of numerical oneness: 
in Top I 7, 103a9 -10: X and Y are one in number iff `X' and `Y' denote the 
same entity even if under different descriptions; 
in Met V 6,1016b32 -3: X and Y are one in number iff the matter out of which X 
is composed and the matter out of which Y is composed is the same;121 
in Met V 6, 1016b1 -3: X and Y are one in number iff X's definition and Y's 
definition are the same. 
For Loux, the third is the most fundamental type of identity, the identity that 
binds together substances and essences according to Met VII 6. Whatever is identical 
in the third sense is also identical and the third. The first and the third 
definitions are applicable to both particulars and universals. The second definition, 
which appears on the one hand in Met V 6, 1015b16 -34 (in the case of accidental 
unity), and 9, 1017b26 -33 (in the case of accidental identity), and on the other in Met 
V 6, 1016b32- 1017a3 (in the case of being one per se) 9, 1018a -9 (in the case of 
being identical per se), applies only to particular composites. 
In the second of the two interpretations mentioned above, supported for instance 
by Annas (1976: 38 -9), the various formulations that Aristotle offers of oneness in 
number are different uses, in different contexts, of the very same notion. The three 
main uses concern: 
- something being one in the sense of being a particular (see e.g. Met II 4, 
999b33- 1000a1; X 1, 1052a31 -32; XII 8, 1074a31 -35); 
two things being one in number because of having the same matter (see e.g. 
Met V 6, 1016b32 -33; 3, X 1054a33 -35); 
121 Sameness number in virtue of sameness in matter includes also the case of things that are the same 
in genus. Sameness in genus may be per accidens (see Met V 6, 1015b16 -34 and 9, 1017b26 -33) or 
per se (see Met V 6, 1016b32- 1017a3, and 9, 1018a4 -9). 
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two things being one in number because of having the same form (see e.g. Met 
II 4, 999b21 -22; VII 13, 1038b14 -16; 16, 1040b17). 
Returning to the classification of types of oneness, regarding (ii), i.e. oneness 
in species, all the commentators understand it along the lines of the third account of 
`being one per se' in Met V, 1016a32 -b2. 
Regarding (iii), i.e. oneness in genus, interpreters disagree on how to 
understand the way it is formulated in terms of sameness in the figure of predication. 
Bonitz (In Met 238 -9) and Ross (1924: I 304 -5), who follows Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (In Met 369, 12 -4) hold opposite views. Bonitz has difficulties with 
Aristotle's claim at 1016b33 -4, where genus and category seems to be used as 
synonyms. Bonitz, following Trendelenburg (1994: 76 -81), argues that the 
expression TÒ oxñpa TrIS KaTriyopiaç has in that context a very generic and 
fundamental meaning: one in genus are those entities that within a single category 
also belong to the same class among the fundamental classes within that category. 
E.g. numbers are within the category of quantity and belong to the class of things that 
are `either even or odd'. Bonitz believes that the interpretation he puts forward finds 
supports also in other textual evidence, e.g. in Met X 3, 1054b27- 1055a2 and 8, 
1058a13 -6. Ross, in disagreement with Bonitz, claims that the term `category' in the 
passage in question in Met V 6, 1016b33 -4, has its usual meaning. He finds textual 
support in two groups of texts, one of which gives evidence that the expression TÒ 
oxñpa TñÇ KaTriyopiaç means simply `the category' (see e.g. Met V 6, 1017a3; VI 2, 
1026a36) and the other evidence that genus is used at times by Aristotle as 
synonymous with `category' (see e.g. Met V 28, 1024b12 -16; Phys V 4, 227b4). 
Regarding (iv), i.e. oneness by analogy, it makes good sense to take this 
account as complementary to the previous one. Aristotle is examining what it is to be 
one on the one hand from an intra- categorical point of view, with oneness in genus as 
a criterion for being one, and on the other hand from an inter -categorical point of 
view, with analogy as a criterion which cuts across categories. For instance, `man' 
belongs to the category of substance and `white' belongs to the category of quality. 
Man and white may be said to be one by analogy (äMo npÒÇ äßo) by virtue of the 
fact that for both we may predicate that they are in potentiality or that they are 
actualised. This account of what it means to be one by analogy finds support in 
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different passages in Aristotle's work, e.g. Met XII 4 and EN I 4.122 In particular, in 
Met IX 6 Aristotle gives the example of movement and substance as being one by 
analogy because of both being in actuality.t23 
Finally, Aristotle concludes the section 1016b31- 1017b3 by offering a 
justification for the order in which the accounts of oneness previously discussed have 
been introduced. The accounts that come later in the order of exposition express 
stronger types of oneness than the ones that come earlier, meaning that what is one in 
number is also one in species and in genus; what is one in species is also one in 
genus, and so on. It is not legitimate though, as Ross notes too (1924: 305), to extend 
this principle to the case of unity by analogy, for it is a type of unity between items 
belonging to different categories, hence it would be wrong to say that what is one by 
analogy is also one e.g. in genus.124 
122 Met XII 4, 1070b16 -20: `These things then have the same elements and principles (though 
specifically different things have specifically different elements); but all things have not the same 
elements in this sense, but only analogically; i.e. one might say that there are three principles -the form, 
the privation, and the matter. But each of these is different for each class; e.g. in colour they are white, 
black, and surface, and in day and night they are light, darkness, and air'. EN I 4, 1096b26 -9: But in 
what sense then are different things called good? For, they do not seem to be a case of things that bear 
the same name merely by chance. Possibly things are called good in virtue of being derived from one 
good; or because they all contribute to one good. Or perhaps it is rather by way of a proportion: that is, 
as sight is good in the body, so intelligence is good in the soul, and similarly another thing in 
something else'. 
123 Met IX 6, 1048b6 -9: `But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by 
analogy -as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are as movement to potency, and the others as 
substance to some sort of matter'. 
124 In the last section of Met V 6, 1017a3 -6, Aristotle discusses the various meanings of the term 
`many', which defined by opposition (ávTIKaptvcoq, see Met V 10, 1018a20 -5) to the meanings of the 
term `one', where `one' has to be taken as `one per se'. The nature of such opposition is investigated 
in depth not in Met V 6 but rather in X 3 and 6: it is not an absolute opposition, which would lead to 
absurd consequences, but rather an opposition between relative terms such as e.g. measure and 
measurable (see in particular Met X 6, 1056b32- 1057a1). Here is how Aristotle accounts for the three 
meanings of `many' in Met V 6: 
things are many because they lack physical continuity 
Tá Nkv yelp -I-LT) pei auV£Xí £ival 
- things are many because they fall under different species 
Tá Ök TCS ÖIOIp£Tñv ÉX£IV TtjV úÀgv KaTà T6 £ÌÖOÇ, i TO np(i)TfgV ij TO T£À£uTaiav 
things are many because they have different definitions 
T6 Ók T(il TOÚS ÀÓyouç nA£iouq TOÚC, Ti 6V £îval ÀkyovTaq 
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Chapter 3: The Analysis of the Puzzle (II): The Being of an Entity 
90 
Introduction 
The exegetical tradition records two main readings of the structure of Met V 7. 
On the one reading, by the majority of the ancient and medieval commentators, the 
chapter has to be read as divided into two sections, one about `being per accidens' 
and the other about `being per se'. On the other reading, first suggested by Alexander 
of Aphrodisias (In Met 370 -2) and embraced by the majority of modern 
commentators, there are four sections in the chapter, one for each meaning of `being' 
(TÒ ÓV): `being per se'; `being per accidens'; `being true' and `being false'; `being in 
potentiality' and `being in actuality'. I will first highlight the differences between the 
two interpretative approaches through the analysis of the criteria that the 
commentators have used to reconstruct the structure of the chapter. 
For the first line of interpretation, I will assume as paradigmatic Aquinas's 
position (In Met lib V lec 9), which is held before him also by Asclepius (In Met 316- 
9) and by Averroes (In Met 115vb -1 l7vb). Aquinas takes the Aristotelian text to be 
in different and increasing length, to indicate the increasing 
importance of the topic: 1017a7 -8; 1017a8 -22; 1017b22 -b9. The first section consists 
in the mere mention of the two ways in which something that is (ens) may be said to 
be; it is only introductory and appears to be taken as a section on its own only for the 
sake of preserving the three -fold structure that Aquinas sees in the text. The second 
section provides for Aquinas a series of meanings for `being per accidens' (ostendit 
quot modis dicitur ens per accidens), which amount to three types of predication: i) 
accidens de accidente, ii) accidens de subiecto, iii) subiectum de accidente. The third 
section provides a series of meanings for `being per se' (modus entis per se): i) ens 
quod est extra animam, ii) ens secundum quod est tantum in mente, iii) ens per 
potentiam et actum.125 This last part of the chapter is interpreted by Aquinas as 
introducing three degrees, in decreasing order, of being and hence of perfection: 
¡25 The conceptual distinctions that Aquinas uses in interpreting this part of Met V 7 (i.e. the 
distinctions between mental realities and extra -mental realities, between simple and complex items, 
and between different degrees of perfection) are to be found also in the commentaries by Averroes 
(XIIth), Albertus Magnus (XIIIth), and later on in the one by Paul of Venice (XIVth). 
For example let us consider the section 1017a31 -5, in which Aristotle accounts for being true and 
being false. Albertus Magnus takes it to be the case that `being true' has two meanings. One concerns 
the entities `extra animam and extra sermonem accepta' and in this case ' veritas rei est ipsa entitatis, 
quam habet ex sui perfection'. The other concerns the objects of thought and language, and in this 
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i) The first degree of being is the one that extra -mental entities enjoy. Extra - 
mental entities are to be divided into ten categories.t26 For each category there is a 
different meaning of the verb `to be', in its existential as well as copulative use, and 
three types of predication. Given a subject x and a predicate F, `x is F' is a 
predication of the first type when the predicate expresses what the subject is (e.g. 
Socrates is a man); of the second type if the predicate expresses what is `contained in' 
the subject, namely what constitutes it and characterises it (e.g. Socrates is white, 
Socrates is flesh and bones); of the third type if the predicate expresses something 
extrinsic to the subject (e.g. Socrates is in the Lyceum, Socrates is walking).127 
ii) The second degree of being is exclusively enjoyed by mental entities, and it 
is expressed, at the linguistic level, by the composition of the terms in the proposition 
which corresponds to the composition realised by the intellect.128 This second way of 
case `veritatem compositionis in complexione sermonic'. See Albertus Magnus In Met lib 5, tr 1, c 11, 
p 234. For Paul of Venice as well `being true' has two meanings. For the so called extra -mental 
entities, their being true consists for each thing in being the thing it is `perfectly', namely in a fully 
realised way. For the mental entities, their being true consists in the truth of the second operation of the 
intellect, namely the operation that the intellect performs when it composes or divides. In the case of 
the extra -mental entities, existing amounts to being perfect and being true, with no further mediation. 
In the case of mental entities, which are the results of composition or division by the intellect, their 
being true depends, in a relation of cause -effect, on the being true of the items that are composed or 
divided by the intellect, which themselves are true, as just said, when they are perfectly realised. See 
Paul of Venice, In Met f. 69rbM. Paul of Venice's interpretation is grounded on the distinction, which 
Averroes is the first to mention in his own commentary and which he attributes to Aristotle, between 
what it is to be true in the case of simple entities and what it is to be true in the case of complex 
entities. See Averroes In Met 14D -E and 14G -H. 
126 Aquinas' reading of Met V 7, 1017a22 -7 has been followed by Brentano (1960: 175) and 
subsequently criticised by Aubenque (1962: 171 note 1), who writes: `Les categories apparaissent donc 
ici [sc.: Met. V 7, 1017a22ff] pour le moins comme les significations privilégiées de l'être, et même 
comme les seules significations de l'être par soi. Ce passage va à l'encontre de l'interprétation de 
Brentano... qui, systématisant des indications de saint Thomas, fait des catégories autres que l'essence 
des divisions de l'être par accident.' Also (1962: 197 note 1): `La tentative la plus cohérente en ce sens 
sera, au XIX` siécle, celle de Brentano, qui, développant certains suggestions de saint Thomas, 
entraprend de `déduire' les catégories à partir de la distinction entre être par soi (ou essence) et être 
par accident (dont les modalités, ellesmêmes obtenues par division, consituent les autres catégories) 
...Certes, nous avons vu que la distinction des catégories n'etait rendue possible que par la distinction 
plus fondamentale de l'être en acte et de l'être in puissance...Mais on ne peut dire pour autant que la 
seconde distinction soit une spécification de la première.' Aubenque moves three objections to 
Brentano's interpretation. The first is that Aristotle presents the ten categories as various meanings of 
`being per se', and this rules out the possibility that the categories other than the category of substance 
are derivable from `being per accidens', but this contradicts Aristotle's position. The second objection 
is that `being per accidens' cannot be articulated into categories because there is no science of 
accidents and no way of deriving categories from them. The third objection is that Brentano confuses 
conceptual distinction and ontological division. The first objection has been raised also by Apelt 
(1975: 123). 
127 In Met lib V, lec 9, [889 -92]. 
128 In Met, lib V, lec 9, [889] and [895]. In other texts however Aquinas distinguishes three levels of 
reality, with respect to which the second level mentioned in the commentary to Met V 7, the level of 
reality of the mental entities, is divided into two levels. First there is the level of the mental entities 
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being is less perfect than the previous ones which are enjoyed by the extra -mental 
entities, for the former is dependent on the latter as an effect on its cause.129 
iii) The third degree of being concerns being in potentiality and being in 
actuality, and is interpreted by Aquinas as the way of being of both extra -mental and 
mental entities.t3° This way of being is defined by Aquinas as communius quam ens 
perfectum, for, at least as far as being in potentiality is concerned, what is in 
potentiality `is' only in relation to something else, namely what is in actuality, and 
thereby in incomplete and imperfect.I31 
From the brief analysis given above of Aquinas' interpretation we can now 
derive the two criteria that he employs in the reconstruction of the structure of 
Aristotle's text. Aquinas takes the chapter to be a self -contained text, and highlights 
its coherence and internal articulation, rather than the connections and the similarities, 
that are at times difficult to interpret, with other parts of Aristotle's works. In order to 
satisfy Aquinas' own requirement of systematisation, the Aristotelian text is 
reconstructed according to criteria of symmetry and hierarchy. The exegetical 
approach just described and well exemplified in Aquinas' commentary is typical of 
the commentaries of Asclepius and Averroes as well, and less prominently, also of 
other commentators intellectually dependent on Aquinas, such as e.g. Siger of 
Brabant (XIIIth).132 Aquinas's approach is to be contrasted with the one put forward 
first by Alexander of Aphrodisias, and shared by the majority of the modern 
commentators: Bonitz, Maier and Brentano,133 and subsequently an heterogeneous 
which have no reality outside the mind (e.g. a chimera), and second the level of the mental entities 
which do have reality outside the mind (e.g. an abstract entity). See e.g. Super Libros Sentent, dist. 
XIX, quaest. V, art. I: `Quaedam enim sunt quae secundum esse totum completum sunt extra animam; 
et huiusmodi sunt entia completa, sicut homo et lapis. Qaedam autem sunt quae nihil habent extra 
animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio chimerae. Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re 
extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem 
animae, ut patet in universali.' 
129ín Met, lib V, lec 9, [896]: `Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparetur ad primum, 
sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in 
propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum Est prout est verbalis copula.' 
130 In Met, lib V, lec 9, [897]: `Et sicut in rebus, quae extra animam sunt, dicitur aliquid in actu et 
aliquid in potentia, ita in actibus animae et in privationibus, quae sunt res rationis tantum.' 
131 In Met, lib V, lec 9, [889]: 'Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est 
communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum.' 
132 Siger of Brabant Questiones in Metaphysicam (1981: 298) and Questiones in Metaphysicam (1983: 
235). 
133 Bonitz, In Met 240: `Hoc quidem capite, quae est universi huius libri ratio, nihil curans quid ipse 
potissimum esse censeat, unice quot modis TÒ ÔV usurpetur disserit. Quos autem enumerat quattuor 
entis modos TÒ ÔV KCITÒ oupf3e[3rjKÒS 1017a7 -22, TÒ ÔV Ka -fa TÒ o)(f1NaTa Ti1S KaTr)yopiaq a22 -30, 
TÒ ôv ccç áAn* a31 -35, TÒ Ôv öuvápJEI Kai arvTEÀEXciç a35 -b9.' Also, Index 221a3ff.: `Ubi piene 
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group of analytic interpreters: Ross (1924: I 305ff), Kahn (1966: 245 -265; 1971: 323- 
334; 1986: 1 -28), Kirwan (1971: 140ff), Thorp (1974: 238 -56), Dubois (1998: 65 -72) 
and Dumoulin (1991: 179 -83). I just want to note here, without trying to present the 
differences in interpretation on particular issues between these commentators, that 
they all concentrate their exegetical efforts in making sense of the text in relation to 
other passages in Aristotle's works in which he discusses more extensively the very 
same themes. Witt's interpretation too follows, in the general lines, the approach of 
most of the modern commentators, with one difference. She sees Aristotle's text as 
divided into three sections; for her the first section, 1017a7 -30 includes both `being 
per se' and `being per accidens', by contrast with e.g. Aquinas.134 
enumerator noaax* AÉyETai T6 6v quattuor distinguuntur modi.' Maier (1900: 334): `In Met V 7, 
wo die 4 Seinsarten kurz zusammengestellt sint'. 
isa Witt's (1989: 38 -62) takes the chapter to have three sections, each of which is devoted to one of the 
following couples of opposite notions: `being essential' and `being accidental'; `being in actuality' and 
`being in potentiality'; `being true' and `being false'. Witt does not provide arguments in support of her 
position, but there are two textual points to be mentioned in her support. In the introduction of the 
chapter Aristotle introduces together the first two ways of being, per se and per accidens, and does not 
mention the other two; furthermore while the first two ways of being are opposed to each other, but 
also united, by the use of the particles piv...óè, each of the other ways of being is introduced by the 
particle ET!, which suggests more distance so to speak between an item and the other in the list of ways 
of being. 
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1. The predicative and the existential uses of the verb `to be' 
The traditional interpretation of Met V 7 is that in this chapter Aristotle is 
concerned with different meanings of the verb `to be'. Interpreters are however 
divided between those who claim Aristotle is giving a series of meanings of the verb 
`to be' in its copulative use, and those who claim that he is giving a series of 
meanings of the verb in its existential use. I will first reconstruct these two lines of 
interpretation, and present and evaluate the arguments which have been given in 
support of each of them. I will show that each of the two lines of interpretation leaves 
unresolved some exegetical difficulties in Aristotle's text. Hence, there is room for 
suggesting a new interpretation, which I will develop in the following section, 
arguing that Aristotle is introducing different entities, rather than different meanings 
of the verb `to be', whether in its copulative or existential use. Here is the passage on 
which the copulative and existential readings diverge, 1017a22 -4: 
Kae' aÚTà £TVQI AtyETQI ÖQQIIEp anpaiVEl Tà OxijNaTa Tñq KQTrwOpiaS' 
óQaXwS yàp A:ryETal, TOQaUTQX(J)C TÓ ETVaI QripaiVEI. 
The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figure 
of predication; for the senses of `being' are just as many as these figures. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias is the first to put forward the line of interpretation 
according to which in Met V 7 Aristotle analyses the different meaning of the verb `to 
be' in its copulative use. Alexander takes the expression TÓ OxrjpaTa TñÇ 
KaTrjyopiac to refer to the ten classes of entities described in Cat 4, 1b25- 2a4.135 For 
Alexander the copula has different meanings in relation to each of the things it is 
connected with; it signifies the belonging of a subject to category, and the belonging 
is qualified by the type of category the subject belongs to, hence the copula has a 
different meaning for each category.136 When the copula expresses the essential 
135 In Met 371, 18-20: (priai ö£ TOaaUTaXWS TÒ K06' aIJTÒ ôV ÁtyEaeal ôaa aOpaTa Kai yivrl 
KOTflyOpl(JV. aXflNaTa ÖÉ KOTflyOpl(ilV TàS ósrKa KaTflyOpÌaq AsryEl' bEKaXWC OUV (prim TÒ KaBY 
airTÒ ôv XtyEa6al. 
136 In Met 371, 21-2: bid yàp ÉKàaTU) TCJV ôVT(AV TÒ ETVOI OUVTOQaÓNEVOV TOÚTOV et) 
aUVTàaaETOI aflpaÌVEI' Tf1V yàp OÌKEÌaV Úf)apkIV tKàaTOU aflpaÌVEI TÒ ôV òpWVUpOV. 
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belonging of a subject to a category, the resulting predicate is a predicate per se of the 
subject.137 
There are however two interpretative difficulties that remain unresolved on the 
line of interpretation of the classification of meanings of the verb `to be' in its 
copulative use. The first one is that in Met V 7 the copulative `is' is qualified as per 
se (Ka9' aùTò), but the examples regard the belonging of an accident to a substance. 
The second one emerges from the comparison with De Int 3, 16b24 -5, where 
Aristotle claims that the copula signifies only a sort of conjunction, and therefore 
taken by itself does not mean anything (nor, a fortiori, can have different 
meanings) :138 
OÙ yelp TÒ EÌVQI Cj Nei Eival aWEÌÒV ÉoTI TOO npelyNaTOS, oúb' tàv TÒ öv 
EÌnnS ytl>`òv. aúrò yelp oúó:rv >aTlv, npoQQnpaivEl ósr Q6v9EQiv riva, 
CjV CIVEU TGV QuyKEIpÉVCOV oúK LOTI VonQQI. 
For neither are 'to be' and 'not to be' the participle 'being' significant of any fact, 
unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but 
imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things 
coupled. 
The difficulties I have just mentioned have been acknowledged by the 
supporters of the copulative line of interpretation, and attempts have been made to 
offer solutions that would make all the textual evidence square well with the general 
interpretation suggested. Alexander of Aphrodisias is the first to address the 
problematic comparison between Met V 7 and De Int 3. Alexander refers to the De 
Int 3 passage quoted above precisely to give support to his own interpretation that the 
copula may have various meanings for it acquires meaning from the conjunction with 
something else.139 Alexander takes Aristotle's point in De Int 3 to be that it is 
impossible to conceive of the copula if not in composition (GÙv9Eaiv) with (literally) 
137 This step in Alexander's reasoning finds support in Top 19, where Aristotle says that a given shade 
of white, one may say that it is a colour, or at least a white of certain kind: in this way one expresses 
the `what it is' of that nuance and signifies a quality. 
138 The same point, based on the comparison with De Int, is made also by Leszl (1970: 297). 
139 In Met 371, 34 -6: (.i)q yelp £inEV tv Tw IlEpì ep IIIVEiaÇir OÚTÒ lJ V oúö: V ÉaTI, npoaafpaiv£I óÈ 
aCiv8Eaiv TIVa, I¡V 4V£U TWV aUyK£INÉVú)V Oú)( oIOV TE EIVOI. 
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`what is put together' (TCv QUyKEIptvwv). For Alexander `what is put together' are 
the copula and the complementary part of the predicate. E.g. `is walking' is a 
predicate which is composed by the conjunction of the copula with an item from the 
category of action. But this way of reading the passage is not natural; the natural 
reading, which all the other interpreters have preferred, is to take `what is put 
together' to be the subject and the predicate, which are connected by the copula, e.g. 
Socrates and his walking. 
With respect to the other difficulty for the supporters of the copulative line of 
interpretation of Met V 7, concerning the meaning of the locution per se (Ka6' a6Tò) 
at 1017a22 -30, various suggestions come from the modern interpreters. Ross for 
example (1924: I 306 -7) shares the same general interpretation of the chapter as 
Alexander, but focuses much more on what distinguishes `being per accidens' from 
`being per se'. Ross takes `being per accidens' to be that use of the copula we find in 
sentences of the type `A man is musical' (this is the example that Aristotle gives at 
1017a9 and 1017a14), where the copula relates the subject and the predicate in a 
purely contingent way. Ross also assumes that Aristotle intends to contrast `being 
per accidens' with `being per se'; this assumption is well grounded in the text, 
because of the occurrence of the particles *...0 at 1017a7. Ross therefore 
concludes that `being per se', by contrast with `being per accidens', is that use of the 
copula by means of which subject and predicate are related by necessity. In fact there 
are four possible types of propositions with a copulative structure in which subject 
and predicate are related by necessity: (i) Y is X's definition; (ii) Y is X's genus; (iii) 
Y is a differentia of X; (iv) Y is a property of X. Furthermore, Aristotle, in 
characterising what it is to be per se, adds the claim at 1017a22 -3 that the various 
meanings of the verb `to be' in its copulative use are to be classified according to 
kinds that correspond to the categories. Ross understands this claim as a qualification 
that restricts which uses of the copula count as per se.140 For Ross the connection 
between subject and predicate expressed by the copula qualifies as per se only if it is 
an intra- categorial relation, i.e. a relation between items belonging to the same 
category. Ross remarks that of the four types of proposition which express a 
14° By contrast Maier (1969: 328) holds that Aristotle intends all the meanings of the verb `to be' 
introduced in the chapter, and not only those of ̀ being per se' to be grouped according to Tá o eipaTQ 
TFjÇ Kalrlyopiaç. For Meier it is only because of Aristotle's careless exposition that the interpreters 
are misled on this point. 
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necessary connection between the subject and the predicate, the ones in which the 
predicate is a property, a differentia or a definition of the subject, allow that subject 
and predicate belong to different categories. Therefore the only type of proposition in 
which the subject and the predicate belong to the same category is the one in which 
the predicate expresses the subject's genus. This is the only case of predication per 
se.141 Ross finds the examples offered by Aristotle for this point do not fit with his 
own interpretation, but he takes this as a matter of obscurity on Aristotle's part. This 
is however a significant difficulty with Ross' interpretation. For, Ross' interpretation 
that the only case of predication per se is the case in which the predicate expresses the 
subject's genus, makes it incoherent for Aristotle to claim in the context of per se 
predication that propositions of the form `Socrates walks' can be converted into 
propositions of the form 'x is walking'. For this conversion cannot not apply to 
propositions in which the predicate expresses the subject's genus. In Met V 7, 
1017a27 -30, Aristotle says:142 
o68>rv yàp blacp>psi Tò äv8pwnoç úylaivwv Tò äv8pwnoç 
üylaivE l, oúbÈ Tò äv8pwnoç ßabiNv >zoTìv il T>rNvwv Toú äv8pwnoç 
ßabi41 r'j T:rNva, òpoiwç bar Kai >rnì Tcv äñwv. 
For, there is no difference between 'the man is recovering' and 'the man 
recovers', nor between 'the man is walking or cutting' and 'the man walks' or 
'cuts'; and similarly in all other cases. 
14' Ross' conclusion is shared also by Apelt (1975: 123). 
142 Aristotle makes the same point also in De Int 10, 20a3 -15, and in An Pr I 46, 51b5-16. 
De Int 10, 20a3 -15: `When the verb 'is' does not fit the structure of the sentence (for instance, when the 
verbs 'walks', 'enjoys health' are used), that scheme applies, which applied when the word 'is' was 
added'. 12, 21b5 -10: `Now if this is the case, in those propositions which do not contain the verb 'to be' 
the verb which takes its place will exercise the same function. Thus the contradictory of 'man walks' is 
'man does not walk', not 'not -man walks'; for to say 'man walks' merely equivalent to saying 'man is 
walking ". Pr An I 46, 51b5 -16: 'In establishing or refuting, it makes some difference whether we 
suppose the expression `not to be this' and 'to be not -this are identical or different in meaning, e.g. `not 
to be white' and 'to be not -white'. For they do not mean the same thing, nor is 'to be not -white' the 
negation of 'to be white', but rather `not to be white'. The reason for this is as follows. The relation of 
'he can walk' to 'he can not -walk' is similar to the relation of 'it is white' to 'it is not -white'; so is that 
of 'he knows what is good' to 'he knows what is not -good'. For there is no difference between the 
expressions 'he knows what is good' and 'he is knowing what is good', or 'he can walk' and 'he is 
able to walk': therefore there is no difference between their opposites 'he cannot walk' - 'he is not able 
to walk'. 
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Another suggestion to solve the interpretative problem of how to account for 
the belonging per se of an accident to a substance has been offered by Kahn. He 
takes propositions of the type `x is accidentally F' to express un- natural predications, 
so called because the logical subject does not coincide with the grammatical one (e.g. 
`The musical is man'), by contrast with propositions of the form `x is per se F' that 
express natural predications.143 This criterion for differentiating `being per se' from 
`being per accidens' however still incurs into the difficulty of explaining one of the 
examples given by Aristotle. For, one of the examples of `being per accidens' that 
Aristotle proposes is `The man is musical' (repeated twice, at 1017a9 and 1017a14 -5) 
which clearly expresses a natural predication. 
In conclusion, the line of interpretation according to which in Met V 7 
Aristotle introduces different meanings of the verb `to be' in its copulative use leaves 
unresolved a few difficulties that the commentators have not yet satisfactorily 
addressed. 
I will now turn to the other traditional line of interpretation, the one according 
to which Aristotle introduces different meanings of the verb `to be' in its existential, 
rather than copulative, use. The general idea of this line of interpretation is that given 
any item Y falling under a certain category, `to be', i.e. `to exist', means for it to be in 
a certain relation with an item X falling under the category of substance. This 
interpretation is held for instance by Kirwan.144 Kirwan's interpretation in terms of 
criteria of existence is clearly very different from Ross' one. For, Ross concludes his 
interpretation of Met V 7 by assimilating the various meanings of to be that Aristotle 
gives to various types of judgements. He writes (1924: I 309): 
`While the first three senses seem to answer to three types of judgement, (1) A 
is (accidentally) B, (2) A is (essentially) B, (3) A is B (= is true that A is B), 
the fourth answers not to a type of statement co- ordinate with these, but to two 
senses [namely, being in potentiality and being in actuality] in which each of 
them may be taken'. 
'43 This terminology has been introduced by Barnes (1975: 112). 
144 Kirwan also remarks that the various meanings of the verb `to be' clearly exceed the number of the 
figures of predication, which Aristotle takes to be eight (or in some contexts ten; e.g. Met III 2, 
1003b6 -10, De Anima II 4, 415b13). Hence, Kirwan takes Aristotle's statement that the meanings of 
`being per se' are as many as to TÒ a)(r1paTa Tñç KcTrlyopiaÇ to mean that the various meanings may 
be classified and ordered in categories, rather than to mean that they may be exhaustively listed as the 
figures of predication. 
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There are however difficulties that the existential line of interpretation creates, 
and that rather support the copulative interpretation. For instance Thorp (1974: 238- 
56) remarks that all the occurrences of the expression per se in the chapter are of the 
type `x is per se F', in which the verb to be is clearly used as copula. 
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2. Ways of being 
The difficulties that the two traditional lines of interpretation leave unresolved 
show that there is room for attempting a new interpretation of the chapter. I suggest 
reading the chapter as a classification of different types of entities. The opening lines 
of the chapter, 1017a7 -8, read as follows: 
TÒ ÖV MY£TC1I TÒ p>rV KQTÒ 0Upß£ß11KÒS TÒ bÈ KQA' QÚTÒ 
Comparing these lines with two of the most thematically relevant passages, Met 
IV 2 and VII 1,145 makes clear that in Met V 7, by contrast with the other two cases, 
Aristotle uses the nominalized participle precisely to indicate that he is giving a 
classification of entities. I contrast this interpretation to the ones according to which 
it is classification of existential or copulative uses of the verb to be. Indeed, 
elsewhere in Met VIII 2, 1042b25 -31, where Aristotle clearly focuses on a 
classification of the uses of the verb `to be' in its existential meaning, he uses the 
nominalized present tense, TÒ LOTI, rather than the participle.146 In addition to these 
considerations on the linguistic level, the interpretation that in Met V 7 Aristotle 
introduces different entities rather than different uses of the verb `to be' finds further 
145 Met IV 2, 1003b5 -10: `So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is'said to be, but all refer to 
one starting -point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are 
affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or 
privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are 
relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we 
say even of non -being that it is non -being'. 
Met VII 1, 1028a1 -20: `There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out 
previously in our book on the various senses of words;' for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a 
thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are 
predicated as these are. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 
'what', which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say 
that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we 
do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'a man' or 'a 'god'. And all other things are said to be 
because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, 
others affections of it, and others some other determination of it.' 
146 Dubois (1998: 67) raises the question of why Aristotle chooses the participle rather than any other 
verbal form: `Avant d'entreprendre le commentaire de ce chapitre consacré à l'étant (on), on est en 
droit de se demander pourquoi Aristote explique précisament ce mot plutôt que le verbe einai et surtout 
que le présent esti qui était le point de départ de la réflexion de Parménide. Ce n'est pas ici le lieu de 
répondre à cette question puisque Aristote lui -même ne la pose pas. Il importe toutefois de la garder 
présente à l'esprit, sourtout lorsque, dans son commentaire, Aristote est obligé de se référer à la 
signification du verbe esti dans l'analyse de l'attribution'. 
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support in the following consideration. While the expression `per se' may be applied 
to items belonging to categories other than the category of substance, there is no 
sense of the expression `per se' which could be applied to the verb `to be' neither in 
its copulative nor its existential use for anything else but substances. In fact the 
expression per se qualifies the verb `to be' in its existential use only in the following 
way: X is per se if X is not said of anything else as its subject. This is the third 
meaning of the expression per se which Aristotle lists in An Post I 4, 73b5 -10. But 
only substances exist per se in this sense, not items belonging to other categories. 
However, in Met V 7 being per se is claimed to be said in as many ways as the 
number of the categories. So any meaning we attribute to the expression per se in 
Met V 7 must be appropriate also for non substantial items. I suggest interpreting per 
se along the following lines: x is per se if it is the type of entity it is without there 
being composition at a more primitive level between different types of entities that 
make up what x is. (For example, contrast an accident with an accidental composite: 
the accident is per se, the accidental composite is not). On this understanding of what 
per se means, an item belonging to any category, other than the category of 
substance, may be said to be per se. For what does not belong to the category of 
substance is per se a certain type of item, although it does not exist per se. Those 
items which do not fall under the category of substance exist in virtue of their 
belonging to substances, namely in virtue of a predicative relation between 
themselves and the substance which is their subject.147 Non -substantial items cannot 
therefore be said to exist per se, because they are dependent entities, but they can be 
correctly be said to be per se, if their definition does not contain reference to a 
predicative relations between ontologically more primitive items.148 Only substances 
are per se with respect both to definition and to existence. Everything else that does 
not fall under the category of substance may be said per se only with respect to 
definition.149 Further evidence for this point is to be found in Met VII 4, where 
147 See e.g. Met VII 1, 1028a18 -20. 
148 Scaltsas (1994: 169) explains in which sense non -substances can have in a derivative sense 
definition, essence, and `what it is' in the light of what Aristotle says in Met VII 4 and 6, and taking 
into consideration also Met V 18. For Scaltsas non -substances are definable only derivatively; for, in 
order to ask the question `what is it' about a non -substantial item one has to perform what Scaltsas 
calls a subject shift. Namely one has to consider the non -substance in abstraction, as if it were a subject 
per se. 
149 Commentators have registered the difficulty of explaining how items that are not substances may be 
said to be per se, and how what Aristotle claims in Met V 7 is compatible with what he says in Met VII 
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Aristotle claims that to exist and to have a definition are primarily and absolutely 
speaking (npcirTwç, ànÀ(öç) features of the substance and only in a derivative sense 
(Énop v(1ç, nc;4) also of the items that do not fall under the category of substance.'5° 
In the light of the remarks made so far, let us return to the following passage 
from Met V 7, 1017a22 -7: 
Kae' aIJT(7 bÈ £ÌVaI AÈV£TQI OQan£p QnNaÌV£I Tà Q)(11paTa Tñq KQTnYOpÌaC' 
ó0aXc74 yàp My£TaI, TOQaUTaX64 TÒ &aI a1jpaÌV£I. Èn£Ì OÚV T(15V 
KQTCjVOpOU*Ct)v TCl Ti ÈOTI QnpaÌV£I, TÒ bÈ nOIÒV, TC] ÓÈ nOQÒV, Tà 
bÈ npàS TI, TCl bÈ noIEÑ nàO)(£IV, TCl IH nOIJ, TÒ óÈ nOTÈ, ÈKÒOT(}) 
TOÚT(OV TÒ £ÌVaI TQÚTÒ QripaÌv£I 
The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures 
of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since, 
then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others 
quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its 
'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. 
The distinction between the two senses in which something may be said to be 
per se, namely with respect to definition and to existence, has broader interpretative 
consequences. For, it allows us to recognise the passage above as a specific stage in 
the development of Aristotle's theory of definition, in between the Topics and Met 
VII -VIII. The Topics model of definition, which is by genus and differentia, does not 
contain any reference to the question whether the deftniendum belongs or not to a 
substratum. This is why on this model there is no difference between the definitions 
1. Paul of Venice, for example, among the medieval commentators, writes: `Dubitatur quia ens 
divisum in decem predicamenta est ens secundum se per Philosophum in littera, sed omne divisum per 
se predicatur de quolibet suorum dividentium; ergo omne predicamentum est ens per se, consequens 
est falsum, quia accidentia non sunt entia per se, sed in alio. Accidens enim non est ens nisi quia entis, 
et accidentis esse est finesse, per Philosophum, septimo huius. Respondetur quod omne accidens, tam 
concretum quam abstractum, est ens per se, ut musicum et musica, calidum et caliditas, ex quo ista 
sunt per se in predicamento et formaliter continentur sub ente. Composita enim per aggregationem 
substantie et accidentis extra se invicem sunt entia per accidens, ut homo albus, sed simplicia sunt entia 
per se'. Paul of Venice In Met, f. 68vbM. 
150 Met VII 4, 1030a21 -7: `For as 'is' belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but to one 
sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple 
sense to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we might ask 
what it is, so that quality also is a 'what a thing is', -not in the simple sense, however, but just as, in the 
case of that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, that that is which is not is -not is 
simply, but is non- existent; so too with quality'. 
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of a substance (which does not belong to any substratum) and of any non -substantial 
item (which necessarily belongs to a substratum). By contrast, in the Met VII -VIII 
model of definition, the definition must mention the conditions for existence of the 
definiendum. These conditions are clearly different for substances and for non - 
substantial entities. In particular, in the case of a non -substantial item x its definition 
must mention, among the conditions for its existence, also the belonging of x to a 
substance, and the substance itself to which x belongs. How does Aristotle move 
from one model for definition to the other? In an ideal reconstruction of the 
development of Aristotle's theory of definition, which I sketch here only very 
roughly, we may then distinguish three stages. The first one corresponds to 
Aristotle's position in the Topics; the second to his position in the Posterior 
Analytics; the third to his position in the central books of the Metaphysics. In order to 
highlight the difference between the Topics and the Analytics models for definition, 
let us first consider the case of non -substantial items. On the Topics model, we can 
give a `nominal' definition of a non -substantial item which expresses what the thing 
is, regardless of whether it actually exists or not, and hence whether it is instantiated 
in a substance or not. For example, the definition of white on the Topics model is: a 
colour of a certain type. This definition contains no reference to the fact that white, 
being a quality, needs a substratum to which to belong - which is the surface of 
objects. By contrast, as we see e.g. in Post An II 10, the `real' (as opposed to 
`nominal') definition of something presupposes that the definiendum exists, hence it 
cannot ignore what the conditions for its existence are. The `real' definition captures 
the condition for the existence of the definiendum by expressing the causes of the 
definiendum, including the material cause. To return to the previous example, the 
definition of white on the Analytics model is: surface coloured in a certain way. The 
Analytics model can in fact be read as an attempt to achieve equivalence between 
nominal and real definition of something. This equivalence is however reached only 
in the third stage of development of Aristotle's theory of definition, in the central 
books of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle's understanding of the genus as matter 
allows him to make definition and conditions for existence of something fully 
equivalent.151 In Met V 7 non -substantial items are said to be per se on the ground 
151 On Aristotle's theory of definition in the central books of the Metaphysics, see e.g. Bostock (1994: 
279 -290). 
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that their being what they are does not rest on a dependence relation between more 
primitive constituents. In this respect, the position Aristotle takes in Met V 7 reflects 
an intermediate stage in between the Topics and the central books of the Metaphysics. 
Aristotle shows awareness that the conditions for existence of the definiendum play a 
role, although they do not (yet) have in his account the same centrality as in the 
central books of the Metaphysics. 
In conclusion, the interpretative suggestions I put forward in relation to Met V 7 
are the following. In the chapter Aristotle presents a classification of entities, rather 
than of meanings of the verb `to be' in either its copulative or existential use. These 
entities are said by Aristotle to be per se. I suggest understanding this claim by 
distinguishing two senses in which something can be said to be per se. One sense in 
which something can be said to be per se is with respect to its existence, i.e. it does 
not depend on something else to exist. Another sense is with respect to its definition, 
i.e. its definition does not require reference to other more primitive entities related as 
to create its internal structure. Only substances are per se in both senses; non - 
substances are per se only in the latter sense. The entities that Aristotle introduces in 
Met V 7 are non -substantial, hence they are per se only in definition; they do not exist 
per se. Those entities are accidents, whose actual existence is parasitic, we may say, 
on substances: they necessarily belong to a subject. Finally, reading Met V 7 as a 
classification of entities allows a better interpretation of Aristotle's claim at 1017a27- 
30 that any proposition of the type e.g. `x walks' is reducible to a proposition with a 
copulative structure of the type `x is walking'. For, the conversion into a copulative 
structure highlights what we may call the nominal aspect of the verb, along the lines 
of what Aristotle says in De Int 3.152 In the De Interpretatione Aristotle reckons two 
functions peculiar to verbs that distinguish them from nouns: expressing the way 
things are related, and locating this relation in time.153 In a proposition with 
152 De Int 3, 16b19 -20: aúTà J V oÚV KaO' aùTà AcyöpEva Tà Pf1paTa óvôpaTá ÉoTI Kai of)paivEi 
TI. `Verbs in and by themselves are substantival and have significance'. 
153 De Int 3, 16b23 -5: aÚTÒ 0/ yàp ot:Zty tCTIV, np000fpaiVEI ösr aIIVeEaiV TIVO, tv áVEU T(.JV 
auyKEIpÉVwV 06K LOT! voñaal. `They do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of 
which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled'. Also, 16b6: 'Pñpa öÉ atoTl TÒ 
np000ripaivov Xpóvov. `A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the 
notion of time'. And, 10, 19b14: (ApaTa ÉK TC )V KEINÉVWV t`oTiV np000ripaiva yàp xpóvov. `The 
expressions 'is', 'will be', 'was', 'is coming to be', and the like are verbs according to our definition, 
since besides their specific meaning they convey the notion of time'. 
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copulative structure. the two fimctìons are both transferred to the copula. and the 
predicative complement of the copula may he understood as the name of an entity. ups 
154 On this point, see Leszl (1970: 36-9). 
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3. The multiplicity of the meanings of `to be' in Aristotle's works 
There is a close parallelism between the classification of the various meanings 
of TÒ Öv in Met V 7 and in VI 2, 1026a33 -b2. Interpreters agree in thinking that in 
Met VI 2, 1026a34, there is a clear reference to V 7. Here is the text that I am going 
to examine: 
AAA' Òn£ì TÒ ÖV TÒ ànAe.oS AEyópEvov Asry£TaI noAAaX63S, wv Ëv p>rv 6v TÒ 
KQTà QUpßEßnKÒS, sT£pOV b>r TÒ (idS àAnetS, Kai TÒ pr] ÖV (ba, TÒ l[J£(ÖoS, 
napà TQUTa b' EOTì T6 O)(CjpaTa TfjS KQTnyOpiaS OioV TÒ pÈV Ti, TÒ öÉ 
nolÒv, TÒ óE noaÒV, TÒ bar noir, TÒ bÈ noT>r, Kai ET TI ÖAAo Qnpaiv£i TÒV 
TpOnoV TOUTOV), ETI napà TQUTa nàVTa TÒ bUVàpEI Kai EvEpyEiQ 
But since the unqualified term 'being' has several meanings, of which one was 
seen to be155 the accidental, and another the true ('non- being' being the false), 
while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the 'what', quality, 
quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which 'being' may have), and 
again besides all these there is that which 'is' potentially or actually. 
The same expression TÒ Öv occurs in both passages in Met V 7 and VI 2, but in 
VI 2 Aristotle qualifies it as TÒ ànAcîÇ AEyÒp£v0v. Interpreters have noted this 
variation, and have explained it in different ways. Some commentators take TÒ 
ànÀciç A£yòpEvov to indicate the level of generality at which Aristotle is making his 
statement. This is how Aquinas understands it for instance; he reads ànAcxç 
translated as simpliciter, and paraphrases it as idest universaliter dictum.156 Other 
modern commentators, for example Kirwan, take ànACk to mean `unqualified'; 
Kirwan translates it `when baldly so called' (1971: 68). The fact however that the 
qualification TÒ ànÀ(iç AEyôpEvov does not appear in other passages where Aristotle 
distinguishes various meanings of TÒ Öv (e.g. Met III 1 and 2, VII 1) suggests in my 
view that the use of this qualification is more significant to the interpretation of Met 
155 The use of past tense suggests that there has been a previous discussion of the issue, and the 
interpreters agree in reckoning it in Met V 7. 
156 In Met lib VI lec 2 [1171]. My hypothesis is that Aquinas paraphrases simpliciter with universaliter 
dictum to avoid possible misunderstandings that might arise because the expression esse simpliciter 
describes a way of being proper to God. 
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VI 2 than the commentators take it to be. In support of this suggestion, I will first 
examine whether Met VI 2 offers a classification of various meanings of the verb `to 
be' in its existential use, or rather a classification of entities analogous to the one in 
Met V 7. The former interpretation has been put forward for instance by Kirwan. 
Kirwan reckons two main uses of the adverb ánA(iïS in Aristotle's works, one to 
signify `without qualification' (e.g. in Met VI 2, 1027a5), and the other `without 
addition' (e.g. Top II 2, 115b29 -35). He holds that &M i ç in the second sense is used 
by Aristotle to qualify the verb `to be' in its existential use (and to distinguish it from 
the copulative use), and finds evidence for this claim e.g. in Post An II 1, 89b33.'57 
Kirwan wants to extend this interpretation also to Met VI 2, 1026a33, which he sees 
as a classification of meanings of the verb `to be' in its existential use. Kirwan's 
interpretation, however, encounters two possible objections, of which he himself is 
aware. The first is that in Met VII 1, 1028a30 -1, Aristotle says that only substances 
can be ánMcöç. In response, Kirwan merely notes that Aristotle's assertion in Met VII 
appears to be contradicted in VI 2, and does not enter into an exegetical discussion of 
this discrepancy between the two texts. His suggestion is that `Aristotle had no 
settled opinion as to whether `x is' must be elliptical when x is a non -substance'. The 
second difficulty is that being true, which is one of the meanings of `to be' Aristotle 
mentions in Met VI 2, is not a type of existence. Kirwan finds a solution to this 
difficulty in Met V 29 where `Aristotle treats falsehood as a property not of 
propositions or sentences, but of "actual things ", sc. states of affairs, and infers that a 
false state of affairs is one that `is not'. This doctrine does in effect propose that truth 
and falsehood are forms of existence and non -existence'. Kirwan's conclusion is that 
`even if there are places in which Aristotle restricts "being baldly" to substances, he 
does not do so in VI 2; and that in VI 2 "is baldly" means "exists '. But Kirwan 
(1971: 189 -90) only asserts his conclusion, and does not offer sufficient 
argumentative support for it. 
The alternative interpretation I want to suggest is grounded in a different 
understanding from Kirwan's of the main uses of the adverb e n)c ç in connection 
157 Contra Kirwan, Kahn (1966: 263 -4) writes: `One may, if one chooses, explicate Ervol TI by 
reference to the copula; but Eivai ianÀtbç is not in general "to exist ". On the contrary, it is a either an 
indeterminate expression, since for Aristotle there is no one, single meaning of "to be ", or else it refers 
specifically to the being of substances, as the primary instance of being in general'. 
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with the verb `to be'. On the basis of an analysis of the most relevant passages,158 I 
suggest the adverb ànÀwç is used by Aristotle to differentiate the way of existing of 
substances, which are what everything else is predicated of but not predicated 
themselves of anything else, from the way of existing of non -substances, whose 
existence in actuality depends on their belonging to an actual substance.159 The first 
use of ànA &ç is to be found e.g. in Met VII 1, 1028a30 -1, and 4, 1030a21 -7: 
(.í)OT£ TÒ np(bT(AS 8v Kaì oÚ Ti 8V àAA' 6v ànAc74 rj ouQia äv £ïn. 
Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without 
qualification, must be substance. 
6Qn£p yàp Kai TÒ ÉOTIV únàpX£I náQlv, àAA' oúX öpoi(oS àAAà Tw pÈv 
np(x)T(oS TOTç b' Énop>rv(oç, OIJTW Kai TÒ Ti ÉOTIV ànA63ç p£V Tñ ntbS 
b>r TOTS ÖAAOIç' KQi yàp TÒ nOIÒV arp0ip£6' äv Ti ÉOTIV, Cí)OT£ Kaì TÒ nOIÒV 
T(L5V Ti ÉOTIV, àAA' Ol1X ànA(74, àAA' (i)Qn£p Éni TOO prj ÖvTOS AOyIKc74 (PaQi 
TIV£S EiVQl TÒ prj 8v, oúX ànAeoç àAAà prj 8v, 00TQ) KQi TÒ n01Òv. 
'What a thing is' in one sense means substance and the 'this', in another one or 
other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as 'is' belongs to all 
things, not however in the same sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to 
others in a secondary way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple sense to 
substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we 
might ask what it is, so that quality also is a 'what a thing is', -not in the simple 
sense, however, but just as, in the case of that which is not, some say, 
emphasizing the linguistic form, that that is which is not is -not is simply, but is 
non -existent; so too with quality. 
In order to shed light on the second use of ànÀ(TS, in relation to non substantial 
items, let us begin with the working hypothesis that x is ànAcç if x is "in virtue of 
being something" (Öv TI), and is not ànAô ç if it is not "in virtue of being something" 
(prj Öv TI). Two passages are particularly relevant to clarify this hypothesis. The 
first one is Phys I 3, 187a3 -6: 
158 For a complete list of the occurrences of the adverb ánÀcSS see Bonitz, Index, 76a -77b. 
159 See the discussion of this topic in chapter 1. 
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(paVEpÒV ót Kai ÖTI OIJK áÀn6ES Gi)S, Ei ÊV QripaiVEI T6 6V KQÌ pr) Ay TE 
61.1a TO ávri(paQly, 06K :'roTal oú9Ev N17 6v oú8>rv Yáp K(oIJ£I, Nrj änÀwq 
gym, áÀÀá pel 6v TI EiVQI T6 pr) 6v 
But obviously it is not true that if `to be' means `to be one', and it is impossibile 
that two contradictories are true at the same time, that -which -is -not will not be 
at all. For, nothing prevents that that -which -is -not is not without qualification, 
but is even if it is not a particular being (my translation). 
In the first part of the passage just quoted, 187a3 -4, Aristotle is reconstructing 
the arguments of those who from the premises that (i) `to be' means `to be one', and 
that (ii) it is impossible to be an not to be at the same time in the same respect, 
conclude that (iii) that -which -is -not is not at all. The conclusion (iii) is derived 
through an argument ad absurdum. Suppose, contrary to (i) that that -which -is -not is 
(in same way); then there must be a way of being which is appropriate for that- which- 
is -not and is also different, because of (ii), from the way of being which characterises 
that -which -is. But if there are these two ways of being, as one seems forced to admit, 
then `to be' no longer means `to be one', contrary to (i). Thus the initial hypothesis 
per absurdum must be abandoned. And it is true that that -which -is -not is not at all. 
In the second part of the passage quoted above, 187a5 -6, Aristotle rejects the 
argument just presented, claiming that that -which -is -not is not ánÀtç, i.e. it is not 
something (pr) 6v TI), but nevertheless it is. The non -being has its own way of being, 
we might say, although its way of being is not to be something determinate.l6o 
This interpretation is derived from the following reading of the text. It is 
natural to read the expression prj 6v TI as explicative of pr ánAk. The meaning of 
the expression l.lrj 6v TI depends on how we understand TI, which can be taken either 
as a predicative complement of `to be', or as an adverb. In the first case, the 
expression pr) 6v TI could mean either `without being something' - where TI is a 
variable, meaning: a type of thing; or else `without being something determinate' - 
where TI stands for a new entity that would be in existence if that -which -is -not were 
160 Ross (1924: 481) paraphrases Aristotle thus: `But it is also evident that it is not true that if being 
means one thing and cannot at the same time mean the opposite of that thing, no non -being will be; for 
there is nothing to prevent that which is not - not from being, simply, but from being what is not some 
particular thing'. 
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to be. In the second case, if TI is taken as an adverb, the expression JI 6v TI means 
`not being, but only in a certain sense'. In order to determine which reading is 
preferable, there is another significant passage to be taken into account, Met VII 1, 
1028a30 -1, where Aristotle contrasts the expressions Oil Ti Öv (equivalent to pfl Öv 
TO with Öv pniVoq. In that context there are reasons (mentioned above p. 114) to 
prefer reading OÙ Ti Öv as meaning `without being something determinate'. By 
analogy, it appears preferable to give the same reading as in Met VII 1 also in Phys I 
3. Hence, Aristotle's claim there is that the fact that that- which -is -not is (in some 
way) does not amount to the coming into being of a new entity with its own 
determinate nature. 
In sum, on the ground of the analysis of the three passages, Met V 7 and VI 2, 
and Phys I 3, I suggest to take `to be ánÀô ç' to signify not generically existence, but 
rather the way in which something is in virtue of being something determinate, by 
contrast with the way in which something is not, being nothing at all. 
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4. Final Remarks 
In the course of analysing Met V 7 I have often mentioned, at least cursorily, 
that there is an ongoing debate among modern interpreters regarding whether 
Aristotle understands the potential ambiguity of the verb `to be'. As it is clear to us 
nowadays, the verb `to be' may be used to signify a copulative relation between two 
terms (x is F, i.e. F is predicated of x); a relation of identity between two items (x is y, 
i.e. x and y are identical); and finally simply the existence of something (x is, i.e. x 
exists). If these various meanings of the verb `to be' are not kept distinct, the richness 
in meaning of the verb becomes ipso facto ambiguity. Modern commentators debate 
whether, and to what extent, Aristotle is aware of such distinction between different 
uses and meanings of the verb `to be', and furthermore whether he classifies them 
according to some order of priority. After two major studies on this topic came out in 
the mid -Sixties by Owen and Khan161 the majority of commentators seemed 
convinced that nowhere in Aristotle do we find an articulate distinction of the various 
meanings of `to be'. More recently Hintikka has deemed this distinction of meanings 
`completely anachronistic when applied to Aristotle'.162 And yet, there are some 
161 Owen (1965: 71) finds in Plato's Sophist a first attempt, which he thinks Aristotle carries forward, 
to distinguish among dyadic uses of the verb `to be' the cases in which the verb has the function of the 
copula and the cases in which it has the function of a sign of identity: `He [i.e. Plato] treats `to be' and 
`not to be' alike incomplete or elliptical expressions which always call for some completion: to be is 
just to be something or other. And if this is so his analysis becomes the direct parent of Aristotle's...It 
is evidently a similar broad division in the uses of that verb that Aristotle is drawing in such passages 
as the seventh chapter of Metaphysics V where he marks off to kath'hauto on ...from, among other 
things, to kata sumbebékos on...But the same chapter shows that it is not these broad distinctions that 
he has in mind in the text from which we set out. For he offers to take only one such general function 
of the verb and show that it harbours a certain multiplicity of use; and he identifies this multiplicity by 
saying that `being' has different uses in different categories (1017a22 -30) ...So the argument in our 
text is confined to one general function of the verb; and it squares with the view that it is concerned 
with question of existence' (italics in the original). Also, Kahn (1966: 247) highlights the reasons why 
he doubts that in ancient Greek it is genuinely possible to distinguish different uses of the verb `to be' 
as copulative, existential and identity: `This fusion of a syntactic and a semantic criterion into a single 
antithesis [between copulative and existential use] could be justified only if there were a direct 
correlation between the two, i.e. only if (1) the absolute use of the verb is always existential in 
meaning, (2) the verb `to be' in the predicative construction is always devoid of meaning, serving as 
merely formal or grammatical device for linking the predicate with the subject. But these assumptions 
seem to me false... for Greek'. 
162 Hintikka (1986: 82 -83): `Not only does he [Aristotle] refuse to countenance the Frege- Russell 
distinction as homonymy between several different meanings. He does not always recognize the 
distinction as a separation between different uses of the Greek words for being (italics in the original). 
For the same point, see also Hintikka (1983: 443 -468). 
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contemporary and authoritative commentators who attempt to establish which of 
these uses we might consider in fact the primary one for Aristotle. The debate is 
between those interpreters who hold that the fundamental use is the existential one, 
and those who think it is the copulative one. The former position has been supported 
most significantly by Owen (1965: 82) and Matthen (1983: 124 -5), while the latter 
has been supported by Kahn (see below). 
Matthen expresses his interpretation as a rhetorical question which presupposes 
a positive answer: 
`Could Aristotle not be assuming...that all uses of `is' correspond to a monadic 
use, and in particular that the copula can be made monadic by moving its 
complement to attributive position ?' 
Matthen explains how the copulative use is reducible to the existential one by 
introducing the notion of a predicative complex, which he defines as the 
`entity formed, as Aristotle suggests in Met. VII 12, from a universal and a 
particular when that particular instantiates that universal... A predicate complex 
a part of a sentence, and does not correspond to a 
sentence as a whole...A complete thought is formed by attributing (monadic) 
being or non -being to one of these complexes'. 
By contrast, for Kahn (1986: 3) `the copula [is] the centre of the system of uses 
of Eivai'. Kahn explains that the copulative use is more fundamental than the 
existential one because of its statistic predominance, its being syntactically more 
elementary, and its conceptual priority. For Khan the copulative use of `to be' is to 
be understood as the focal meaning of the verb, from which all the others depend. 
Kahn's proposal culminates in a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of TÒ Ti 6V 
Eivai in the light of the supposed priority of the copulative use of the verb `to be' over 
the existential one, thus: 
The general tendency of this Aristotelian method in ontology is for the 
existential idea to be absorbed into the theory of predication, and to be 
expressed linguistically by copula uses of the verb. So we find that the key 
ontological formula of Aristotle's metaphysics, the TÒ Ti r?jv U val, defines the 
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mode of existence for any subject whatsoever, but it does so without any 
existential use of the verb (1971: 332). 
Met V 7, along with VIII 2, is considered by both groups of commentators to be one 
of the texts most relevant to the debate on the ambiguity of the verb `to be'. By 
contrast with the traditional view, in the interpretation I suggest the theme of Met V 7 
is not the classification of existential or copulative uses of the verb `to be', but rather 
of entities. This is why in my view this chapter is not textual evidence to the debate. 
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Chapter 4: The Analysis of the Puzzle (III): Sameness and Difference 
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1. Accidental identity 
Met V 9 has two parts: the first, 1017b27- 1018a13, regards sameness and 
difference, the second, 1018a13 -9, regards similarity and dissimilarity, articulated in 
the following subsections: 
Part I 
i) 1017b27- 1018a4, on identity per accidens 
ii) 1018a4 -9, on identity per se 
iii) 1018a9 -11, on otherness 
iv) 1018a11 -5, on difference 
Part II 
v) 1018a15 -8, on similarity 
vi) 1018a18 -9, on dissimilarity 
Regarding the first section of the first part of the chapter, there is an apparent 
correspondence between the three kinds of accidental identity described in Met V 9, 
1017b27- 1018a4, and the three kinds of accidental unity described in Met V 6, 
1015b16 -36 in so far as they are relations holding between the same pairs of relata: 
1) two accidents predicated of the same substance; 2) a substance and the accident 
that is predicated of it; 3) an accidental composite and each of its constituents. The 
same examples also occur in the two chapters 6 and 9. In Met V 9 Aristotle adds a 
parenthetical section, 1017b33- 1018a4, formulated as a syllogism, to the effect of 
arguing that accidental identities cannot be generalised, because universal 
propositions are essentia1.163 This remark follows, as Bonitz (In Met 245) and Kirwan 
(1971: 149) note too, from the definition Aristotle gives of universal propositions in 
Post An I, 73b26 -8.164 There Aristotle claims that if a given attribute Y belongs 
always and to all subjects that fall under the genus X, and has all xs as its proper 
subjects, then the belonging of Y to subjects that fall under X depends on their 
essence qua xs, hence it is per se. Hence, it is necessary to make a distinction 
between the case in which accidents belong to subjects that are universal and the case 
163 On this remark being made in the form of a syllogism see e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias (In Met 
377, 6 -7) and Ross (1924: 312). 
164 Post An I, 73b26 -8: Kaeò)\OU ò Atyu) ô öv KOTO nQVTÔS TE únbpX!1 KOÌ Kae' 0ÙTò Kal 6 011T6. 
(pavEpòv äpa 6-ri öaa Kaeaou, a i; bváyKrlÇ linápXEI TOTS npáypaaiv. 
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in which accidents belong to particular subjects, as Aristotle mentions at 1017b35- 
1018a2: 
TCI Yap KaeC1A0U Kae' aÚTa ÚnapX£I, TCI óÈ QUNß£ßnKC1Ta OÚ KW aina' 
äA' ÉnÌ T(OV Kae' £KaQra änAc74 A>rY£Tal 
For universal attributes belong to things in virtue of their own nature, but 
accidents do not belong to them in virtue of their own nature); but of the 
individuals the statements are made without qualification. 
Crucial to the understanding of this passage is the meaning of the adverb 
ánAtç, by means of which Aristotle makes a distinction between universals and 
particulars that may be read in two ways: as a distinction either between singular and 
universal terms (e.g. Socrates versus Man) or between propositions having as subject 
singular and universal terms (e.g. `Socrates and the musical Socrates are 
coincidentally the same' versus `Every man is coincidentally the same as that which 
is musical').165 Bonitz (In Met 245) and Kirwan (1971: 150) adopt the first reading; 
Duminil and Jaulin the second. It is worth noting that Bonitz on the one hand, and 
Duminil and Jaulin on the other, find ground for their diverging interpretations of the 
meaning of anÀô ç in this context in the comparison with the same passage in Met V 
5, 1015b7 -8.166 There Aristotle says that a demonstration aril* leads to a necessary 
conclusion such as to express that things are in a certain way and could not be 
different. If an)w* has the same meaning in the passage in Met V 9, then it signifies 
that the relation between the accidents and the particular subject is necessary without 
further qualification. This is the interpretation that Duminil and Jaulin (1991: 194) 
put forward. By contrast, according to Bonitz' interpretation, which is shared on 
different grounds also by Kirwan, an) * according to the same passage in Met V 5 
has the function of expressing an opposition between universal and particular terms. 
Universal terms can be the subject of accidental predications in the sense that the 
accidents predicated of them betoken some particular of the universal (and this is 
expressed through some appropriate qualification such as ávepwnoç TIS), while 
165 Kirwan (1971: 150) mentions both possible readings, and after him so does Duminil (1991: 194). 
166 Met V 5, 1015b7 -8: ETI el ánoôEi IS T(.JV QVayKaÌG)V, tiTI OÚK ÉV5ÉXET01 (5)ti\WS EXEIV, EÌ 
ánoMEIKTa1 ánÀCx)q. `Again, demonstration is a necessary thing because the conclusion cannot be 
otherwise, if there has been demonstration in the unqualified sense'. 
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particular terms do not allow this type of ambiguity and hence do not require 
qualifications_ 167 In support of this line Kirwan argues that if we accept Duminil and 
Jaulin's interpretation two difficulties remain unresolved. First, the role of ónAwÇ in 
Met V 9, 1017b35- 1018a2, remains quite mysterious; by contrast, he translates it as 
`baldly, i.e. without any additional `some ". Second, the claim immediately 
following at 1018a2 -4, also remains unexplained, and in particular it is not explained 
why it is net linguistic practice to say `every Socrates' although it is so to say `every 
man' In sum the reading suggested by Bonitz and Kirwan appears more natural. 
167 Bonitz explains this meaning of ánA* in Met V 5 more extensively in the Index, 77a3 8ff: `Eodem 
sensu usurpatur non addditis vocabulis vel synonymis, veluti anOÖEÖEiKroi 
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2. Identity Per Se 
At 1018a5 Aristotle claims that there is an equivalence between being one 
per se and being the same per se; this point is however a matter of controversy both 
because the text is corrupted and because the commentators diverge in their readings. 
The manuscripts E and J transmit the following line: 
T 1: Tà bÉ Kae' alJTà 0a'a (Imp Kai TÒ £V' 
Schwieger edits a different text on the ground of the testimony of Ab and 
Asclepius' commentary (In Met 320, 16): 
text: 
T 2: Tà £ Kae' aÚTà, Cí)O'nEp KQi TÓ £v' 
The modern editors Ross and Jaeger on the other hand agree on the following 
T 3: Tà b>r Kae' al1Tà óa'aX63UnEp Kai TÒ b' 
The adverb àa'a)Th'QnEp is a correction by Jaeger justified on the basis of 
Alexander's commentary (In Met 377, 17 -8) which reads:168 
T 4: Tà ó£ Kae' aÚTà TQÚTà àU\lj>\oIS AEyàlaEva TOQaUTaXc'k (pnQl 
IkbyEQeal àQQX* Kai TÒ Kae' aúTÒ V. 
Although the choice of one variant or the other does not significantly change 
the literal meaning of the sentence, some variants are relevant in a broader context to 
the issue of whether there is, and how close it is, correspondence between the 
accounts Aristotle gives of being the same per se and being one per se in Met V 9 and 
6 respectively. First of all, the comparison between T 1 -4, which are numbered 
according to the chronological order in which they have been suggested, shows that in 
168 Immediately after this remark, at 377, 18 -22, Alexander observes that Aristotle does not give in Met 
V 9 all the meanings of `being the same per se' which corresponds to the ones of `being one per se' 
either because the complete series of meanings already appears in Met V 6 or because the series of 
meanings give in Met V 6 may be reduced to the shorter series that appears in V 9. The former 
hypothesis is suggested by Bonitz too (In Met 245): 'Aristoteles omissis quas antea exposuit 
distinctionibus satis habet praecipuas eius notionis significationes memorasse'. 
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time there has evolved a more interpretative reading of the text. The text T 1 
transmitted by the most authoritative manuscripts, E and J, as it stands, does not 
emphasise the correspondence between sameness and oneness per se. T 2, which 
receives some authority from Asclepius' commentary, allows a generic 
correspondence between one -ness and sameness, facilitated by c QnEp. (T 2 is the 
text that fits bets with Kirwan's, Duminil's and Jaulin's interpretation).169 T 3, 
supported by Alexander's comments ad locum,170 certainly suggests through 
OQaXwJnEp a strong correspondence between Met V 6 and 9. If, in my view, one 
accepts Jaeger's amendment, the text indeed reads more clearly, and makes explicit 
the correspondence with Met V 6. In fact, however, a close comparison between Met 
V 6 and 9 shows, as it will appear in the next section, that the correspondence 
between accounts of sameness and accounts of one -ness per se, is not straightforward. 
My suggestion is that what the two chapters have in common are the criteria Aristotle 
uses for oneness and sameness, but not ipso facto the two classifications of the 
concepts. 
Sameness is investigated in Met V 9 according to the two -fold distinction 
between per se and per accidens which is at work in Met V 6 too. This observation 
acquires significance in view of the fact that Aristotle elsewhere has also another 
perspective of investigation on sameness, for instance in Met X 3, 1054a32 -b3. The 
comparative analysis of Met V 9 and IX 3 shows that Aristotle has (at least) two 
principles for classifying types of identity; let us call C.1 the one having sameness 
per se as the focal type of identity, and C.2 the other with numerical oneness (KaT' 
äpiOpòv or el piep0) as the focal type of identity. The suggestion I want to put 
forward is that while in Met X 3 Aristotle makes use only of C.1, in Met V 6 and 9 
the two criteria are interwoven and hence create interpretative difficulties. I will 
169 Kirwan (1971: 150 -1): `Nothing here or elsewhere corresponds to the sense of `one' at V 6. 
1016b11- 17...The sameness of things whose matter is one in form answers to V 6. 1016b17 -24, but 
the correspondence is not exact...The same objection faces Ross's suggestion that the sameness of 
things whose matter is one in number corresponds with oneness in continuity, V 6. 1015b36- 1016a17'. 
For Kirwan, the choice of textual variant is not an issue: `The corrupt readings of our manuscripts 
convey the same sense'. Duminil and Jaulin (1991) find preferable T 2 and even consider `suspicious' 
the parallelism between Met V 6 and 9: `En effet, si l'on confronte le texte de 1016b31 -35 avec le 
présent texte, on constate non seulement une différence de nombre de cas, ce qui remet en question le 
`autant', mais aussi une différence des critères de classement, de nature à remettre en cause la `façon ". 
170 Some support to Jaeger's emendation comes also from the fact that OQaxarnEp has only two other 
occurrences in Aristotle's works and both of them are also in Met V (7, 1017a23 and 17, 1022a11. See 
Bonitz Index 532b28. 
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develop my suggestion in three steps. Firstly, I will argue that for Aristotle sameness 
per se is not equivalent in definition to oneness in number, and it is legitimate to 
distinguish the two criteria C.1 and C.2. Secondly, I will briefly recapitulate the 
results of my analysis of Met V 6 to show that C.1 is the prevalent criterion at work 
there, but in section 1016b31- 1017a3 there is a change to C.2, and the combination of 
the two criteria generates a reduplication of the classification of accounts of one -ness 
in the same chapter. Finally, I will give a detailed examination of the classification of 
accounts of identity in Met V 9. The crucial passage for the comparative analysis 
with Met V 6 and X 3 that shows that Aristotle has two criteria for identity is the 
following: 
KQÌ TCl pÈV OÜTWS AÉyETOI TOÙTÒ, TÒ óÈ KaeY aim!' ÒQaX(.oQnEp KQÌ TÒ Ev. KQÌ 
Ò (It Ú pia . EÌÒEI . 0104 TOÙTÒ >r £TOI KOÌ (idV 000Ìa pia Y P n n u n n Y u 
The two main accounts of sameness are sameness in matter and sameness in 
substance,171 which are correlated in the passage by Kai...Kai; while the subordinate 
distinction of sameness in matter in form and in number are correlated by 
giving the following classification: 
i. sameness because of oneness in matter 
i.i in species or form 
i.ii in number 
ii. sameness because of oneness in substance 
Let us now consider the classification of sameness in Met X 3, 1054a32 -b3: 
AEyOpÉVOU bÈ TOO TOÙTOU fIOMaX6C, Eva parV TpÒfIOV KOT' ÒpleNòv AtyopEv 
£ViOTE aÙTÒ, TÒ ó' £ÒV KOÌ AÒyw KOÌ QplepW ÉV 6, OrOV GÙ QaUTW KOÌ T({J EÌÒEI 
KOÌ £v' ET! Ò' ÉCIV Ò MyOg ó TfiS Ilp(idTfiq Ol1QÌaS EfS 6, OTOV ai Taal 
ypappaÌ £ÙeEÌaI ai aÙTai, KOÌ TÒ Toa KOÌ ioOyCi)VIa TETpC1yWVa, KOiT01 f1AEiW' 
QXA' ÉV TOÙTOIq 1) i0'ÒTfIq ÉVÒTIiS. 
171 The meaning of substance in this context will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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'The same' has several meanings; (1) we sometimes mean 'the same numerically'; 
again, (2) we call a thing the same if it is one both in definition and in number, e.g. 
you are one with yourself both in form and in matter; and again, (3) if the definition 
of its primary essence is one; e.g. equal straight lines are the same, and so are equal 
and equal- angled quadrilaterals; there are many such, but in these equality constitutes 
unity. 
In the passage just quoted, Aristotle distinguishes three accounts of sameness: 
i. sameness in number 
ii. sameness in definition and number 
iii. sameness in definition of the primary substance 
I understand `primary substance' in this context as essence, following Bonitz' 
suggestion (In Met 425), on the grounds of Met VII 7, 1032b1 -2: ETboÇ bÈ À>y(w TÒ Ti 
IV EÌVOI ÉKaOTOU Kai TO nPCbTI1V OùoiaV.172 
It is apparent that the two classifications in Met V 9 and X 3 do not fully 
overlap; the accounts given in Met X 3 do not all fall either under accidental 
sameness or under per se sameness. Sameness in number but not in definition is a 
case of accidental sameness, according to the majority of commentators, who see it in 
connection with the first account of accidental oneness in Met V 6, 1015b17 -34 (see 
e.g. Ross 1924: 287). Sameness both in number and in definition and sameness in 
definition are cases of essential sameness. Furthermore, sameness only in number in 
Met X 3 is given as an independent criterion for sameness, while in Met V 9 it is a 
specification of the criterion for sameness in matter. Hence, not everything that is the 
same in number (Met X 3) is also ipso facto the same per se (Met V 9), and vice 
versa; sameness per se and sameness in number have different definitions, and give 
rise to different classifications of sameness. Hence, there are grounds for 
differentiating C.1 from C.2 as I suggested above. The question to address now is 
whether Aristotle himself keeps the two criteria apart. In Met V 6 Aristotle appears 
to have made the choice of employing C.1, but, unexpectedly, at 1016b31- 1017a3, 
introduces a classification of accounts of sameness which in fact follows from C.2 
rather than from C.1. As I have pointed out in commenting on that passage this 
second classification creates reduplication and a lack of clarity in Aristotle's line of 
172 Bonitz (/oc cit) explains npcx)Trl oúaia as `primaria rei natura, qua quid sit res definiatur seiunctis 
omnibus accidentibus'. 
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investigation in Met V 6. Some commentators emphasise the heterogeneity of that 
passage with the rest of the chapter. But there is not enough evidence available to 
take a position on whether Aristotle introduces the two classifications juxtaposing the 
two criteria in the same chapter because he was not clearly aware of the distinction 
between C.1 and C.2 or for other reasons. To recapitulate, here is a comparative 
presentation of the two classifications in Met V 6: 
First classification: 
i. oneness by continuity 
ii. oneness in substratum 
ii.i oneness in material substratum 
ii.ii oneness in genus 
iii. oneness by indivisibility 
iii.i indivisibility of definition 
iii.ii indivisibility in general 
Second classification: 
i. oneness in number 
ii. oneness in species 
iii. oneness in genus 
iv. oneness by analogy 
Having highlighted, in brief, analogies and differences in Aristotle's 
investigation between Met V 9 and the two most relevantly connected passages, Met 
V 6 and X 3, I will now focus on a closer examination of Aristotle's treatment of 
sameness per se in Met V 9. Aristotle gives two main accounts of sameness per se: 
oneness in matter and oneness in substance. Oneness in matter is explained by either 
oneness in number in the sense of sameness in the quantity of matter, or oneness in 
species of matter, in the sense of sameness in the type of matter.173 (I shall return on 
the topic of sameness in matter and in substratum in chapter 5 and 6). In the case of 
sameness in type of matter there is correspondence between this account and the one 
13 Duminil and Jaulin (1991: 196) find the account of sameness at 1018a6 problematic. For, given the 
equivalence between oneness in number and oneness in matter Aristotle mentions in Met V 6, 
1016b33, Aristotle's claim that `ce dont la matière est une, soit par la forme, soit par nombre' in their 
interpretation means `matière une, soit par la forme, soit par la matière'. They find this definition 
circular because matter is mentioned both as definiens and definiendum. To avoid attributing 
circularity to Aristotle's definition, Duminil and Jaulin think that we need to asssume Aristotle is 
referring here to the account of genus as matter in Met V 28, 1024b8 -9. 
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of sameness in substratum in the first classification in Met V 6, 1016a17- 32.174 In 
brief, in Met V 6 in the first classification oneness in substratum is differentiated in 
oneness in material substratum and oneness in genus: some things are said to be one 
per se because their material substratum does not show specific differences detectable 
to the senses (see comments ad locum); some other things are said to be one per se 
because they fall under the same genus, even if they have opposite specific 
differences. The correspondence between the accounts in Met V 6 and 9 does indeed 
hold in this case. 
Now we come to the third account of sameness per se in Met V 9, which is 
sameness in substance. In this case too Aristotle's definition is extremely sketchy, 
and the interpretation of the text is problematic. Two interpretations are possible of 
the term oúaÌa: Aristotle may intend `form', or `substance' meaning the composite 
of matter and form. 
The former interpretation was suggested first by Alexander of Aphrodisias (In 
Met 377,35 - 378,1), and appears plausible in the light of the comparison with Met X 
3, 1054b1. On this reading, this account of sameness per se corresponds to the third 
account of oneness per se in the first classification in Met V 6. This is oneness by 
indivisibility. In this case the parallelism between Met V 9 and X 3 finds support in 
the comparison with Met V 6. Assuming the correspondence between the third 
account of sameness per se in Met V 9 and the third account of oneness per se in Met 
V 6, and in view of the fact that the third account of oneness per se in Met V 6 is 
illustrated by Aristotle with the same example that is used to illustrate the third 
account of sameness in Met X 3, it is plausible to extend the parallelism between Met 
V 6 and 9 to Met X 3 as well. In Met V 6 Aristotle uses as an illustration of oneness 
per se the indivisibility of geometric figures of the same type. In Met X 3 sameness 
in definition of the primary substance is exemplified by the case of equal straight 
lines and congruent quadrilaterals. These geometrical entities may be distinguished 
one from the other because they have different quantities of intelligible matter 
although they are qualitatively of the same type (as in the case of similar geometrical 
174 See also Ross (1924: 312): `The reference to Uri in the present classification (1018a6) indicates 
that this list has greater affinities with the list of types of unity in ch. 6'. Also, Dubois (1998: 84): 
`Dans le présent chapitre de V, la référence à la matière (1018a6) donne à penser que la présente liste 
est assez voisine de celle que nous avons lue au chapitre 6 (1015b16- 1016b6)'. 
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figures), or because they occupy a different place in space although they have the 
same quantity and type of intelligible matter (as in the case of congruent geometrical 
figures). 
On the other hand, on a different interpretative hypothesis, it is possible to 
understand sameness in oúaia as sameness in matter and form, as in the second 
account of identity in Met X 3. In that context Aristotle gives at 1054a34 -5 a general 
definition of identity in terms of Kaì AOycq Kai ápiepw, but in the example (the 
identity between one and oneself) the identity is described in terms of Kai T(il EïbEI 
Kai Tñ OM. On the assumption, shared by all commentators, that the two descrptions 
are to be taken as equivalent, Mytp corresponds to Elba and ápiOp to 'an. Hence, 
the three accounts of sameness in Met X 3 describe respectively: i) sameness in 
matter only, ii) sameness in matter and form, iii) sameness in form only. The 
correspondence between the second account of sameness in Met X 3 and the third 
account of sameness per se in Met V 9 is supported by the fact that in both chapters 
Aristotle uses the example of self identity, which evidently involves sameness in form 
and in matter. Furthermore, this interpretation of the third account of sameness per se 
in Met V 9 is strengthened by the fact that in Soph El 24 Aristotle refers to this type 
of sameness by using precisely the term OúGia.175 
Having discussed two plausible interpretations for the passage under 
examination from Met V 9, in conclusion there appears to be equally strong evidence 
in support of either interpretation; hence no preference of the one over the other 
seems to be justified. 
Proceeding with the analysis of the text, Aristotle, just after the exposition of 
the various accounts of sameness, repeats at 1018a7 -9 once again the interdependence 
between oneness and sameness: 
. , 
¿)UTE (paVEpÒV OTI n TQUTOT1lS ÉVOTnq Tiq tam/ n nA£IÒV(JV TOO E VQI n OTQV 
XpnTQI Cog nA£iOUIV, OiOV ÓTQV Atyn QÚTÒ Ql1T(.p TQÚTÒV' 
175 Soph El 24, 179a37 -9: povoiç yap To ç KQTÒ TO oúaiam ÒÖIa(pöpOIS Kai ÊV aim/ änavTa 
óoKEi TaÚTÒ únápXcIv. For only to things that are indistinguishable and one in essence (Ka-rÒ -rep/ 
oúaiav) is it generally agreed that all the same attributes belong. For a discussion on this passage and 
on the potential contrast with Top VII 1, 152a33 -7, see e.g. Lewis (1982), Mariani (2000), Mignucci 
(1985). 
125 
Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of 
one thing when it is treated as more than one, i.e. when we say a thing is the same as 
itself; for we treat it as two. 
The use of the abstract terms TaUTÒTf Ç and >rvòTflÇ, which are rarely found in 
Aristotle's works,176 in place of the nominalized adjective in the neuter may indicate 
that Aristotle is giving here a sort of classification of concepts.177 We may speculate 
that Aristotle sees sameness as a type (Tiç) of oneness, i.e. as a species under the 
genus oneness. The use of abstract terms for expressing a relation between concepts 
analogous to the genus- species one finds support in other passages in which Aristotle 
uses abstract terms to classify concepts: e.g. when talking about oneness as ò6TrjÇ in 
relation to oneness in general in Met V 26 (1023b36: ci.S oùanç TñÇ 6ÀÒTnTOS 
EV6TnT6ç TIVOC); when talking about equality in relation to oneness in general in Met 
X 3 (1O54b3: Év ToIJTOIS rj icròTnç Év6Tnç); when talking about being different from 
and contrary to in Met X 8 (1058a16: Ij ápa 61(4 00 ÉvavTicoGiÇ azorlv). 
If this interpretation is correct, we can revisit in the light of it Kirwan's and 
White's argument (discussed in chapter 2) to the effect that Aristotle confuses the 
monadic and dyadic uses of oneness, regarding respectively the intrinsic unity of a 
single item and the identity relations between two or more items.178 Kirwan's and 
White's argument is primarily grounded in their analysis of Met V 6 but finds 
corroboration, from their point of view, in the very passage of Met V 9 I have been 
discussing so far.179 White (1971: 187 -8) for instance interprets the passage thus: `To 
say that X is the same as X is just to say that X is one with X; but this is to say that X 
and X (together) constitute one thing, and this in turn is to treat X as two things going 
to make up one thing'. By contrast, in my interpretation of Met V 9 Aristotle shows 
awareness of the fact that oneness and sameness are not in principle fully equivalent 
when he says that sameness is a type (species) of oneness (genus). 
16 See Bonitz Index 253a22 -4 and 748b49 -51. 
17 Contra Kirwan (1971: 150) who holds Aristotle is making a linguistic point about the 
interchangeability of the terms `one' and `the same': "Sameness is a kind of oneness' because any 
statement using `same' can be rephrased using `one'. Aristotle appears to maintain that the converse is 
also true when he says that things are called the same in their own right `in as many ways' as they are 
called one...It is hard to see justification for the latter claim'. 
18 For a discussion of these two uses see also (Miller 1973: 483 -90). 
19 Kirwan (1971: 134), White (1971: 177 -97; 1986: 475 -94). 
126 
3. Otherness, difference, similarity, dissimilarity 
After the discussion on sameness, Aristotle deals, very briefly, with its 
opposite: otherness, at 1018a9 -11: 
gT£pa ó>r A>ry£Tal ri rei £ïórl nA£ico ri rj úAn rj ó Aóyoq TnS oúQiaS Kai 
ÖAcoS ÓVTIK£11J>rVcoS TW TQÚTW Aay£TQI T0 ËT£pOV. 
As Bonitz (In Met 245), Ross (1924: 312 -3),1ßÖ and Duminil and Jaulin 
(1991:197) note, this passage is to be integrated by the remarks Aristotle makes on 
the nature of this opposition in Met X 3, 1054b19 -23. Sameness and otherness are 
not to be taken as mutually contradictory, as Aristotle explains there: 
'Other or the same' can therefore be predicated of everything with regard to 
everything else -but only if the things are one and existent, for 'other' is not the 
contradictory of 'the same'; which is why it is not predicated of non -existent 
things (while 'not the same' is so predicated). It is predicated of all existing 
things; for everything that is existent and one is by its very nature either one 
or not one with anything else. 
From a comparison between the classifications of sameness per se and of 
otherness, it is clear that there is no one -to -one correspondence, as shown: 
Sameness per se Otherness 
i. Sameness in matter j. Otherness in species 
i.i in specie jj. Otherness in matter 
i.ii in number jjj. Otherness in definition of the substance 
ii. Sameness in substance 
180 Ross takes the relation between sameness and otherness as analogous to the relation betweenç 
and oTÉp£Qiç, possibly in view of Met X 7, 1057a33 -7, where Aristotle distinguishes four types of 
opposition: contradiction, privation (oTOeoiç), contrariety, and relation. On Ross' interpretation, the 
contrast Aristotle draws in Met V 9 between sameness and otherness is to be understood not 
generically but specifically as a relation of privation. 
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Ross (1924: 312), following a suggestion by Alexander of Aphrodisias (In 
Met 378: 19 -22), believes that the two classifications may be reduced one to the other, 
in the following way: 
k. Sameness in species of matter versus otherness in species 
kk. Sameness versus otherness in the actual matter 
kkk. Sameness versus otherness in substance 
Contra Ross, Kirwan (1971: 151) rightly in my view points out that the first 
correspondence is not legitimate, for any two substances may be other in form but the 
same in form of matter, like e.g. a bronze sphere and a bronze cube. 
The classification of accounts of otherness in Met V 9 is also problematic in 
the light of the comparison with the one in Met X 3, 1054b 13 -8:18 
i. Being the opposite of being the same 
ii. Being other in matter and form 
iii. Being other as the objects of mathematics are 
The first account in Met X 3 corresponds to the general definition of otherness 
on Met V 9 and is not in fact set against any account of sameness either in X 3 or in V 
9. The second account in Met X 3 is to be contrasted with the second account of 
sameness introduced in the same chapter, i.e. sameness in substance, and with the 
third account of sameness per se in Met V 9, provided that this is taken as sameness 
in form and matter. The third account in Met X 3 is to be contrasted with the third 
account of sameness in the same chapter, i.e. sameness in the definition of the 
primary substance, which is exemplified by Aristotle with congruent geometrical 
figures, and with the third account of sameness per se in Met V 9, provided that this is 
understood as sameness in form. 
In the conclusion of his analysis of sameness and otherness, Aristotle adds a 
brief remark at 1018a12 -5, where he notes that the relations between things are not 
exhaustively described only by sameness and otherness, which are opposites. In Met 
V 9, 1018a12, `different' is said to apply to things that are identical and at the same 
time non identical in different respects with other things. Two main accounts of 
181 Met X 3, 1054b13-8: `Evidently, then, 'other' and 'unlike' also have several meanings. And the other 
in one sense is the opposite of the same (so that everything is either the same as or other than 
everything else). In another sense things are other unless both their matter and their definition are one 
(so that you are other than your neighbour). The other in the third sense is exemplified in the objects of 
mathematics'. 
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difference are given, separated by formula of transition Ërl. In the first account there 
are four respects in which two things may differ (which correspond to the second 
classification of sameness in Met V 6, 1016b31- 1017a3): number, form, genus, 
analogy. In the second account, things may differ in genus, or be opposites (within 
one genus), or differ in specific difference (within one genus).182 
The interpretation of 1. 1018a14 has been a matter of much controversy among 
commentators. For instance Bonitz (In Met 245 -6) believes that Aristotle's 
exposition is loose in this passage and that 1. 1018a14 is in fact superfluous to the 
discussion. Alexander of Aphrodisias e.g. (In Met 379, 15 -24) proposes three possible 
interpretations. In the first Aristotle is referring only to the opposites, Tá >rvavTia, 
and is using the expression ÖQa ËXEi >rV Tñ OÚQ*Q TOV ËTEpÔTflTO as epesegetic. In 
the second Aristotle mentions things that are opposites only in some respect (e.g. 
water as wet versus earth as dry). Dubois for instance (1998: 85) adopts this reading 
by Alexander. Finally, in the third possible interpretation offered by Alexander, 
Aristotle intends those things that have a common substratum but different 
definitions. 
If we now turn to analyze specifically the first account that Aristotle gives of 
difference, we find the first interpretative difficulty at 1018a12 -3 regarding the 
expression pfj pòvov ápiepc on which the commentators widely disagree. The 
traditional interpretation, which is put forward first by Alexander (In Met 378, 30 -4), 
states that what is different cannot be numerically one, hence Aristotle's expression 
makes sense only if understood with a concessive value, namely: those things are 
called different that are the same in some respects (i.e. in genus, species, or analogy) 
but not the same in other respects, provided that they are not different in number. 
Alexander (In Met 379, 5 -7) also adds that being different in number is a necessary 
condition, along with sameness in some respect, for defining the notion of 
182 
In Met V 14 Aristotle uses analogous expressions to the one used in V 9 to refer to specific 
difference and on these grounds I assume that in V 9 the term oúQia means `specific difference'. This 
interpretation is suggested also by Ross (1924: I 313), on the grounds of the comparison with Met X 8, 
1058a7. See Met V 14, 1020a33 -bl: 'Quality means (1) the differentia of the essence, e.g. man is an 
animal of a certain quality because he is two- footed, and the horse is so because it is four -footed; and a 
circle is a figure of particular quality because it is without angles, -which shows that the essential 
differentia is a quality. -This, then, is one meaning of quality-the differentia of the essence. 
See also Met X 8, 1058a6-8: áVÓyKfl 'pa To &IQ(pop&V TQÙTf1V ÉTEpoTfgTQ TOO ysrvouç EÌVQI. 
À yw yap yEVOUS Öiacpopàv £TcpòTIjTQ iÌ ÉTEpOV ftolEÌ TOOTO alma. 
This difference, then, must be an otherness of the genus. For I give the name of 'difference in the 
genus' an otherness which makes the genus itself other. 
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difference.183 Alexander's interpretation is adopted also by Dubois (1998: 85) and by 
Bonitz (In Met 245). Bonitz finds further support for Alexander's reading in Met VI 
1, 1025b27 -8, where he finds an expression analogous in meaning and in form to the 
one in Met V 9: nEpì oúo'iav TO KQTQ Tòv Àòyov thç £nì TÓ noÀù d ç oú 
wpm* pávov (my emphasis).184 Contra Bonitz, Ross (1924: 313) questions the 
parallelism between Met V 9 and VI 1 and is inclined to reject Bonitz' 
interpretation. J 85 Kirwan (1971: 151) registers two more interpretations in the history 
of the tradition. The first is grounded in an entirely different reading of 1018a12 -3: 
pr) pòvov QpiOpw is referred to ETEpà rather than to TO OÚTO, and the passage is 
translated: `other [in number] while being the same something', which is how 
Schwegler, for instance, understands the passage (In Met 218). The second 
interpretation mentioned by Kirwan assumes that even what is the same in number 
may be different in some aspect e.g. in the course of time. In conclusion, although 
the traditional interpretation seems not to have genuine textual support, the other 
interpretations mentioned by Kirwan do not offer more persuasive alternatives. 
The first account of difference is twofold: one way things may differ is by 
belonging to different genera, the other way is by being specifically different 
although belonging to one and the same genus. In the first case things are only 
accidentally different,186 in the second case things that share the same genus may be 
differentiated either by opposite determinations or by divisive differences. The 
distinction between opposite determinations and divisive differences is made on the 
183 In Met 378,30- 4: -rò bÈKai pr) pòvov áplepCJ npoaÉergK£TC)TaÚTo TI òVTO cbq 
1a0V TO pövov pr) ápiOpc övra TOÚTÒ' TCI Op °Úm) TOÚTCI OÚKÉTI blaTtpeiV bbvaTOI. Tò yelp 
TairTÒV Tel ÓIa(pÉpOVTa (ÀÀrIAWv ÉXEIV ÖEÌ KOT' áplep6V Tel yelp 0ÚT(0 TOÚTÒ OP lel(popa). 
In Met 379, 5 -7: 6E7 Tá ölá(popa povov ÉT£pa E vai áp1Op i, óÀÀò Kai KOTCI TI Tel 0ÚT6 
áÀÀrlAoiç Eival, Ei *Ito' JI pôvov '0-pa £ÌVai áAÀel Kai ölá(pOpa. 
184 In Met 245: Nam primum illud quidem recte docet, in T(;.) bla(pópcp ad notionem TO i ÉTÉpou, quae 
eius est genus, unitatem quandam accedere, modo ne cogites (N rl p á v o v al 2, quasi dicat p ó v o v 
p rl , Alex. p. 340, 4, cf. E 1. 1025b28) unitatem numeri, sed vel speciei, vel generis vel analogiae 
unitatem'. 
'88 Ross (1924: 313): `où XcoploTrlV povov is, however, not a very close parallel to pr) pOvov 
eiplepc7,3, and it is doubtful whether it has the meaning corresponding to that which Alexander and 
Bonitz assign to prl pòvov áp10pc). A different reading and punctuation seem preferable in that 
passage.' 
186 In Met X 7, 1057a26 -8 for instance Aristotle claims: NETaßOÀÀEly âÀÀou ytvouç Eiç âÀÀo 
yÉVOÇ 0ÚK ECTTIV áÀA' fj KOTC)aupPERr1KOç, 0Ì0V ÉK XpG)NaTOS Eiç axrlpa. áVáyKrl Opa TO iJ£Takù 
Kai aùTOÌÇ Kai ¿i v pcTakú £ialV ÉV TC{) aùTCO yÉV£I EIVOI. `But to change from one genus to another 
genus is not possible except in an incidental way, as from colour to figure'. 
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ground that the one is not in every case the same as the other, for divisive differences 
come in degrees, while opposite determinations do not. 
In conclusion, Aristotle's discussion on difference in Met V 9 is extremely 
brief and sketchy; the same themes receive a philosophically deeper analysis in Met X 
8 -9. In particular, for example in Met X 8 we find a definition of what a specific 
difference is, at 1058a26 -8: vavricùaly yàp àvàyKf Eival -rep/ blacpopàv oú 
biacptpEi EÌÒEI' aOTT YE ilnapXEi TOTS acv TaÚTC yarvEI 06GI iaàvolç.'87 In Met X 9 
Aristotle argues that specific differences are determined only by the oppositions that 
concern the form, at 1058b1 -2: TÒ IJ V ÀÒyoç TÒ Ò' ÙAfj, 60'aí [AV ÉV T() ÀÒyq 
EIOIV ÉvavTIÒTgTES EïÒEI noloücn bla(popàlv.1S8 
The second part of Met V 9 is devoted to discussion of likeness and 
unlikeness. Aristotle distinguishes four degrees of similarity things may have with 
each other, ordered from the strongest to the weakest: 
i) by having all the same attributes 
ii) by having more attributes the same than different 
iii) by being of the same quality 
iv) by sharing the greater number or the more important of the 
attributes (each of the attributes being one of two contraries) 
In Met X 3, 1054b3 -13 returns to the topic of similarity and offers a different 
and more accurate classification, to which Ross (1924: 313 -4) believes the one in Met 
V 9 can be reduced to. According to Met X 3 things are similar if: 
187 Aristotle explains more extensively what a specific difference in Met X 8, 1057b35- 1058a8: 'That 
which is other in species is other than something in something, and this must belong to both; e.g. if it is 
an animal other in species, both are animals. The things, then, which are other in species must be in the 
same genus. For by genus I mean that one identical thing which is predicated of both and is 
differentiated in no merely accidental way, whether conceived as matter or otherwise. For not only 
must the common nature attach to the different things, e.g. not only must both be animals, but this very 
animality must also be different for each (e.g. in the one case equinity, in the other humanity), and so 
this common nature is specifically different for each from what it is for the other. One, then, will be in 
virtue of its own nature one sort of animal, and the other another, e.g. one a horse and the other a man. 
This difference, then, must be an otherness of the genus. For, I give the name of 'difference in the 
genus' an otherness which makes the genus itself other'. 
188 What I quoted above is the conclusion of Aristotle's argument, which is developed at 1057b34- 
1058a3: 'This question is almost the same as the other, why one contrariety makes things different in 
species and another does not, e.g. 'with feet' and 'with wings' do, but paleness and darkness do not. 
Perhaps it is because the former are modifications peculiar to the genus, and the latter are less so. And 
since one element is definition and one is matter, contrarieties which are in the definition make a 
difference in species, but those which are in the thing taken as including its matter do not make one'. 
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i) not being absolutely the same, nor without difference in respect of their 
concrete substance, they are the same in form; 
ii) having the same form, and being things in which difference of degree is 
possible, they have no difference of degree; 
iii) the qualities they have in common are more numerous than those in 
which they differ -either the qualities in general or the prominent 
qualities 
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Chapter 5: The Two -in -One Model in Aristotle's Theory of Causation 
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Introduction 
The long history of philosophy has seen many formidable attempts at the 
analysis of causation. Necessary connection, counterfactual dependence, 
nomological subsumption, statistical correlation, and other core conceptions have 
been used in seeking to account for the relation between a cause and its effect. In 
view of the centrality this relation has enjoyed in metaphysics on the one hand, and 
the immense amount of exegetical study that has been devoted to Aristotle's works 
on the other, it is surprising that Aristotle's unique analysis of causation has not been 
recognised as a chapter in the history of this concept. His analysis is fundamentally 
different from any other that has left its mark; and because his account has remained 
hitherto latent, it might even provide a promising new starting -point for us in tackling 
this elusive metaphysical notion. 
Aristotle takes causation to be the occurrence of a complex entity. The entity 
comprises a physical process grounding two natures (e.g. building and being built). 
The two natures are ontologically interdependent, requiring a mutual process of 
realisation. But the potentialities for the two natures belong, respectively, to two 
different substances, the agent and the patient, and so, in consequence, do the two 
natures themselves. Aristotle builds a causal bridge between substances out of 
potential properties of substances which are mutually realised. Their mutual 
realisation binds them together into a net of ontological dependencies which 
delineates the boundary of the causal entity. So, from one point of view, a causal 
interaction consists in two objects realising two properties which they have in 
potentiality; from another point of view, their realisation is a physical activity which 
is itself essentially characterised by two natures. Potentiality, actuality, and 
ontological dependence suffice to bridge the two substances causally, without 
introducing any additional metaphysical causal cement to do the job. 
Aristotle examines the relation between cause and effect by analysing the 
relation between mover and movable, in his discussion of KivncIÇ (change, motion) 
in Physics III. Although his definition of 
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KÌVnQIS (see e.g. 201a9-10, 201a27-9; 
201b4 -5; 202a13 -4)189 allows for a very wide span of instances to come under the 
mover -movable relation, including such cases as aging or ripening, central in 
Aristotle's discussion are cases that we would readily treat as instances of causal 
relations, such as building, heating, doctoring, etc. I shall therefore talk of the 
relation of a mover to the movable as a causal relation, despite the fact that for 
Aristotle it also includes what we would consider untypical cases of it. 
Fundamental in his search for an understanding of motion is the assumption 
that an ontological account of motion will not require a new, primitive category of 
being, as he says at 200b32-201a3: 
oÚK LOTI bÉ KiVnQIS napà it npàypara pETaßàMEI yàp àEì TÒ 
p£TaßàÀÀOV Cj KQT'000'iaV il KoTà nOQOV fj KQTà nOIÒV ij KoTà TÒnoV, 
KOIVÒV b1 Énì ToIJTcoV OÚblrv LOTI Àaß£iV, cbq cpalJtv, ö OÜTE TÒb£ OÜT£ 
nOQÒV OÜTE nOIÒV OÜTE TWV áÀwV KOTnyOpnpàTcoV OIJeÉv' Gí)OT' (Mt 
KivnQlS oúöÈ la£TaßoÀrl oúe£vòq Loral napà TO Eipnp>rva, une£vàs yE 
öVTOç napà Tà Eipnp:rva. 
There is no such thing as motion over and above the things. It is always with 
respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes 
changes. But it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything common to these 
which is neither `this' nor quantity nor quality nor any of the other predicates. 
Hence neither will motion and change have reference to something over and 
above the things mentioned; for there is nothing, over and above them. 
This programmatic stance will play a role in directing Aristotle's account of 
the ontology of causation. In particular, instead of introducing new entities he will 
make use of his three principles, the form, the privation and the substratum that 
remains through change. Furthermore, he will use his distinction between being in 
potentiality and being in actuality, which is a primitive distinction of ways in which 
things are (see e.g. Phys III 1).190 But even though he will not introduce new 
189 Phys III 1, 201a9 -10: The fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is 
motion. Phys III 1, 201b4 -5: It is the fulfilment of what is potential when it is already fully real and 
operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion. Phys III 3, 202a13 -4: [motion] is in the 
movable...It is the fulfilment of this potentiality, and by the action of that which has the power of 
causing motion'. 
190 Phys III 1, 201a9 -10: We have distinguished in respect of each class between what is in fulfilment 
and what is in potentiality. 
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metaphysical building blocks, causation will introduce something novel in his 
ontology. Aristotle will construct a new type of entity consisting of an underlying 
substratum that has two natures. This is a surprise in the context of Aristotelian 
substantial essentialism, where a substance is a composite of a material substratum 
and a single substantial form, as we have seen in the analysis of Aristotle's 
conception of substance in chapter 1. But in causation we are not concerned with the 
metaphysics of substances as such, but with the metaphysics of the causal interaction 
between them. These metaphysical relations involved in a causal activity constitute a 
new type of entity Aristotle uses in accounting for causation. The investigation of 
these relations has not been undertaken before in the exegetical tradition. For, the 
vast majority of the commentators, from Late Antiquity (Themistius, Philoponus, 
Simplicius) to the Middle Ages (Averroes, Aquinas),191 on to nowadays (Ross, Gill, 
Waterlow, Hussey), puzzled by the position Aristotle takes in Phys III 3, read the 
crucial passage in which, in my view, he introduces the two natures out of which the 
causal entity is built as merely referring to two descriptions of one thing. But the 
textual evidence is in fact against this reading. 
Aristotle explains causation in terms of the modifications the mover and the 
movable suffer in the causal process. He uses his aporetic method in developing the 
metaphysical details of his account, by presenting in Phys III 3 a dilemma regarding 
the actuality of the mover and the movable. This is a long and intricate argument, to 
which I shall refer as the Actualities of Motion Dilemma (202a21 -b5), in the course 
of which Aristotle rehearses various metaphysical accounts of what happens to the 
mover and the movable in causal circumstances. He will reject some of these 
accounts, while introducing positions he will include in his own. I will use the 
argument eclectically in this exposition, drawing from it the elements that are useful 
for configuring Aristotle's own account; his own final position does not result from 
this argument, but we can better understand it in view of various considerations he 
introduces in the course of this argument. I provide an analysis of the logic of this 
argument in section 3 of this chapter. 
191 
In a later commentary such as the one by Zabarella the issue of what the two beings that have one 
and the same reality are is not even raised. Without intending to generalise beyond the commentaries I 
have mentioned, I wish to note that there appears to be a tendency in the tradition to take Aristotle's 
position in Phys III 3 to be metaphysically quite straightforward, while, as we will see, it is far from 
being so. 
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In discussing the Dilemma here, I shall be concerned mainly with the way 
Aristotle understands the problem of the relation of a mover to a movable. I will first 
identify the questions he thinks need to be addressed in giving a satisfactory answer 
to the problem, and then examine the solutions he gives, thereby developing his own 
theory of causation. The starting point of Aristotle's account is the cause of motion, 
see 202a9 -12: 
Ì EÌSO S óÈ QE OÏQETOÌ TI TÒ KIVOIÑ , C]T01 ÒbE TOIÒVbE T000VÓE, ó 
EOTQI QpXn KQÌ QÌTIOV TCjq KIVfjQE(>uS, OTOV KIVñ, OÌOV b tvTEAEXEiÇI 
6v6pconoS nolEi £K TOO buvápEl SvroS äv6pcbnou äv8pc,onov. 
The mover will always transmit a form, either a `this' or such or so much, 
which, when it moves, will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the 
actual man begets man from what is potentially man. 
The core conception in Aristotle's account of causation is the transmission of 
the form from the mover to the movable, e.g. from the actual person to the potential 
one. During the causal interaction changes take place in the movable, but may also 
take place in the mover due to its engagement in moving the movable.192 But the 
causal interaction is the transference of the form from the mover to the movable. 
Since causal efficacy consists in the transmission of the form, whatever happens to 
the mover in transmitting the form is not its causal agency, because the mover is not 
transmitting the form it itself; the causal efficacy of the mover impacts only on the 
movable.193 
The metaphysical mechanism of the transference of form is innovative and 
complex. To reach Aristotle's metaphysical innovation we need to first examine 
what occurs in the mover and what in the movable during the causal interaction. The 
mover moves in actuality, and the movable is actually moved. These two actualities 
192 Although changes may take place in the movable only, and not in the mover: `It is possible for a 
thing [e.g. the prime mover] to cause motion, though it is itself incapable of being moved' (201a27), 
they may take place also in the mover: `every mover too is moved, as has been said - every mover, 
that is, which is capable of motion' (202a3 -4). 
193 `To act on the movable as such is just to move it' (202a5 -6); Aristotle continues: `But this it does 
by contact, so that at the same time it [the mover] is also acted on' (a6 -7). This remark explains the 
motion of the mover as a reciprocal impact it suffers by the necessary contact with the movable. 
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are not casually coincident. The occurrence of the first is responsible for the 
occurrence of the second, so their coincidence needs to be ontologically explained. 
Aristotle explores the elusive relation between the two actualities (of the 
mover as a mover and of the movable as movable) in his dialectical puzzle about the 
Actualities of Motion. In brief, he considers two possibilities: that the two actualities 
are different, or that they are one and the same. If they are different, either both 
actualities occur in one of the two, either the mover or the moved, or one occurs in 
each. If both the actualities occur in one of them, then, first, one of them will not 
have its own actuality realised in it; e.g. the actuality of the mover will occur in the 
moved, not in the mover; but how could that be? And secondly, whatever has both 
actualities in it will change in two different ways in relation to one form.194 If on the 
other hand the actuality of the mover is in the mover, and the actuality of the movable 
is in the movable, then either the causal agency of the mover will impact on the 
mover itself, not the movable, or it will impact on nothing, in which case it is not 
being a mover in actuality. Finally, if the actualities of the mover and the moved are 
the same, then we reach absurdity, since agency and patiency cannot be the same. I 
will selectively discuss certain points in this argument which relate to important 
issues for the metaphysics of Aristotle's account of causation. 
I will first consider the role of the form (EiòOS) in Aristotle's account of 
causation. There are three interrelated sub -themes. First, there is the transmission of 
the form from the mover to the movable (202a9 -12). Secondly, the actuality of the 
mover and the actuality of the moved are in relation to one form, the transmitted 
one.195 And finally, these two actualities are of different types.'96 The form that is 
the principle and cause of the motion is the form that is transmitted from the mover to 
the movable. For example, the causal efficacy of fire consists in its transmitting the 
194 E.g. it will become more and less hot at the same time. 
195 This tenet is presupposed by the rhetorical question Aristotle asks: `How will there be two 
alterations of quality in one subject towards one form? (202a35 -36). See P (5.2) in the Dilemma in the 
Appendix. 
196 See Phys III 3, 202b1 -5. Here Aristotle distinguishes teaching from learning, not because the 
content of the lesson is different, but because the one activity is teaching, and the other is learning, the 
same lesson. Contrast e.g. Themistius (In Phys 78, 9 -23), who in his interpretation confuses the 
content of teaching and learning and the common underlying substratum for both. Themistius talks 
about the very same theorem being taught and learned as an example of the common substratum of 
teaching and learning, and assimilates it to the stretch of path for the roads from Athens to Thebes and 
from Thebes to Athens. But this mistakes what is common in the forms of moving and tbeing moved 
with what underlies the activities of moving and being moved. 
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form of heat to the pot. It follows that the motion suffered by what is movable 
consists in the reception of the form that is transmitted to it. So the mover's being a 
mover and the movable being moved will be achieved in relation to one form (EdÇ Ev 
Eiboç, 202a35 -6). But since the mover transmits and the movable receives the form, 
their achievements are of different types,197 because they relate to the same form 
differently. Thus the actuality of the mover as a mover is the transmission of the 
form, and the actuality of the movable as movable is the reception of that form. 
The second issue that arises out of the Dilemma of the Actualities of Motion 
is the distinction Aristotle makes between the subjects the actualities occur in and the 
subjects they belong to. Here, as we shall see, Aristotle's metaphysical intuitions are 
tested to the extreme, and he finally opts for an account that opens new ground in the 
area of causation. Aristotle raises the issue of where the actualities of the mover as 
mover, the action, and of the movable as movable, the passion, are, i.e. whether they 
are in the mover or in the movable (>zv TiVI; `in what ?', 202a25). By asking in what 
the action of the agent and the passion of the patient are, he distinguishes in one and 
the same question two metaphysical relations: the one is `belonging to a subject' and 
the other is `occurring in a subject'.198 We need to examine why this distinction 
arises here, and how it can be understood. 
Let us first look at Aristotle's own attempt to justify the distinction. He says: 
ÉnEÌ OÚV CIpCpw KIVI)QEIS, Ei pÈV ËT£paI, £V TivI; 
Since then they are both [the agent's action and the patient's passion] 
motions, we may ask: in what are they? (202a25) 
Ìj OÚTE Tò CMou tv£pyclav >zV t.`r>rpcp &al áTOnov (ËOTI yàp ei 
bibakIS >rv>rpyEla TOO blbaQKOAIKOIJ, ËV TIVI p>VTOI, KQÌ OIJK 
ànoTETp1ip>Vri, àk\à ToúbE tv TGilbE) 
197 202b1 -3 `It is contrary to reason to suppose that there should be one identical actualisation of two 
things which are different in kind. Yet there will be, if teaching and learning are the same, and agency 
and patiency'. See P 15 in the Dilemma in the final section of this chapter. 
198 Being `in a subject' in the context of Phys III 3 should not to be understood along the lines of 
inherence in the Categories, as, for instance, red inheres in an apple. The reason is that the 
Categories' inherence in the substance entails belonging to that substance as subject; whereas, as we 
shall see, here, e.g. heating something belongs to the fire but occurs in the pot. 
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It is not absurd that the actualisation of one thing should be in another. 
Teaching is the activity of a person who can teach, yet the operation is 
performed in something - it is not cut adrift from a subject [the teacher], but 
is of one thing [the teacher] in another [the learner]. (202b5 -8, my emphasis) 
The first passage makes a general point, too broad to be illuminating in the 
present circumstances. It tells us that in relation to motions we can ask the question 
of where they take place. Thus, my walk can take place in the park, and my tanning 
at the seashore. But in neither case am I doing something (at least in any way 
significant) to, or changing, that in which my motion takes place. My walk and my 
tanning are external to the park and the seashore. They are `in' them in a local sense, 
which must not be the point Aristotle wants to make, if he is to distinguish e.g. my 
tanning taking place in the seashore from its taking place in me, who tans.199 The 
second passage gives us a clearer idea of the type of distinction that Aristotle has in 
mind. He concentrates on one of the two actualities, the agent's, and says that 
teaching is performed by the teacher in something. If this is to be more illuminating 
than the first passage, we must take Aristotle to be saying something other than that 
teaching takes place in a classroom. Indeed he does tell us that teaching takes place 
in the learner. But how is this to be understood, and generalised? 
A clue as to what Aristotle means by talking of where an action takes place 
can be found in a sub -argument in the Dilemma (P 9 -12 in the argument analysis), in 
the following dialectical move, at 202a26 -31: 
ij YàP CIlJ(p(x) tv nÒOxOVTI Kai KIVOUp>rV(p, pv nOinQlq tv TW 
nololJVTI, È nàenQlq tv nàoxOVTI (Ei bÈ b£Ì Kai TallTnv noinQlV 
KQA£Ñ, Òp(ioVupOS C1V £Ïn). àlvvi pnV Ei TOOTO, rl KÌVnQIS tv KIVOUVTI 
£O-rai Ò Ò aIJTÒ Ò o Èni KIVOlJVTO Kai KIVOU ÈVOU (ií)OT ' nay TÒ ( Y P S Y S S I ) n 
KIVOIJV KIVt)Q£TQI, fj >'rXOV KÌVnQIV 06 KIVIjQ£TOI 
[Suppose] the agency is in the agent and the patiency in the patient. [Then] 
... the motion will be in the mover, for the same account will hold of mover 
and movable. Hence either every mover will be moved, or, though having 
motion, it will not be moved. 
199 Contrast Hussey ad locum who holds that `there is nothing to suggest that anything other than a 
local sense of ̀ in' is intended' (1982: 65). 
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The key ideas in this argument are that where the actuality of the mover as a 
mover is will also be where the motion is; and the thing the motion is in is set in 
motion. Aristotle's justification for the first claim, that motion follows the actuality 
of the mover as mover, is that the rationale here must be the same in the case of the 
movable. Because if, as per the initial hypothesis, the action of the mover moves the 
movable, then it must be that the action of the mover generates motion. But if the 
action of the mover is in the mover, the generated motion will, for that reason, also be 
in the mover. But then the mover will be in motion, for otherwise `though having 
motion, it will not be moved', which is treated as absurd and closes this branch of the 
argument. So the motion is where the actuality of the mover as mover is, and where 
the motion is, it sets that thing in motion. 
In that case we can interpret the question `>ry Tivi;' (`in what ?', 202a25) as 
asking `at what is the motion directed ?' Teaching is directed at a learner, heating at a 
colder object, and scratching at a surface, because it is these objects that are set in 
motion by the movers. So the actuality of the mover as mover is in the patient 
generating the motion in it. On the other hand, the actuality of the patient as patient 
is always in the patient because the patient always suffers the caused motion itself. 
The picture which emerges from the distinction of the two metaphysical relations, 
`belonging to a subject' and `occurring in a subject', is that there is a motion that is 
the coincidence of two activities, the agent's and the patient's, in the patient. I shall 
explore this metaphysical picture in the section 2 of this chapter 
Before we come to this, a clarification is needed regarding whether the mover 
itself is in motion. We have seen that Aristotle distinguishes the motion of the 
mover, due to necessary contact with the movable, from the motion in the movable 
due to the mover's causal efficacy. The first is in the mover and the second in the 
movable.200 But there is a third, Cambridge, type of change that both the mover and 
200 
In the sub -argument of the Dilemma examined above, the falsehood that closes one of the branches 
is that `every mover will be moved' (202a30). See (P 10.1) in theargument analysis in section 3 of 
this chapter. This follows from the assumption that the mover's actuality, as a mover, is in the mover 
itself. Then, due to their self inflicted causal efficacy, all movers would move, which is treated as a 
falsehood, and so it is denied that the mover's actuality is in the mover. But although `every mover 
will be moved' is treated as a falsehood in the Dilemma, Aristotle has earlier stated that `every mover 
is moved' (202a3). The difference between the statements is that the second ranges over movable 
movers only, while the first ranges over all movers, including god, who is immovable, which falsifies 
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the movable undergo; namely they become respectively mover and moved. This is 
different from the change the mover suffers due to contact with the movable, since 
the mover would undergo the change into being a mover even if it moved the 
movable without contact with it (e.g. in the case of the prime mover). Similarly, the 
movable becomes moved as well as hot, or red or shaped. 
the statement. Of course this argument does not block the possibility of self -directed motion, as in the 
case of a doctor healing herself, where the mover and moved are the same. 
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1. The Cause and the Effect 
Immediately following the Actualities of Motion Dilemma, Aristotle denies 
three of its premises, at 202b5 -21: 
[1] oüT£ TÒ TCÌV äÀÀOU ÉVÉpy£IOV ÉV ÉTÉpq.) £ivai äTOnov ... [2] 06T£ play 
bUOÌV K(oÀIJ£I OÚQÉV TrjV aÚTIjV EÑaI... [3] QÚT' àVàyKrj TÒV IóàQKOVTa 
paVeàV£Iv, oú6' £i TÒ n01£ÌV KOi nàOX£IV TÒ O0TÒ ÉOTIV, Nrj (BUTE 
TÒV ÀOyoV £ÍVOI Eva TÒV <TÒ> Ti 6v £ival ÀÉyovTa ...àÀÀ' 65 únàpX£i 
MOTO, Cj KÌVfjoIS' 
[lilt is not absurd that the actualisation of one thing should be in another. ... 
[2] There is nothing to prevent two things having one and the same 
actualisation ... [3] Nor is it necessary that the teacher should learn, even if to 
act and to acted on are one and the same, provided they are not the same in 
respect of the account which states their essence ... but in respect to the 
subject to which they belong, the motion. 
This leads directly to the discussion of his own position, which he had already 
sketched, just before entering the Dilemma, as follows, at 202a13 -18: 
Kai TÒ ànopoúp£vov óÉ cpav£pöv, äTI ÉoTiV ñ KÌVnoIS tv TCJ KIVrjT(T' 
>VT£ÀÉX£Ia yelp ÉoTI TOÚTOU [Kai] únò TOO KIVIjTiKOIJ. Kai Ij TOO 
KIVfjTIKOÚ óÉ ÉvÉpy£ia 06K äÀÀrj Early. ó£i N:::vv yelp £ivai ÉvT£ÀÉX£iav 
àpCpOiV' KIVCjTIKÒV pÉV yelp ÉOTIV TW ÓllVaoeal, KIVOUV bÉ Tcil £V£py£ÌV, 
elÀÀ' ÉOTIV £V£pyrjTIKÒV TOO KIVITTOtJ, WoT£ öNOi(AS pia rj àpcpOÌV 
, 
£v£py£la 
The solution of the difficulty is plain: motion is in the movable. It is the 
fulfilment of this potentiality by the action of that which has the power of 
causing motion; and the actuality of that which has the power of causing 
motion is not other than the actuality of the movable; for it must be the 
fulfilment of both...it is on the movable that it [the mover] is capable of 
acting. Hence there is one and the same actuality of both' (my translation, 
slightly modified from Barnes (1982)). 
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I will first briefly outline Aristotle's solution to the problem of causation 
before discussing it in detail. Causal interaction consists in the transmission of a 
form from an agent to a patient. The agent's causal activity consists in transmitting 
the form, and the patient's activity, which is the causal effect, consists in receiving 
the form. So, causal interaction results in the actualisation of properties in both 
objects: the cause in the agent, and the effect in the patient. The actualisation of these 
potentialities is a physical process facilitating the transmission of the form, e.g. the 
movements of the sculptor's arms and chisel on the wood. This process is at one and 
the same time characterised essentially by the natures of the two potentialities, the 
agent's as agent and the patient's as patient (e.g. sculpting and being carved into 
shape, heating and being heated, teaching and learning). The two natures of the 
process are different, interdependent, and asymmetrically realised. Their asymmetry 
lies in that the activity of the agent is realised in the patient, producing the effect on 
the patient. The interdependences of the two natures are multifarious, binding them 
into a complex entity of an underlying physical activity grounding two essential 
natures, namely the cause and the effect. It is their being essential natures of the 
underlying activity that makes this a case of a complex entity that is neither one 
entity with two properties, nor two entities that are different. This complex entity 
comes about by the mutual, interdependent actualisation of properties of the two 
objects which are in causal interaction. The entity itself is the causal bridge between 
the two objects. 
We have already seen that causation is the transmission of form from the 
mover to the movable, at 202a9 -12: 
The mover will always transmit a form ... which, when it moves, will be the 
principle and cause of the motion. 
This is the core conception which explains further fundamental features of the 
Aristotelian account of causation, such as its incompleteness, and its asymmetry. The 
causal interaction begins with contact between the agent and patient, see 202a5 -7: 
For to operate on this, qua such, is just what it is to produce change, and this 
it does by contact, so that it will be at the same time acted upon. 
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The contact facilitates the transmission of the form from the mover to the 
movable. But the transmission is a process that takes place in time. While it lasts the 
transmission has not been completed. The unfolding of the stages of transmission 
marks the incompleteness of the causal process (e.g. building a structure). The 
process of the reception of the form by the patient is the causal effect. Once the 
transmission is completed, the causal interaction is not taking place any more. The 
agent is not acting on the patient, which now possesses the transmitted form. So the 
process of realisation of the agent's capacity to transmit the form and the patient's 
capacity to receive the form is the causal process which lasts until the transmission is 
completed. The realisation takes place through time, during which period the process 
is driven by the yet not fully fulfilled potentialities of the agent to transmit the form 
and the patient to receive it. So the causal process of transmission is actual while 
these potentialities are being realised, and only before they are fully realised. In that 
sense the causal process is actual only when the potentialities that drive it are 
incompletely actualised, see 201b31 -33: 
Motion is thought to be a sort of actuality, but incomplete, the reason being 
that the potential whose actuality it is, is incomplete. 
But more important than the explanation of the incompleteness of causation is 
the role that the transmission of the form plays in selecting the cause, which can 
inform any account of causation. We already saw that the agent is involved in 
different motions in the course of the causal interaction, due to the contact with the 
patient which is necessary for the transmission of the form. All of these motions are 
required for the effect to occur - if not these particular tokens, at least their functional 
types. But although all of them can thereby be thought of as belonging to the causal 
field of this causal act, not all of them, or any arbitrary selection from them, are the 
cause. Some of what happens to the agent is only the means for the transmission of 
the form.201 This distinction between the cause and the means towards its realisation 
201 I would like to make a clarification regarding the motion of the mover. One kind of motion is the 
one resulting from the mover's contact with the movable, which is required to transmit the form to it. 
But there is a further type of motion that may be required for the transmission of the form. It may be 
that to achieve contact at all, or to achieve the requisite contact, the mover needs to move itself, as e.g. 
in the case of a sculptor or a builder. These motions are neither the transmission of the form, nor the 
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is already found in Plato's Phaedo (99a5- b4).202 But what Aristotle makes explicit 
here is the criterion that determines the cause, distinguishing it from the means. The 
form that is transmitted is the principle and the cause of the motion. Everything else 
that happens in the process, or even the conditions of its happening, is the means for 
the transmission of the form. Thus the heat from the fire, or from the match, or from 
the particle fission, is the cause of the explosion, while such factors as the presence of 
oxygen, or the striking of the match, or the uncovering of the reactor rods, are the 
means towards the transmission of the form, or even the generation of the form to be 
transmitted. 
Since the causal interaction is the transmission of the form, at the time of 
transmission the causal form must be present in the agent not only in actuality, but in 
a transmissible state. The teacher may possess knowledge, but this does not make her 
into a teacher until she embodies this knowledge in her lecture that transmits it to the 
students. The knowledge in her memory is the non -transmissible form, while that in 
her lecture is the transmissible one. (The memory knowledge is non -transmissible in 
the sense that the agent must come to posses the knowledge in a different form before 
it can be transmitted.203) But the mover need not possess the form in any way other 
than in a transmissible state at the time of the transmission. This is the least 
requirement of possession of the form by the mover. The mover may also possess the 
form in non -transmissible ways, but this is not necessary for it to be or become a 
mover. Also, even if it does possess the form in a transmissible state, e.g. the teacher 
has prepared the lecture, it is not a mover until the conditions are such that they allow 
the form to be actually transmitted. And finally, even if it possesses the form in a 
transmissible way, it may not be in the appropriate mode for transmitting it to the 
type of patient at hand. 
result of contact with the movable, but the preparation for it. But this does not make them uncaused 
motions. They are motions that are self -inflicted by the mover for the sake of transmitting the form to 
the movable. They are part of the mover's plan, if the mover is capable of planning, to engage in a 
more complex causal activity, e.g. hitting the ball in a game of tennis, which involves component 
motions. Aristotle does not set them apart here, but they have already been distinguished by Plato (see 
following note). 
202 
See in particular 9962 -4: ÖÀÀO 0/ Ti LOTI TÒ aÌTIOv T4.0) ÓVTI, âÀÀO öL LKEÌVO ÓVEU 06 TÒ OTTIOV 
OOK 6v nor' Eirl ainov. In Gallop's translation: `Fancy being unable to distinguish two different 
things: the reason proper, and that without which the reason could never be a reason'. 
203 Of course it is the memory knowledge that is transmitted, and in that sense it is transmissible, too, 
but only by being the origin of the further, transmissible state of that knowledge, which the teacher 
comes to possess before transmitting it to the student. 
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The transmissibility of the form is a very significant, and entirely unexplored, 
feature of Aristotle's theory of causation. There are two aspects of it which I want to 
remark on, even if there is no space here to expound on them. The first is the context 
relativity of transmission: since the form must be transmissible to a particular type of 
object, in a particular type of circumstances, the agent must possess the form in a 
transmissible state relevant to the type of object and type of circumstances of the 
transmission. An example is the teacher transmitting the lesson in an oral lecture or 
in a printed article. The teacher, thereby, possesses the lesson in different ways - in 
her memory, her lecture, and the article. Two of them are transmissible forms, each 
fitting the circumstances of transmission. The second feature of the transmissibility 
of the form is the democracy of transmission: no type of transmission is more 
privileged than others. This means that no type of possession of the form is more 
privileged than others. Thus, whether the lesson is in a lecture or in an article, neither 
is more authentically the teacher's lesson than the other. 
The context relativity and the democracy of transmission have important 
consequences for various theories of Aristotle where causal connections play a 
significant role. For instance, in the case of perception, in different contexts the 
surface of the wall may look red, orange or pink, without the surface having changed 
colours. None of these is more truly the colour of the surface than the others, because 
what colour is transmitted to the perceiver's experience is relative to the 
circumstances of transmission. There is no illusion in seeing red or pink, not even if 
the light shining on the wall is coloured or the perceiver is drugged. These are all 
colours that the surface transmits in these circumstances to this or these perceiver(s). 
(Chapter 6 is devoted to the investigation of the ontology of colours. 
)204 
The more general question is whether a form that the agent transmits in 
different contexts remains the same, with only the mode of transmission differing, or 
whether the form is affected by the mode of transmission. I am inclined towards the 
latter, which would lead us to a one -to -many relation between a feature of the agent 
and its transmissible types (or even a many -to -many relation between a family of 
features and a family of types). But this is an area to be explored elsewhere, not as 
Aristotelian scholarship but as a potential contribution to current philosophical 
debates. 
204 For a fuller exposition of this feature of perceptual causation, see also Marmodoro (2006). 
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A further question that arises is the following: which form possessed by the 
agent is the cause of the causal interaction, the non -transmissible form possessed by 
the agent pre -transmission, or the transmissible form that the agent either possesses 
before, or comes to possess by the time of the transmission occurrence, or even 
during the time of the transmission occurrence ?205 For instance, in the case of the 
teacher, is it the non -transmissible knowledge that the teacher already possesses in 
her memory that is the cause of the student's learning, or the transmissible knowledge 
embodied in the delivered lecture? Aristotle does not give us a decisive statement on 
this issue. I believe that he vacillates between the two because the problem is 
complex and he never addresses it directly. 
One question is the one we just addressed - which form is the cause. A 
further question is whether the non -transmissible and the transmissible forms are the 
same. In some cases there would be no doubt, as in the case of heat. But in other 
cases, where the mode of embodiment of the transmissible form gives a different type 
of presence to the form in the object (like time, in analogue and digital watches), 
uncertainties arise. In different contexts Aristotle takes different positions on the 
topic, which also affect the answer to the question of which of the two modes of 
possession of the form is the cause. For instance, in the case of a human being or a 
builder, the non -transmissible form seems to play the prominent role. The human 
form of the particular human being seems to be the only human form that is actually 
present in the person; it remains unclear whether the human form embodied in the 
heat of his sperm - which generates the embryo by affecting the menstrual fluids - is 
an instance of the human form which is actually present in the human being. In this 
case it seems that the human form of the person (not in the sperm) is the cause of 
generation of the embryo.206 Similarly, the form of the house in the builder's mind 
seems to be the house form present in her, rather than the form of the house 
embodied in the movements of her arms and instruments while she is building. Thus 
the form in her mind seems to be the cause of the generation of the building, although 
there is a sense in which the arm movements are the direct cause. But in the case of 
205 The oral lecture which embodies the knowledge of the teacher comes to embody this knowledge 
during the course of the transmission, just as the movements of the arms and chisel of the sculptress 
embody the shape transmitted to the statue. 
206 Phys III 2, 202a11 -2 `The actual man (ó tvTE%EXEdÇ] ávepWnoq) begets man from what is 
potentially man'. 
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teaching, the lecture seems to be the cause rather than the knowledge in the teacher's 
memory; but the memory knowledge seems to be the one that is actually present in 
the teacher. However, when we come to Aristotle's examination of secondary 
properties in the De Anima the balance tips all the way in the direction of the 
transmissible form. In the case of the colour of a surface, he considers the physical 
properties of the surface of the object in the dark as only the first actuality of colour 
in the object;207 this gives the object only the potentiality to have visible colour; the 
object possesses visible colour in actuality only when it is perceived in the light; see 
426a15 -26: 
End bÉ pia pÉV ÉOTIV >zV>rpy£la rj TOO OiQeriTOIJ KOi TOO aÌQenTIKOU, TÒ b' 
EiV01 ÉT£pOV, áVáyKr) Clpa cpe£ip£Qeal Kai O'Cig£Qeal OÚT(.i) À£yOpÉvnv 
àK01)V Kai t}1dcp0y, Kai XulJÒV br) KOi y£lJQly, Kai TCl áÀO dpoiwS' TCI b>r 
KOTà búvaplv À£ydp£va 06K ávàyKn áÀÀ' 0i npÒT£pov cpuQloAdyol 
TOOTO Oú KQÀwS >'rÀ£yOV, OúeÉV Oidp£V01 0ÚT£ À£UKÒV 06T£ *ay £IVaI 
C1V£U öyi£cx)S, oúb>r XupÒV CN£u y£úQ£wS. Tñ N£v yàp EÀ£yov dpewS, Tri 
b' 06K dpewS bIXc74 yàp À£yop>rvriS TñS aiQerjQ£wq Kai TOO aiQeriToú, 
TUN pÉV KOTá úVaplV TGV b>r KOT' tvOy£IOV, Eni TOúTwv pÉV O'UpßOiv£I 
TÒ À£XesrV, >zni bÒ Tc.76V >rTEpwV Oú QUpßaiv£I. áÀÀ' >tKEÌVOI ànÀwS ËÀ£y0v 
n£pì Twv À£yop>rvwv oúX ànÀwS. 
Since the actualities of the sensible object and of the sensitive faculty are one 
actuality in spite of their difference between their modes of being, actual 
hearing and actual sounding appear and disappear from existence at one and 
the same moment, and so actual savour and actual tasting, etc., while as 
potentialities one of them may exist without the other. The earlier students of 
nature were mistaken in their view that without sight there was no white or 
black, without taste no savour. This statement of theirs is partly true, partly 
false: `sense' and `the sensible object' are ambiguous terms, i.e. may denote 
either potentialities or actualities: the statement is true of the latter [since 
without sight there is no actual white or black], false of the former [since 
without sight there is potential white or black]. This ambiguity they wholly 
failed to notice. (My emphasis.) 
207 It is the sense in which a violinist is a violinist while she is writing a letter: she possesses the ability 
to play the violin in appropriate circumstances. 
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Here the actual surface properties of a coloured object are only potential 
colour. The object possesses colour when, and only while it is seen. (See chapter 6). 
So it is the transmissible form that is the cause of the motion. 
I will not explore these questions further, as they would require close 
examination of many passages, and have gone this far only to sketch Aristotle's 
vacillation on them. We can retain for our present discussion the claim that the form 
that is transmitted must be possessed in actuality (either in non -transmissible or 
transmissible mode, or both), and that it must also be embodied in the object in a 
transmissible mode at least during the time of transmission. Whether the embodied 
form deserves to count as an actual presence of the form in the object, or only a 
potential one; whether the non -transmissible form is the same as, or only potentially, 
the transmissible form; and whether the cause of the motion is considered to be the 
one or the other - all these may ultimately depend on the case. Aristotle's vacillation 
may be his way of allowing leeway to accommodate our fluid intuitions about these 
issues. 
The direction of transmission of the form also determines what the cause is 
and what the effect. This is particularly important in the cases where the form is 
possessed only in a transmissible state and only at the moment of transmission.208 In 
these cases, both the agent and the patient have the potentiality to possess the form, 
and both come to possess the form actually only at transmission time. Also each of 
them is necessary for the other; the agent can be an agent only by acting on the 
patient, and the patient can be a patient only by being acted upon by the agent.209 But 
the direction of the transmission of the form is asymmetric. And due to the causal 
role of the form, this direction determines which is the agent and which the patient. 
Let us revisit the distinction between `belonging to' and `occurring in' in 
relation to the asymmetry of the direction of transmission. The `actuality of that 
which has the power of causing motion' (202a14), i.e. the actuality of the mover as a 
mover, belongs to the mover as subject. But `it is not absurd that the actualisation of 
one thing should be in another' (202b6); so, since the mover's power to cause motion 
is actualised in the movable, `motion is in the movable' (202a13 -14). But the 
208 For example, consider a geometer first solving a problem on the board while lecturing on it. 
209 
`It is on the movable that the mover is capable of acting' (202a17); and `motion is the fulfilment of 
the potentiality of the movable by the action of that which has the power of causing motion' (202a13- 
4). 
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actualisation of the mover's power as mover consists in the transmission of a form 
`which, when it moves, will be the principle and the cause of the motion' (202a10- 
11); so the motion in the movable is nothing but the reception the form. This is why 
we gave a sense of directedness, above, to the occurrence of the mover's actuality in 
the movable, understanding it as the motion's being directed at the movable: the 
directedness derives from the transmission of the form to the movable, which is what 
the motion of the movable is. 
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2. The Causal Connection 
What type of entity is the transmission of the form from the mover to the 
movable? There is the actuality of the mover as a mover and the actuality of the 
movable as movable, both being realised in the transmission of the form from the 
mover to the movable, which is the motion caused and suffered. How are these three 
actualities related? The metaphysical account of their relation is Aristotle's answer to 
the problem of causation. The challenge is to explain the nature of the special bond 
that connects two objects engaged in causal interaction. The challenge is made 
harder for Aristotle because he restricts himself to the ontology so far developed in 
his system, which does not make any provisions for such entities as necessary 
connections between objects, which later philosophers sought to find in causal 
interactions. But neither does he question or deny the existence of a bond between 
the interacting objects. So he has to build the bond from the materials of his 
ontological warehouse of substances and their properties, which they possess either 
actually or potentially.210 
210 Waterlow (1982) also considers the difficulty of the challenge that causation poses for Aristotle, but 
her analysis of the problem and of Aristotle's solution differs from mine in the following respect. For 
Waterlow the challenge for Aristotle does not come from the metaphysical problem of how to account 
for the special bond between cause and effect without introducing ontological entities such as 
necessary connections. Rather, it comes from the fact that the worldview Aristotle operates with (and 
the language available to him) seemingly creates a need for a metaphysical justification of a bond 
between causes and effects that has no place in his metaphysics. Waterlow attributes to Aristotle an 
`anthropomorphic' view of causation and change, where `the point of view of the voluntary agent is 
one from which the `halves' [sc. agent and patient] already present themselves as distinct' (203), while 
in fact by his own metaphysical account there are not two distinct `halves' to causation. `Aristotle's 
retention of the language of agency and patiency has nothing to do with any postulation of a mystical 
(and mythical) transaction tying agent to patient or to its effect in the patient' (200)... `Why should we 
not regard the artifex and his material as forming, in the change, a concrete organic unity, as if the 
material were an extension of his own body? What happens in the one and what happens in the other 
have the same end and are from the same principle (201)... In the change as a concrete unitary event 
there are not different entities to be agent and patient. The active and passive of the verb, from this 
point of view, are used of the change itself only derivatively, on the basis of an actual distinction 
existing only ante and post eventum (202)... Since there are not two beings to connect, there can be 
neither problem nor solution about the nature and status of the connection' (202). Waterlow's 
interpretation of Aristotle's account of causation relies on the reading she offers for Phys III 3 which I 
shall discuss in detail in footnote 26. For the moment I want to register in outline where our 
interpretations agree and where they disagree. There is agreement in understanding that Aristotle sees 
agent and patient as enjoying a special type of unity. There is disagreement in the understanding of 
Aristotle's account of that unity. For Waterlow agency and patiency have the same end and are from 
the same principle, and this is why they are one. Their relation may be understood in the light of the 
model of an organic part whole relation `as if the material were an extension of his [the artifex's] own 
body' (201). But contra Waterlow it is clear from the texts I have commented on so far that agency 
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Substances move. Aristotle's solution to the causal bond problem is to make 
the motion of the causally interacting substances the same. Their motion, being one 
and the same but belonging to both substances, links the two substances together. 
But here a challenge emerges (202b1 -5): how can the motion of the agent be the 
same as the motion of the patient? 
áAA' pÀ0Y0V blJO ÈTÈp(ilV TW EÏóEI TO 06T1)V Kai piav Eival ÈVÈpy£laV 
Kai >'ro-rai, E'ínEp rj bibaIS Kai ñ pàenQlq Tò ab-rò Kai rj noinQlq Kai el 
náenQlS, Kai TO blbàQKEIV TC,.) payeàVEIV TÒ a6TÒ KQi TÒ n01EÑ TO 
náOxEIV, 60TE TÒV blbáQKOVTa ávàyKn ÉoTQI nàvra paveàVEIV Kai TÒV 
nololJvra nàoxElV. 
It is contrary to reason to suppose that there should be one actualisation of 
two things which are different in kind. Yet, there will be if teaching and 
learning are the same, and agency and patiency. To teach will be the same as 
to learn, and to act the same as to be acted on - the teacher will necessarily be 
learning everything that he teaches, and the agent will be acted on. 
Aristotle does not draw back from his solution in view of this problem, but is 
led to innovate. He will keep the oneness of the motion, but account for its twoness 
in a metaphysically novel way, which follows different principles from his 
established essentialism in his theory of substances. 
Aristotle tells us, at 202a14 -16, that the motion that is in the movable, brought 
about by the mover: 
ÈvrEAÈXEIa yap ÈOTI TOIJTOU [Kai] Únò TOO KIVnTIKOIJ. Kai r) TOO 
KIVnTIKOl1 bÈ ÈVÈpyEla 00K QAAn ÈoTÌV bEi NÈV yàp dval tVTEAÈXEIaV 
áp(POÌV 
is the fulfilment of this potentiality [of the movable as movable] by the action 
of that which has the power of causing motion [the mover]; and the actuality 
and patiency have different ends, one being the transmission of the form, and the other the reception of 
the form. Agency and patiency have different natures, being the realisation of different potentialities 
which belong to different substances. Yet, causation ties agent to patient through a complex entity, a 
bond, whose metaphysical structure is not left `mystical' by Aristotle. 
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of that which has the power of causing motion [the mover] is not other than 
the actuality of the moveable; for it must be the fulfilment of both. 
The terms translated as `fulfilment' and `actuality' are tVTEÀ XEIa and 
Év>rpyEla respectively, which are used interchangeably in this context.211 Clearly, so 
described, the solution faces the prima facie objection we encountered above, that 
teaching will be the same as learning and that the teacher will learn what she teaches. 
So Aristotle proceeds to refine his answer by a series of examples. Before examining 
his examples, I should mention that it is only elucidation by example, rather than a 
change in the answer, that he offers. This is surprising in view of the fact that, as we 
shall see, we would have expected his answer to be given using different terminology 
in view of the clarification he makes. But Aristotle does not change the terminology 
of his solution, despite the fact that he has the opportunity to do so when he repeats it 
(at 202b -9) immediately following the discussion of the prima facie objection. His 
solution, enriched by the examples, does avoid the objection, as I shall argue below. 
But one would have expected a re- description of his solution that did not claim the 
(objectionable) sameness of the two actualities, which his solution does not require 
and is in fact misleading for the reader. As we do not get a re- description, we need to 
conclude that Aristotle is using the terms :rvTEÀ XEIa and Év>rpyEla broadly here, to 
mean by actualisation the activity of the agent and patient, rather than the natures of 
their activities. 
Aristotle gives four examples to elucidate his solution to the causal 
connection problem. He sets up the problem by stating the explanandum, at 202a16- 
17: 
A thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this, it is a mover 
because it actually does it. But it is on the movable that it is capable of 
acting. 
Z" See Gill (1980) for an informed discussion of the etymology of tvTEAtXEia, its possible 
translations, and the debated issue of its synonymy with ÉvapyEia. Gill devotes particular attention to 
the textual observation that: `Aristotle's argument...proves that the ÉvTEÀÉXEIa of the agent and the 
patient is one, but in the argument Aristotle does not explicitly claim that motion is the atvTEÀ XEia of 
both'. Gill finds it an `attractive suggestion' to explain the textual observation thus: `the claim would 
be that the £vTE /ÉXm of the teacher and the learner is the same but what it is to be that tvTEÀtXcIa for 
the teacher is an activity, namely a teaching of the teacher in the learner, and a change in the learner, 
namely a learning of the learner by the teacher'. But she dismisses this as Aristotle's view in the light 
of 202b19ff, because she finds no indication of an ontological asymmetry between agency as activity 
and patiency as change (134 -5). 
154 
The action of the mover can be realised only by acting on the movable. This 
requires Aristotle to explain how the mover's capacity is bound up with the movable. 
Immediately following his statement of the problem, he proceeds to offer his 
explanation by restating his solution and elucidating it with the first two examples, at 
202a18 -20: 
,. , , , , , , , , woTE opoicoS pia r apcpoiv EvpYEia cQnEp TÒ ÚTÒ biao-rnpa v npoS 
Elk Kai búo npÒç ËV, KQÌ TÒ CIVOVTES Kai TÒ KÒTQVTES' 
Hence there is one and the same actualityof both [the mover and the movable] 
alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval, and the steep 
ascent and the steep descent are one. 
The first example is ambiguous. On the one hand the interval from one to two 
can be taken to be the same as the interval from two to one, being either an 
arithmetical unit of value one, or a geometrical magnitude of value one. On the other 
hand, the two intervals can be taken to be different, such as the positive and negative 
values of the number one, or vectors with opposite directions. I take the example in 
the latter way because, as we shall see, the metaphysics of the two intervals require 
them to have different essential natures, as the positive and negative unit values do, 
or as opposite vectors do; whereas taken in the former way the two intervals are one 
and the same, described in two different ways - from one to two, and from two to 
one. The ancient and medieval commentators interpret this example in two ways, 
both of which belong to the one entity -two descriptions family of interpretations. 
The second example is also ambiguous, between the stretch of land being the same 
inclined road for both ascent and decent, or there being two routes, the route up or the 
route down, which, as any bicyclist knows, are not only essentially, but dramatically 
different! 
Ancient commentators vacillate (often indiscriminately) between two 
readings, staying within the one entity -two descriptions family: either one interval 
described in two different ways in terms of its end points, or one relation described 
from the point of view of either relatum. I believe that the reason for the 
commentators' vacillation between the two readings is that at 202b17-9 Aristotle 
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describes the example, speaking loosely, both as an interval (óiàOTac iç) between two 
points, and as the relation of either point being distant (Tò öii0TaG8a0 from the 
other, as if they were equivalent ways of formulating the example. Reading the 
example as one interval described differently in terms of its end points is found e.g. 
in: Simplicius (446, 31 -2); Philoponus (370, 7; 375, 26 - 376, 5); Aquinas (III, 4 
[314]). Reading the example as one relation that has two relata, and accordingly two 
descriptions (e.g. the relation of procreation, with father and son as the two relata, 
and `being the father of' and `being the son of' s the two descriptions), is found in: 
Simplicius (439, 34bis -37; 448, 30ff; on this reading of Simplicius see also Luna, 
1987: 126); Averroes (92v. I -L; 94r. E; 95r. A); Aquinas (III, 4 [307]; to be 
contrasted with [314]). The modern commentators do not fall prey to this possible 
confusion, but yet most of them take the one entity -two descriptions interpretation of 
Aristotle's examples in Phys III 3; for instance see e.g. Ross (1979: 361, 362, 540); 
Gill (1980: 140; 143); Waterlow (1982: 182, 191); Hussey (1983:69 -70). 
Aristotle does proceed to offer an explanation of the sameness involved in 
these examples, at 202a20: 
For these are one and the same, although their definitions [À0yOç] are not one. 
So it is with the mover and the moved. (My emphasis). 
This is important, but not complete. It is important because it blocks the 
objection that teaching would end up being the same as learning, by stating that they 
have different essential natures. But if they have different essential natures they are 
not one and the same entity described in two different ways. Whatever it is that is 
common between the two intervals or the ascent and descent must have two different 
definitions. Commentators who read Myoç as `account/description' rather than 
`definition' take the examples to be introducing a common single entity in each case, 
e.g. unit value one, or the inclined road (or the relation between the extremes). This 
view is held by the majority of the commentators, ancient and modern ones. I have 
already discussed the position of the ancient and medieval commentators. I will limit 
myself here to present two recent and very interesting modern accounts that have 
been offered for the same entity view; one is by Waterlow (1982) and the other by 
Hussey (1983: 66). Waterlow (and also Kosman (1975: 514)) in analysing the 
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analogous case of hearing and sounding) identifies the differently described entity as 
a single event, a single change that is both teaching and learning: 
His [Aristotle's] argument proceeds on the following assumption: the only 
reason anyone could have for supposing that being a changer (an actual 
changer) entails change in that changer, rests on a false view of the difference 
regarding these (in some given instance, such as teaching and learning) as 
different concrete events, that one could be misled into thinking that the 
changer as such undergoes a change. But once it is seen that these are 
different ways of describing the same event, the problem disappears, leaving 
only one change, which is to be located in the patient (180). 
The point of crucial importance that Aristotle emphasises again and again... is 
that X's teaching is not a different concrete event from Y's learning. These 
are one and the same actuality under two descriptions (182). 
Waterlow associates this single event that is the entity to which the two 
descriptions apply with `a neutral verb -stem determinable by active and passive 
voices ... we may say (a) that teaching is a predicate of Y as well as of X; and (b) 
that `teaching' applies to Y in a determinate form (the passive) which is perfectly 
consistent with the statement `Y does not teach" (182). But this linguistic 
description of a verb -stem and its two grammatical determinations does not explain 
or establish that the corelevant ontology is of one event under two descriptions rather 
than along the two vectors or the two routes ontology. 
Hussey, who also holds the one entity -two descriptions view, considers that 
Aristotle's `positive argument to show that the changes [of the agent and patient] are 
the same' may be that "an operation must be something that happens over a period of 
time, and that if we look at the minimal case of change, in which the agent is 
completely unaffected, there is `nothing happening' except the change of the patient. 
Hence, the operation of the agent must be the change" (66). I do not see the 
relevance of the change being incremental to whether the agent is affected or not. 
But since in Phys III 3 there is no reference to incremental changes, there appears to 
be no reason to attribute to Aristotle this argument. 
For reasons that will become clear in the discussion of Aristotle's subsequent 
examples and explanation, I take Àòyoç here to mean `definition', by contrast with 
interpretations which read the examples as involving one entity under two 
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descriptions. My reading requires that whatever it is that the two intervals or routes 
share in common is not any familiar entity of the Aristotelian ontology, since it has 
two different definitions of what it is to be it. 
It follows on my reading that when Aristotle says that there is a single 
actuality [Évtpycia] of both the mover and the movable (as there is between the two 
intervals or the two routes), he must be telling us that the mover and the movable as 
so related in their activity as to be one in some sense, but not one in the definitions 
that describe what each of them does or suffers. What makes the definitions of the 
vector lines two are opposite directions; but what makes these vector lines one? It is 
the non -directional interval between one and two that is the same for both vector 
lines. The interval would not be the same, for example, between vector lines one to 
two and four to three. Similarly with the uphill and downhill routes; they are 
different because of their opposed directions but are both the same stretch of land, as 
opposed to two routes on different sides of the hill that share no common stretch of 
land. Although these examples and this explanation go some way towards explaining 
what Aristotle means by claiming that the actuality of the mover and the movable is 
the same, his position is not as explicit as in the explanation we shall find in his next 
set of examples, which I now turn to consider. 
After the Dilemma Aristotle states his own position, resolving the puzzles 
encountered in the course of the Dilemma itself. On the issue we are examining here, 
Aristotle says at 202b10 -14: 
oüT' áváyKn Tòv blbáQKOVTa pavAávEiv, oúò' Ei it noiEiv Kai náoXEiV Tò 
aüTò ÉOTiv, pij ptvrOi 6)OTE Tòv Aòyov ETvai Eva Tòv <Tò> Ti 6v ETVaI 
AtyovTa, oiov cbS Awrnov Kai ipáTiov, áiA' cbS rj òòòS el OrjßriAEV 
AAr1va4 Kai rl AArjvriAEv EiS OrlßaS, cbQnEp EïpriTai Kai npòTEpov 
Nor is it necessary that the teacher should learn, even if to act and be acted on 
are one and the same, provided that they are not the same in respect of the 
account which states their essence (as raiment and dress), but are the same in 
the sense in which the road from Thebes to Athens and the road from Athens 
to Thebes are the same, as has been explained above. 
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No doubt is recorded in the modern editions on the expression Ti Iry Elva1 at 
202b12; only the two immediately preceding articles TÒV <TÒ> have had a less firm 
transmission in the manuscripts, as Ross documents in the apparatus ad locum: we 
find only TÒV in I J; only TÒ in E; neither in F. We can easily explain the fact that 
one or the other article dropped out in the manuscripts transcription process because 
the two words appear very much alike. Bonitz prints both articles TÒV TÒ as part of 
the text. Ross chooses to print <TÒ> as a lacuna to be completed by sense. 
The use of the technical expression, coined by Aristotle himself, for essence, 
<TÒ> Ti 11V EIVOI, settles the issue as to whether by `account', AÒyoc, he means 
description or definition of nature. This is further supported by his immediate 
example of things that have the same account, namely raiment and dress. `Raiment' 
and `clothing' are one thing, under two names or descriptions, but with one definition 
which expresses its essence. In Topics I 7, 103a25 -7, Aristotle says that whatever is 
one in essence is one in the primary sense (KupiwÇ), and indeed we find there the 
very same example of the `raiment' and `clothing' to illustrate this type of oneness: 
KUpICi)TQTa pv Kai npCi)TGt)S ÒTaV ÓVÒpaTI Pi ÒpC}) TÒ TaIJTÒV Ònob06rl, 
Ka6ánEp ipáTlov Awnicp Kai c.`1:.)ov ngÒV óinouv óv6p(i)ncx) 
It follows that the route from Thebes to Athens differs in definition from the 
route from Athens to Thebes since they are not, as Aristotle tells us, like raiment and 
clothing. The reference back to what `has been explained above' is to the passage we 
just examined, 202a19 -20, on the relation of the uphill route to the downhill one that 
differs in account, Aòyoç. Hence there, too, Aristotle intends AÒyoç to be the 
definition of essence. 
But there is further evidence that here AÒyoç is the definition of essence and 
not a mere description. This comes in an unexpected metaphysical observation that 
Aristotle makes immediately afterwards. This observation also makes it evident that 
Aristotle's aim in the two passages we are examining, in which he says that mover 
and movable are `one and the same', or that one `actuality ... must be the fulfilment 
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of both', or that `to act and to be acted on are one and the same',212 is to carve out a 
sense of qualified sameness, a sense different from identity of substances, see 
202b14-16: 
oú yelp Taúrà nàvTa únàpXEl ToiS Ònmoúv To7ç aúroiç, àAAà NÒvov Orç 
TÒ ET VOI TÒ aUT, Ò. 
For it is not things which are in any way the same that have all their attributes 
the same, but only those to be which is the same. 
Aristotle must be referring to the attributes of substances, because he uses the 
expression `everything which belongs' (TaúTà nàvTa únàpXEI) to these substances, 
which excludes the underlying substratum. Furthermore, although he only talks of 
substances that have the same being (TÒ Eíval TÒ aÚTÒ), he must mean by `being' the 
whole constitution of such things, namely matter and form.213 The reason is that if he 
meant only that these substances would be the same in essential form, the statement 
would be obviously false; two trees of the same species do not have all their 
attributes the same. Of course, if he meant that the two substances are the same in 
form, whether form is essential or accidental, he would be stating a tautology when 
he claims that such substances would have their attributes the same. We should then 
take Aristotle to be claiming that things with the same constitution, namely identical 
things, have the same attributes, and hence are indiscernible - we shall refer to it as 
Leibniz's Law. Aristotle mentions the indiscernibility of identicals, in order to set it 
apart from the sameness he is discussing in this passage when he says that `to act and 
to be acted on are one and the same' (202b11). 
212 See the following passages: ÉVT£ÁÉX£IU yap ÉOTI TOIJTOU [Kai] úf1Ò TOO KIVI1TIKOO. Kai fj TOO 
KIVf1TIKOO ö: tvt py£la OÚK äßn taTiV (202a14 -5); via rj apcpoiv trvt py£Ia (202a18); OÚT£ piav 
[scilicet tvtpy£Iav] òuoîv Ku)Àù£I oúAÉV TfjV aúTf1V £IV=I (202b8 -9). 
213 For sameness of individuals there needs to be sameness of number, and hence of matter, not only 
sameness of essence. As we have seen in chapter 2, Aristotle says in Met V 6, 1016b31 -6: `Some 
things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, ...; in number those whose matter is one, 
in species those whose definition is one, .... The latter kinds of unity are always found when the 
former are; e.g. things that are one in number are also one in species, while things that are one in 
species are not all one in number' (my emphasis). Matter here has the role of the particularising 
principle, securing the numerical identity of the individuals. If one attributes to Aristotle a different 
particularising principle than matter, then that principle must be understood to be evoked in the present 
passage - 202b14 -16. 
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Although Hussey (1983) takes this passage to be about Leibniz's Law (LL) of 
the indiscernibility of identicals, he also takes Aristotle to be saying about it here that 
the indiscernibility of identicals is not unrestrictedly true. Presumably Hussey 
considers that Aristotle is claiming an exception to Leibniz's Law (LL) in the case of 
the agent and patient: 
Aristotle's treatment of the indiscernibility of identicals is incomplete', for he 
`nowhere specifies a necessary condition for LL to apply, but only a sufficient 
condition (which is evidently too strong to be also necessary, viz. that LL 
applies when there is `sameness in being' (69 -70). 
But, contra Hussey, first, Aristotle does not treat the sameness of the agent 
and patient as being of the same kind of sameness as that of the identicals, since he 
says: `for it is not things which are in any way the same that have their attributes the 
same ...' (202b14 -15, my emphasis), which differentiates the agent -patient sameness 
from the case of the identicals. Furthermore, I do not agree that it is evident that 
sameness of constitution is too strong a condition to be necessary for the 
indiscernibility of identicals. I do take Aristotle to be treating sameness of 
constitution as a necessary condition for the indiscernibility of identicals, and not to 
consider the agent -patient sameness as an exception to it, but a different case of 
sameness from it. 
It is a cornerstone of Aristotelian substantial essentialism that if the essences 
are of different kind, the substrata (at the same time) are different too, e.g. being a 
wolf, and being a rabbit. But this is not the case with the causal agent and patient, 
which is why Aristotle is at pains to explain their unique metaphysics. What it is to 
be an agent is different what it is to be a patient; their definitions are different 
(202a20, 202b22), and with them their kind (202b1). But what makes the 
metaphysical situation of agent and patient unique is that although the definitions 
stating their essence ( <Tò> Ti ñV TÍVai, 202b12) are different, `to act and to be acted 
on are one and the same' (202b11). 
But Aristotle's examples have already prepared us for understanding this 
statement. There is a kind of sameness that the route from Athens to Thebes has with 
the route from Thebes to Athens, because these routes are realised on the same road. 
The line from one to two is realised on the same interval as the line from two to one. 
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In all such cases, their ground of realisation is one and the same despite their essences 
being different in kind. Aristotle finally states this explicitly at 202b19 -22: 
oAaoç ó' Eindv otJb' tj bibigiç Th- waehoEi oúb' noirlrnç Tj naerloe TÒ 
OfllTÓ Kupicoç, tikA° ún®pXci Tai"rTa, 4 Kivrlrnç 
To generalise, teaching is not the same in the primary sense [KupiwÇ] with 
learning, nor is agency with patiency, but that to which those belong [W 
Únáp)El] [scilicet is the same for both], namely the motion [Kivrlmc]; for the 
actualisation [[vspyEIa] of this [teaching] in that [learning] and the 
actualisation [: vvpyaa] of that [learning] through the action of this [teaching] 
differ in definition. (My translation.) 
There is disagreement between the interpreters on the translation of this 
passage. As Hussey (1983: 72) notes, there two ways of understanding the passage: 
(i) `the change in which these things are present, i.e. of which it is true that it 
is an acting -upon and a being- acted -upon, is the same as being acted upon' 
(ii) `the change in which these things are present, i.e. of which it is true that it 
is both an acting -upon and a being- acted -upon, is the change'. 
The latter (ii) is the way in which the majority of the interpreters, including 
myself, read the passage (e.g. Philoponus (383, 21 -2), Ross (1979: 362), and Gill 
(1980: 137)). Hussey, though, opts for (i) (1983: 6), and so does Charles (1984: 14). 
For, Hussey remarks, in (i) the `extra point is made that 'change is indeed the same in 
definition as the being- acted -upon (for change has been defined as the actuality of the 
changing thing Hussey does not develop this point further, but Charles does, as he 
grounds on these lines his interpretation of the chapter, differing from that of the 
majority. I shall devote the discussion here to the arguments in support of, and 
against translation (i), and discuss Charles' interpretation. Both Hussey and Charles 
acknowledge that on linguistic grounds both readings (i) and (ü) of the passage are 
equally possible; the reasons why they prefer reading (i) to (ii) are mostly 
interpretative. Charles (1984: 14-5) says: 
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`I reject this translation (sc. the equivalent to Hussey's (ii)) because (a) it 
gives up the essential connection on which Aristotle elsewhere insists 
between the process and the suffering (202a14 -6, b25 -7); (b) it postulates a 
process which is non -directional (and non -relational) and thus conflicts with 
Aristotle's general view of the essences of processes as the realisation of 
goal- directed capacities (201a16 -8); (c) the grammar of 202b19 -22 seems to 
require that the clause `the process is the same in the primary sense' takes 
over both the notion in the primary sense from b20, and also the grammatical 
object with which it is the same in this sense: viz. the learning, suffering.' 
In answer to (a) I wish to say that it is not true that by taking KivrlclÇ as the 
ground of the instantiation for action and passion, `the essential connection...between 
the process and the suffering' is given up; rather, more than one essential connection 
is allowed, namely the relation to agency and also to patiency. In answer to (b), in 
my interpretation, the nature of motion is to be found, not in the underlying physical 
activity, but in the two beings that this activity grounds, agency and patiency. 
Neither of its natures is truer of the motion than the other, any more than either 
direction of the route between Athens and Thebes is truer of the underlying road than 
the other. Aristotle's definition of change does not favour the one over the other. 
Change is no more the unfolding actuality of the potentiality of the patient as a 
patient, than it is the unfolding actuality of the potentiality of the agent as an agent. 
In answer to (c), I wish to defend my reading of the text on the ground that it is 
actually the most natural: it takes `being one in the primary sense' to be retaining the 
same meaning throughout, and working as a predicate that has as its logical subjects 
on the one hand teaching and learning (as a pair) and action and passion (as a pair), 
and on the other hand `that to which these things belong, namely the underlying 
process'. 
The motion to which teaching and learning belong is the substratum of the 
two actualities. It is the activity between the two substances, their particular type of 
interaction, that makes actual both the teaching and the learning. As such, the motion 
is the actuality of the agent's potentiality to teach and the patient's potentiality to 
learn (see 202a13 -16). It is the fulfilment of both potentialities (see 202a16, a18). 
Since the two potentialities differ in kind, their actualities differ in kind too. 
Because the agent's and the patient's capacities are essentially different, the 
one being the capacity of transmitting the form and the other being the capacity to 
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receive the transmittable form, the realisation of the two different capacities is also 
essentially different. Charles (1984: 10; 11; 18) shows on the basis of investigation 
of various passages of the Physics: 
In Phys V 4, that a process is one in number only if it is one in essence ...but 
the essence of each thing is defined when one says what it is to be that thing 
(1017b21 -3). If so, processes are one in number only if the definitions of 
what it is to be that thing are identical... Aristotelian processes are essentially 
realisations of given capacities of given subjects: their essential properties 
include the subject of change and the end point of the type of change (i.e. its 
goal). They are distinct if they do not share all essential properties...It 
follows that in III 3 teaching and learning must be numerically distinct 
processes since they differ in essence. 
We are now faced by three actualities, two of which are the third! The 
actualities of the two potentialities (for teaching and learning) are fulfilled in the 
interaction, the motion, which is their common actuality. No wonder Aristotle had a 
difficulty expressing this; terminology let him down. 
Teaching causes learning. Neither can happen without the other. The teacher 
is not teaching if the learner is not learning, and the learner (i.e. ` instructee) is not 
learning (being instructed) if the teacher is not teaching. These two potentialities can 
occur only together. Their interdependence is captured by the fact that they are 
actualised by one and the same activity. Both of them therefore characterise that 
activity, essentially, which in this case is an instance of teaching and learning. The 
activity bears the two forms in the way that matter bears the essential form in a 
substance, being en- formed by it. Only that here, the two forms come together in a 
package of interdependence; the activity is essentially both teaching and learning. 
Neither oneness, nor twoness can be sacrificed. The oneness of the activity 
reflects the interdependent actualisation of the cause and the effect. The twoness of 
the activity preserves the polarity of the causal interaction; causes are born together 
with their effects. Is there a price to pay for this arithmetical versatility? What is lost 
is the unity of substance, or the autonomy of subject: neither teaching nor learning 
can stand on its own, the way substances do; they stand and fall together. Nor do we 
have quite two subjects, either, since neither is autonomous - changes in the internal 
properties of the one result in changes in the internal properties of the other, as would 
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readily follow if the teacher taught a slightly different lesson. Together, they 
comprise a new type of entity, of an ontological status of its own. 
The new type of entity - call it a two -in -one entity - consists of two essential 
natures en- forming an underlying activity. The activity supports both natures 
together because of the relation that these two natures have to each other. They are 
interdependent in different ways, such as being co- existent and co- variant, which is 
secured by their mutual dependence on the underlying activity.214 And of course, the 
entity itself is further dependent on the two substances to which the two actualised 
potentialities belong. So the two co- actualised natures make up a non -autonomous 
entity which is the `causal connection' between the two interacting substances. The 
one nature is the agent's actualised potentiality and cause, and the other nature is the 
patient's actualised potentiality and effect; the two are bound together by 
interdependencies through their grounding on the underlying physical activity. Thus, 
for example, the physical movement of the carpenter's hands and chisel on the hard 
wood constitute the carpenter's carving, and the log's being shaped into a statue. 
Hussey offers a very different account of the sameness of the motion of the 
agent and the patient. He says (1982: 66): 
"What then is Aristotle's positive argument to show that the changes [of the 
agent and the patient] are the same? It might be just that an operation must be 
something that happens over a period of time, and that if we look at a minimal 
case of change, in which the agent is completely unaffected, there is `nothing 
happening' except the change -(Intransitive) of the patient. Hence, the 
operation of the agent must be the change -(Intransitive).' 
I do not agree that, because the agent's transitive change of the patient 
happens over time, within a small period of time the agent does not suffer any 
change. To put it in Aristotelian terms, some but not all of the form that is being 
transmitted will be transmitted within a short interval. 
Finally, although the same type of dependencies binds together causal and 
non -causal complexes, e.g. teaching and learning but also the overlapping routes, 
214 Determining the details of the ontological interdependence of the two natures, through their relation 
to their underlying activity, would take us beyond Aristotle's text into metaphysical considerations 
which can be built on Aristotle's examples, but which are not to be found explicitly in the text. For an 
account of the metaphysical structure of the two -in -one entity see also chapter 6 of the repsent work 
and Marmodoro (2006). 
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there is a fundamental difference between them. Non -causal two -in -one entities are 
ontologically autonomous complex entities, such as two opposite overlapping 
vectors, while causal two -in -one entities are dependent on the substances which they 
causally unite. So the causal connection is a dependent two -in -one entity, but shares 
its ontological type with non -causal two -in -one entities. 
Having examined the nature of the causal connection between the two 
substances, I would like to end by commenting on an explanatory remark Aristotle 
makes regarding the mutual actualisation of the cause and the effect. In describing 
his own position on the oneness of the actualities of the agent and the patient (202b8- 
22), where, as we saw, he explains that they share the same substratum, he introduces 
it by saying at 202b8 -10: 
OÜT£ pÌQV buoiv KcoAú£I OlJav Teiv QIJTñv £ÌVQI (pt) (ioS TCp" &Ql Tò QÚTò, 
áAA' únápX£I Tò buváp£I 6v npòS Tò >rv£pyoúv) 
There is nothing to prevent two things having one and the same actualisation 
(not the same in being, but related as the potential to the actual). 
Here he is making the same point with which he concludes this section, that 
what is common between two co- actualised potentialities are not their respective 
actualities, which differ in kind (e.g. teaching and learning), but their substratum, the 
underlying activity. The way Aristotle introduces this position is that the 
potentialities of the agent and patient have one and the same actualisation, not by 
becoming one thing, not even by realising the same type of being, but by having one 
and the same activity actualise both of them, underlying them both as potential 
(substratum) to actual. The actualisation of the agency and patiency, therefore, is 
related to the two resulting actualities as potential to actual, underlying them both as 
their common grounding activity. For example, the physical activity of the 
embroidering hands and needle on the material are related to the embroidering and to 
the decoration of the material in the way that the wood is related to the statue of 
Hermes.215 Thus, although in the Dilemma Aristotle objected to two potentialities 
215 The position is then further refined by the requirement mentioned above, that the 
movements of the 
hands and needle on the cloth underlie two actualities at the same time, 
embroidering and being 
decorated; while the wood of Hermes underlies only one actuality at a time, first the 
log and then the 
statue of Hermes. 
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having one and the same actuality because teaching would end up being the same as 
learning (202b1 -5), here he is saying that what is the same is only their actualisation, 
not their actuality. They are two mutually bound potentialities in that they can be 
actualised only together in one and the same actualisation process. Their respective 
actualities will characterise the nature of this process in different ways, but the 
process will be one insofar as the same physical activity realises teaching and 
learning, or sculpting and being carved into shape. Because of the brevity of the 
description at 202b8 -10, different readings of it can justifiably be given, leading to 
alternative understandings of the relation between the potential and the actual. In 
particular, it can be read as saying that the actuality of the patient is the potential for 
the actuality of the agent, related to it as matter to form.216 But I have argued that the 
subsequent explanation Aristotle gives in the same passage, and his examples, 
support the common underlying activity interpretation. 
216 This is the interpretation suggested by Charles (1984: 15) on the ground of his and Hussey's 
translation of 202b14 -9 (see footnote 31): `Teaching and learning are numerically distinct, but are one 
in some sense because the teaching `belongs to' the learning which `underlies it'. Because Aristotle 
identifies the process strictly with the learning (the capacity of the patient: see also 202a14 -16; b25 -7), 
there is no non -directional process which underlies both teaching and learning ... The learning in the 
underlying process which stands to the teaching in a relation akin to that of matter to form, because the 
latter `imprints' on the learner the knowledge which he had possessed previously only potentially 
(202a9 -12)'. Hussey finds the following in 202b8 -10: "Aristotle has in mind sophistic puzzles such as 
that about Socrates, who at first unmusical, then becomes musical. The unmusical Socrates 
is 
potentially musical, the musical Socrates is `operating' in respect of musicality. `They' are one and the 
same man: yet different, incompatible things are true of the `two' Socrateses'. Accordingly, for 
Aristotle `they' are not one in definition" (p. 72). 
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3. The Actualities of Motion Dilemma 
I report here, for ease of reference, the original text in which Aristotle 
presents the Actualities of Motion Dilemma, at 201a21 -b5, and its argument analysis: 
This view has a dialectical difficulty. Perhaps it is necessary that the actuality 
of the agent and that of the patient should not be the same. The one is 'agency' 
and the other 'patiency'; and the outcome and completion of the one is an 
'action', that of the other a 'passion'. Since then they are both motions, we may 
ask: in what are they, if they are different? Either (a) both are in what is acted 
on and moved, or (b) the agency is in the agent and the patiency in the patient. 
(If we ought to call the latter also 'agency', the word would be used in two 
senses.) 
Now, in alternative (b), the motion will be in the mover, for the same 
statement will hold of 'mover' and 'moved'. Hence either every mover will be 
moved, or, though having motion, it will not be moved. 
If on the other hand (a) both are in what is moved and acted on -both the 
agency and the patiency (e.g. both teaching and learning, though they are two, 
in the learner), then, first, the actuality of each will not be present in each, and, 
a second absurdity, a thing will have two motions at the same time. How will 
there be two alterations of quality in one subject towards one definite quality? 
The thing is impossible: the actualization will be one. 
But (some one will say) it is contrary to reason to suppose that there should be 
one identical actualization of two things which are different in kind. Yet there 
will be, if teaching and learning are the same, and agency and patiency. To 
teach will be the same as to learn, and to act the same as to be acted on -the 
teacher will necessarily be learning everything that he teaches, and the agent 
will be acted on. 
Aristotle refers to the argument as a ánOpia ÀoyIKr). Interpreters disagree as 
to how to understand this characterisation. The way I understand it is closest to 
Philoponus' reading: `By `logical' he means one worthy of logical scrutiny' (In Phys 
376, 6). Aquinas' and Hussey's remarks are more descriptive than explanatory when 
they comment, respectively, that: `the difficulty is `dialectical, i.e. logical. For there 
are probable arguments on both sides' (In Phys III 5 [309]); and `the arguments used 
are of a very general kind' (1983: 67). The main alternative reading of ÀOyIKrl in the 
tradition, with which I will find myself in disagreement, is reported first by 
Simplicius (`he calls this verbal...because its plausibility arises only from the words 
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and it is not supported by the facts', In Phys 440, 21 -2), and voiced among the 
contemporary commentators, e.g. by Ross: `the question is a superficial or dialectical 
one, turning on the verbal difference between nOinGiÇ and náügaiç' (1979: 540). 
In the structured representation of the argument that follows in the next page, 
the convention I follow is to indent under the conclusion the premises or the sub - 
arguments that support that conclusion. The premises justifying or objecting to a 
conclusion are grouped into the same level of indentation. The premises are 
numbered consecutively to facilitate reference. In parenthesis I indicate which 
premises I have supplied for completeness in addition to what is found in Aristotle's 
text. 
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C The realisation of the agent's and the patient's capacities are neither the same nor different (supplied). 
P 1 Because it is impossible that the realisation of the agent's capacity is different from the realisation of 
the patient's capacity (supplied). 
P 2 Because if the realisation of the agent's capacity is different (in number) from the realisation of 
the patient's capacity, one of the following disjuncts is true: (2.1) either both are realised in the 
patient; (2.2) or both are realised in the agent; (2.3) or one is realised in the agent and one in the 
patient, e.g. the realisation of the agent's capacity takes place in the agent and the realisation of the 
patient's capacity takes place in the patient. (See 202a25 -7; (2.2) and (2.3) are supplied). 
P 3 But none of the disjuncts is true. 
P 4 Because (2.1) is impossible. Namely, it is impossible that the realisation of the agent's 
capacity and the realisation of the patient's capacity are both in the patient (supplied). 
P 5 Because if the realisation of the agent's capacity and the realisation of the patient's 
capacity are both in the patient, then both consequences follow: (5.1) the agent's 
capacity will not be realised in the subject that has the capacity, the agent; (5.2) the 
same subject, the patient, will undergo the realisation of two (different) capacities at 
the same time towards acquiring one form. (See 202a33 -6). 
P 6 But (5.1) is nonsense (see 202a36). 
P 7 And (5.2) is impossible (see 202a36). 
P 8 And mutatis mutandis for (2.2) (See 202a29 -30). 
P 9 And it is impossible that the realisation of the agent's capacity takes place in the agent 
and realisation of the patient's capacity takes place in the patient (supplied). 
P 10 Because if the realisation of the agent's capacity and the realisation of the 
patient's capacity are each in each, then one of the following disjuncts is true: (10.1) 
either every agent will also be acted upon; (10.2) or the agent, having causal efficacy, 
will not be causally efficacious. (See 202a28 -b1). 
P 11 But (10.1) is false, and leads to infinite regress (supplied). 
P 12 And (10.2) is false (supplied). 
P 13 And it is impossible that the realisation of the agent's capacity is one and the same with the 
realisation of the patient's capacity (202a36 -b2). 
P 14 Because then agency and patiency would be the same actuality, and so acting and being acted 
upon would be the same thing. (see 202b2 -5 for the example). 
P 15 But it is nonsense that two things different in essence, e.g. the agent's acting and the patient's 
being acted upon, have one and the same actuality (see 202a36 -b2). 
P 16 Because the actuality of something is the realisation of its essence (supplied). 
P 17 The agent's capacity and the patient's capacity are essentially different things (see 202a20 and 
201b1). 
Later translations (the Arab -Latin one), and commentaries (by Themistius and Simplicius) take (2.2) to be 
part of the original Aristotelian text, Simplicius has it as a variant at 202a26: ñ] fj Év Tc;t noioOvn Kai 
ÖIOTI9 VrI ñ. Ross (1979: 540), and before him Philoponus (370, 20), comments that `the fuller reading is 
the result of a later endeavour to make a formally complete disjunction without regard to the actual course of 
discussion ... Aristotle evidently omits as patently impossible the view that both activity and passivity are 
embodied in the agent'. 
Chapter 6: The Two -in -One Model in Aristotle's Theory of Perception 
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1. Aristotle's Metaphysical Account of Secondary Qualities 
Aristotle's theory of secondary properties is grounded on the metaphysical 
model for two -in -one entities which I reconstructed in chapter 5. The challenge for 
the interpreter of Aristotle's theory is how to account for the distinction that Aristotle 
wants between sound and sounding, and for the relation between sounding and 
hearing.217 Aristotle's theory is of interest not only from an exegetical point of view, 
but to contemporary philosophy too, because he claims realism for the phenomenal 
properties of secondary properties. By phenomenal properties I mean here, in 
Shoemaker's words, `a certain sort of property of objects that are constitutively 
defined by relations to our experience'. Phenomenal properties are not the sensations 
of red, or of screeching, etc. that the perceiver experiences. For Aristotle they are the 
properties of objects that resemble these perceptual experiences. Objects, for 
Aristotle, are the way they appear to the perceiver, e.g. red, screeching, etc., but they 
are such only during the time that they appear such to the perceiver. This does not 
mean that, for Aristotle, an apple is colourless when not observed. He does recognise 
that even in the absence of an observer, perceptible objects emanate, and transmit 
through different physical media, the perceptible forms of colour or sound, etc. But 
for Aristotle, this emanation of form is sound only in potentiality, not yet fully 
actualised. It is sound that is not sounding. Aristotle holds that a sound sounds only 
through its interaction with a perceiver. Sound is actual only when it is sounding for 
a perceiver, because only then is the sound's phenomenal aspect realised and it is that 
aspect that is most truly a sounding (rather than the vibrations travelling through the 
air). But it is not the sound sensation in the perceiver that is the phenomenal property 
of sounding. Rather, sounding is a property of, e.g., a bell, that resembles the sound 
sensation of the hearer, and exists in full actuality only while the hearer hears the 
sound. Sounding requires a hearer as a condition for its realisation. In a sense, we are 
a medium in which the appearance of the objects is realised, and in this way the 
potentialities of their nature come to be fully realised through their interaction with 
us. Their appearance is not realised in our perceptual experience; it is realised in a 
21 This terminology will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
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being that is different from the perceptual experience and belongs to the object, not 
the experience. But that being is multiply dependent on the perceptual experience. 
The causal interaction between a bell and a hearer is a single activity in the 
hearer that constitutes two beings, on the model reconstructed in chapter 5: the one 
being is the sensation of sounding the hearer experiences; the other being is the 
correlative phenomenal property of sounding of the bell, which is most truly what 
sounding is. 
In accounting for Aristotle's theory of secondary properties I will be referring 
primarily to De An III 2, 425b26- 426a19, which I report here for ease fo reference: 
The actuality of the perceptible and of the perceptual experience is one and the 
same, although their being is not the same. I mean, for example, the sound in 
actuality and hearing in actuality; for it is possible that that who has the capacity 
to hear does not to hear, and that which can produce sounds is not always doing 
so. But when that which can hear is hearing and that which can produce sound 
is producing it, then hearing in actuality and sounding in actuality come to be at 
the same time, and one might call the one hearing and the other sounding. 
If then movement, i.e. acting [and being affected], is in that which is acted upon, 
both sounding and hearing in actuality necessarily are in that which has the 
capacity to hear; for the actuality of that which can act and produce movement 
takes place in that which is affected; for this reason it is not necessary for that 
which produces movement to be itself moved. The actuality of that which can 
sound is sound or sounding, while that of that which can hear is hearing or 
listening; for hearing is twofold, and so is sound. 
The same account applies also to the other perceptual experiences and 
perceptibles. For just as both acting and being affected are in that which is 
affected and not in that which acts, so the actuality of both the perceptible and 
the perceptual experience takes place in that which can perceive. But in some 
cases there is a name, e.g. sounding and hearing, while in others one or the other 
actuality has no name; for, the actuality of sight is spoken of as seeing, but that 
of colour has no name, while that of that which can taste is tasting, but that of 
flavour has no name. 
Since the actuality of the perceptible and of the perceptual experience is one, 
though their being is different, the hearing and sounding which are so spoken of 
are necessarily simultaneously destroyed and simultaneously preserved, and so 
too for flavour and taste, and the rest similarly; but this is not necessary for 
those which are spoken of as potential. (My translation). 
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The passage quoted, however sketchy and at first sight obscure, presents the 
two -in -one model in its application in Aristotle's theory of perception. Aristotle is 
here describing the metaphysical relations that link together perceptible forms (that I 
take to be what we nowadays call secondary qualities such as sounds and colours), 
the objects which they are qualities of, and the perceptual experiences we have of 
them. The key philosophical intuition at the basis of Aristotle's metaphysical account 
of perception is that on the one hand perceptible forms are real in the world as 
properties of the objects they belong to, while on the other hand they fully realise 
their nature only when perceived. It is the interaction between the object of 
perception and the perceiver that brings about both the reality of the perceptible form 
and of the perceptual experience. Sounding and hearing, in the example given, are so 
intimately mutually dependent that their reality is one, though what it is for them to 
be such is different and what each metaphysically belongs to is different. In the 
passage I am considering Aristotle addresses, or better anticipates, a worry of great 
interest and concern to contemporary philosophers. This worry, to use Sidney 
Shoemaker's words, is that `the identity of what we call secondary properties seems 
to be in some way bound up with the phenomenal character of our experience of 
them'. The general framework in which this philosophical issue is embedded is the 
seeming disparity between (in Sellars' terminology) the so- called `manifest image' 
namely the world as we experience it, and the so- called `scientific imige', namely the 
world as science tells us it is. How the colour one experiences can be somehow part 
of what scientific theories tell us is out there has become a puzzle, where the 
challenge is to find a way forward that avoids either: subjectifying secondary 
properties and construing them as features of sensations (thereby eliminating them 
from the `real' world); or objectifying secondary properties and identifying them with 
whatever physical properties of the objects in the world systematically cause our 
sensations (thereby eliminating us as a `real' coefficient in determining what 
secondary qualities are).218 
We, and Aristotle well before us, want an account for the redness of an apple as 
due both to the environment around us, the `real' world, but also in part to the 
interaction with us qua perceivers. The passage quoted above from the De Anima 
218 
I have followed Shoemaker (1996) as to how to state the problem. 
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shows that not only does Aristotle share our puzzlement about what secondary 
qualities are, but also our desiderata for the solution to this puzzle. This is why the 
solution he provides is heuristically promising, as we shall see in section 2 of this 
chapter. 
Aristotle's position about the ontological status of secondary properties finds its 
metaphysical basis in the Two -in -One model. This model describes an `entity' that is 
too many to be one, and too few to be two. It has a double nature, defined by two 
distinct sets of (incompatible but interdependent) properties. 
The first `building block' for the metaphysical structure Aristotle is creating is 
presented in the very first sentence of the passage under examination: 
The actuality of the perceptible and of the perceptual experience is one and the 
same (425b26 -7). 
It is the oneness of the actuality of the perceptible, e.g. the sound of a bell, and 
of the corresponding perceptual experience, hearing. But how can the actuality of 
sounding and that of hearing be one? 
In the sketchy passage in the De Anima there is only a hint as to how to provide 
philosophical justification of their oneness. The hint is given in the claim that the 
actuality of the two beings is `in' the perceiver, or more precisely in the sense organ: 
Both sounding and hearing in actuality necessarily are in that which has the 
capacity to hear (426a3 -4). 
On the basis of the analogy between this passage and Phys III 3, extensively 
discussed in chapter 5, it is sound to conclude that sounding and hearing being in the 
ear amounts to the their being forms which are instantiated in matter; in this case, the 
forms are instantiated in the physical activity caused by the vibrations transmitted 
through the air from the bell onto the sense organ of the ear. 
But that the two beings are instantiated in the same substratum certainly 
generates metaphysical unease: why is it that the two co- instantiated beings do not 
give rise to two actualities that just overlap in matter? Why does only one actuality 
arise? To see the reasons against this stance we need to turn to another aspect of the 
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Two -in -One model, namely the relation between the two beings. This topic has been 
discussed at length in chapter 5; here I just want to refer back to example of the 
Athens- Thebes road. 
There is a mutual dependence between the form of the road from Athens to 
Thebes and the form of the road from Thebes to Athens. The reason is that they are 
both realised on the stretch of path between Athens and Thebes. Any change in the 
form of the Athens -Thebes road entails a change in the Thebes- Athens road, and vice 
versa. Similarly for teaching and learning. There is a correlation in content and co- 
variation between teaching and learning for Aristotle. First, a lecturer in an empty 
classroom is just speaking, not teaching, since no one is learning. Similarly with a 
lecturer who is speaking but is not understood by the students. And similarly with a 
lecturer who is speaking about X but the students take her to be speaking about Y. 
What is taught is what is learned, and if not learned, it has not been taught. If 
something different had been taught, something different would have been learned. 
Thus, too, in the case of hearing and sounding: what is sounding is what is heard; if 
something different were heard, something different would have sounded. 
The mutual dependence for their actualisation, of the roads, of teaching and 
learning, and of sounding and hearing, entails that what each of the two beings is 
depends on what the other being is; and neither of the two beings can change without 
the other changing as well. 
Further there is an existential dependence between the two beings, as we find 
stated in the passage under examination: 
When that which can hear is hearing and that which can produce sound is 
producing it, then hearing in actuality and sounding in actuality come to be at 
the same time (425b29 -31). 
The requirement of co- instantiation of the two beings at the same time 
establishes a temporal co- extensiveness dependence of each being on the other. 
Hence, neither of the two pairs can be actualised without the other also being 
actualised. 
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I take the correlation in content between the two beings (in virtue of their 
instantiation in the same substratum), their co- variation, and the temporal co- 
extensiveness requirement of each being on the other, to be conditions for the 
obtaining of the Two -in -One model. These mutual dependencies tend to bind the two 
beings into a single structure. They become like a single form, only complex. But 
the type of complexity is very important. As we shall see in the following section, 
they are two essentially different subjects which cannot make up (and belong to) a 
further single subject. "Being a lung" and "being a heart" are essentially different. 
But their instantiations are also constituents of a single subject, the particular animal 
they belong to. This is not the case with our Two -in -One beings: although they come, 
so to speak, only in pairs, they do not build up a single entity. Rather, they are 
irreducibly two subjects at the highest level of composition. So, they are a single 
complex form (due to their interdependence), but a form that is irreducibly two 
subjects. In so far as they are one form, they contribute to the oneness of the entity. 
In so far as they are two subjects, they undermine it. 
What does it mean for hearing and sounding to be different in being? Why does 
the model require them to be two in being, despite the oneness actuality? 
The being [i.e. what it is to be such for the perceptible and for the perceptual 
experience] is not the same (426b27). 
The difference in being between hearing and sounding, and analogously for the 
Athens -Thebes roads, and teaching and learning, can be explained in terms of 
difference in essential properties, in `what it is to be such', whether `such' stands for 
an activity like teaching and learning or a substance like the two roads. 
Now, granted, as we learn from the text, that the two beings are essentially 
different, why could they not be both parts of a metaphysically higher -level being or 
form, instantiated as a whole in a single substratum? This would make the Two -in- 
One model unproblematic in Aristotle's theory of substance, as discussed in chapter 
1. The question why the two beings do not constitute a single being, in the sense just 
explained, is challenging, and I can here only begin to tackle it by examining briefly 
some of its different aspects. 
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Could the two beings of a Two -in -One entity be in a single subject as its 
constituents, in just the way that "being toothed" and "being handed" are in an 
animal? The answer is that they cannot, because we know from the previous analysis 
of the Two -in -One entity that the two beings in question are instantiated in the same 
matter, whereas teeth and hands are instantiated in different quantities of matter. The 
type of beings involved in the Two -in -One model could not possibly be instantiated 
in different quantities of matter. Consider the roads case: if the two roads Athens - 
Thebes and Thebes -Athens are instantiated, as it were, in different stretches of paths 
they are not instances of the Two -in -One model; they are just different roads. 
Can the two beings of a Two -in -One entity belong to a single subject in the way 
that being a grammarian and being a mathematician do, or in the way that being a 
teacher and being a mother do? This case differs from the previous one in that the 
question is whether the two beings can constitute the same subject while being 
realised in the same, not different, matter. The answer is that they cannot, because 
they possess incompatible properties, such as the opposite directions of the two roads. 
The two beings of a Two -in -One entity are, as a pair, something like "being round 
and being square" or "being five foot tall and being seven foot tall ". There cannot 
exist a subject that possesses both beings as realised in the same matter, for the 
properties of each being would belong to it, which they cannot because of their 
incompatibility. 
Now, one can see the incompatibility of the two beings in the case of teaching 
and learning, too, since they are opposite achievements. In the case of hearing and 
sounding the incompatibility is certainly assumed by Aristotle; I would not attempt 
though to produce an "in principle" argument in support of this assumption of his. 
To sum up, `entities' of the kind like hearing and sounding and the Athens - 
Thebes roads are characterised by a bottom -up oneness, and a top -down twoness. 
They start from the same substratum but cannot constitute a single subject. 
Let us now turn to examining the nature of the two beings in the De Anima 
application of the Two -in -One model I have being describing so far. Here the two 
beings are, as we said, a perceptual form (or secondary quality in our terms) like 
sounding, and the perceptual experience, like hearing. 
177 
It is possible to have the capacity to hear and not to hear, and that which can 
produce sounds is not always doing so. But when that which can hear is hearing 
and that which can produce sound is producing it, then hearing in actuality and 
sounding in actuality come to be at the same time, and one might call the one 
hearing and the other sounding (425b28- 426a1, my italics). 
We have already seen that Aristotle claims mutual dependence and a complete 
temporal co- extension between the sounding say of a bell, and hearing it. The 
relation is analogous to the one holding between teaching and learning, where neither 
happens without the other for Aristotle. It follows that if no one is hearing, there is 
no sounding. Does this mean that, for Aristotle, there are no sounds if there is no 
hearing? And similarly for all other perceptual forms? I wish to argue that this is not 
Aristotle's claim. Aristotle is not identifying sound and sounding. For him the sound 
is a state of activation of the sounding power of the bell, but not its fullest activation, 
which is the sounding. The sound can be realised independently of perceivers, while 
the sounding is realised only through the mediation of a perceiver; yet it is a property 
of the bell, not of the perceiver. 
We can assume that Aristotle holds that sound, or colour, can be realised in the 
world independently from the perceiver on the basis of polemical passages in which 
he rejects the opposite view, held by his predecessors.219 In the continuation of the 
passage I have quoted in the beginning from the De Anima, we read, at 426a21 -5: 
But the earlier philosophers of nature did not state the matter well, thinking that 
there is without sight nothing white nor black, nor flavour without tasting. For 
in one way they were right but in another wrong; for since the perception and 
the perceptible are so spoken of in two ways, as potential and as actual, the 
statement holds of the latter, but it does not hold of the former. 
The above passage should be read in connection with another one, a few pages 
later, where Aristotle says, at 430a16 -17 (on which see also the discussion in Chapter 
5): `In a way light makes colours which are potential into actual colours'. On the 
219 Two important passages, in polemical contexts, that are illuminating for Aristotle's position can be 
found in the Metaphysics, but I can here only mention them here because of space limitations: the 
argument against the Protagoreans in Met IV 5, 1010b30- 1011a2, and the one against the Megarians in 
Met IX 3 1047a4 -5. See also Johansen (1998: 259 -63). 
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basis of the this (and other similar) passages, and bearing in mind the results achieved 
so far in the metaphysical analysis of the perception case, it is plausible to reconstruct 
Aristotle's view on the ontological status of secondary qualities in the following 
terms: 
a) An apple in the dark is red, but only potentially (even if in the presence of 
an observer); its redness is `dormant', 
b) An apple in the light is potentially red, if unobserved; but its redness being 
in the light is, so to speak, in active state of alert, 
a) Finally, an apple in the light, that is being observed, is red in full actuality; 
its fully actualised redness is just the way it appears red to us. 
It is plausible to draw the distinction between (a) and (b) from the second quote 
just above, and the distinction between (b) and (c) from the first quote just above. 
Through his doctrine of potentiality and actuality, as we see in the passages quoted 
above, Aristotle can differentiate sound from sounding, that is sound as heard (or 
colour from colour as seen) by taking sound as partially actualised potentiality and 
sounding as its full actuality. The `earlier philosophers of nature' according to 
Aristotle were in a way right and in a way wrong in believing that there are no 
colours in the world unless these colours are perceived. They were right from 
Aristotle's point of view because secondary properties can be fully realised only 
when perceived, but they were wrong in thinking that in the absence of a perceiver 
objects do not have secondary qualities at all. 
Against his predecessors' view, Aristotle does attribute some qualities to objects 
whose secondary properties are not yet perceived, but not quite what we attribute to 
them. We believe that when the object, say a red apple, is in the appropriate 
conditions, i.e. in the light, it emits radiations which are the fully realised secondary 
property of redness. Once the apple is emitting the relevant radiations, thereby 
realising (fully) its secondary property of being red, and these radiations are 
perceived, then for us further properties of the red apple come to be realised in virtue 
of the interaction between the red apple and the perceiver. These properties, which 
we call phenomenal properties, determine the way the red apple appears to us. 
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But for Aristotle perceptual forms are most real only when realised in the 
perceiver: so the perceptual form when fully realised is the sounding, not the sound of 
the bell, or the redness of the apple. The sound, that is what I call in this context the 
unheard vibrations of the bell, is for Aristotle only an intermediate state in the 
realisation of a perceptible form. It is so to speak a secondary property in the making, 
a semi -activated power which will become, when perceived, a fully actualised 
perceptible form, e.g. a sounding. Sounding, which is a phenomenal property of e.g. 
the bell, is for Aristotle the most real sound there can be. Phenomenal properties are 
for Aristotle `like' our perceptual experiences, and yet different from them. This 
conclusion can be derived from the analysis given so far of the Two -in -One model. 
Sounding and hearing, the two beings in ine substratum, are correlated by multiple 
mutual dependences. As we have seen in the roads case and in the teaching and 
learning case, their mutual dependence entails that what each of the two beings is 
depends on what the other being is; and neither of the two beings can change without 
the other changing as well. This is the sense in which the phenomenal property, 
sounding, is `like' the perceptual experience, hearing. Phenomenal properties 
however are not identical for Aristotle to our perceptual experiences of them (and this 
is why he is a realist about phenomenal properties). They belong to, i.e. are 
properties of, the objects of perception. If the phenomenal properties were identical 
to our sensations they would belong to us, not to the objects of perception. But this 
possibility is to be dismissed on the basis of 426a6 -7: 
The actuality of that which can sound is sound or sounding, while that of that 
which can hear is hearing or listening. 
In the De Anima the claim that the two beings, hearing and sounding, belong to 
two different things, namely the perceiver and the object of perception is just stated. 
In the Physics Aristotle actually argues for the belonging of the two beings to two 
different things, against a possible misunderstanding of his position about the oneness 
in actuality of teaching and learning. I have analysed the argument in chapter 5, here 
I just mention that the objection Aristotle wants to prevent is the following: 
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To teach will be the same as to learn, and to act as to be acted on - the teacher 
will be necessarily be learning everything that he teaches and the agent will be 
acted on (202b3 -5). 
To which he answers: 
Teaching is the activity of a person who can teach, yet the operation is 
performed in something - it is not cut adrift from a subject, but is of one thing 
in another (202b5 -8). 
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2. Can Aristotle's account strengthen Primitivism, in the contemporary 
theories of colour? 
In his paper Perception and the Fall from Eden, Chalmers argues that colour 
properties are not to be found instantiated in our world in the way they are presented 
in the phenomenology of our experience - namely, as simple primitive intrinsic 
properties belonging to physical objects; they are to be found instantiated only in a 
possible world different from our own, which he refers to metaphorically as Paradise 
lost. Adam is the only one who enjoyed a `world of perfect living colours' and it was 
only in the Garden of Eden that when an apple looked red, `the apple was gloriously, 
perfectly, and primitively red'. Adam's Fall from Eden has condemned us all to 
massive delusion in our visual experiences, with objects not instantiating the colour 
properties we perceive them to have. David Chalmers claims this is our 
predicament.22° 
Chalmers's arguments are directed against the contemporary view in the debate 
on the nature of colour held in a variety of versions by Campbell (1993), McGinn 
(1996) and others, which he calls Primitivism, and describes thus (2004a: 169): 
Primitivism...holds that colours are certain primitive intrinsic properties that are 
not phenomenal properties or properties of our visual field, but are nevertheless 
constitutively connected to such properties. On this view colours have an 
intrinsic `qualitative nature' that is revealed in some fashion by colour 
experiences ... There is a certain phenomenological plausibility [in 
Primitivism]...but [it] seem[s] to have the counterintuitive consequence that 
colour experience is massively illusory. When we have an experience as of a red 
apple, it seems unlikely that the apple itself ... instantiates a simple intrinsic 
property with a qualitative nature that is constitutively connected to the quality 
of my visual experience. (My emphasis). 
Having unearthed Aristotle's intuition about the ontology of secondary 
properties I find Primitivism, as described by Chalmers in the quote above, the closest 
contemporary theory to Aristotle's own one. The strength of Primitivism lies in 
220 All the quotes, unless otherwise specified, are from Chalmers 2004b. 
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providing an account of colour that respects our intuition about objects being truly 
coloured as they appear to us - what Chalmers calls its `phenomenological 
plausibility'. Its weakness however is its inability to supply a metaphysics which can 
accommodate sceptical worries such as the ones Chalmers lines up against it. I shall 
to remedy that weakness drawing inspiration from Aristotle's insight on the matter. 
For the intuition motivating Primitivism is irresistible. But one also cannot dismiss 
Chalmers's worries about Primitivism. The position to be set out here therefore 
endeavors to hold on to the phenomenological plausibility of colours being in the 
world, while providing a metaphysical account for the claim of a `constitutive 
connection' between colours in the world and our experiences of them, an account 
that can withstand Chalmers's criticism of Primitivism. 
Here is how Chalmers chronicles our Fall from Eden. He argues that by eating 
from the Tree of Illusion Adam learned that `objects sometimes seemed to have 
different colours ... at different times, even though there was reason to believe the 
object itself had not changed'. From Eve's being, by hypothesis, spectrum- inverted 
relative to him, Adam learned that `a red apple ... can cause phenomenally red 
experiences [for him] ... and (in some circumstances) can cause phenomenally green 
experiences [for Eve], without any change in its intrinsic properties'. This taught him 
perceptual egalitarianism, since he had no reason to favour as more veridical his 
perceptual experiences over Eve's. From the experience of hallucination, Adam 
learned that `one sometimes has phenomenally red experiences in the absence of 
perfect redness'. Finally, eating from the Tree of Science he learned that his visual 
experiences are the result of `a long causal chain from the microphysics of the 
[object's] surface through air and brain to a contingently connected visual 
experience'. 
From Chalmers's arguments we are well advised to give up the notion that we 
are immediately acquainted with colours as we were in Eden,22' in favour of a 
perceptual causal interaction between the object and the perceiver. There is also 
reason to question whether colours are intrinsic properties of a surface, in view of the 
possibility of inverted spectrum vision together with perceptual egalitarianism. At the 
221 Chalmers (2004b): `In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were 
directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented 
to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory'. 
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same time, we reckon that colours are non -relational properties. Shoemaker put 
forward a position that makes the qualitative nature of colour properties in objects 
relational (Shoemaker 1996: 252 -254). This is unsatisfactory because explaining the 
qualitative nature of the colour red in the apple as a relation is sacrificing the 
phenomenological given. As others have pointed out as well, when we look at 
coloured objects, we simply do not see relations (for example, McGinn 1996: 541- 
542). 
Having set these initial constraints, let us now turn to the `constitutional 
connection' of the qualitative nature of coloured surfaces to our colour experiences. 
The position to be put forward here could be called Constitutionalism, as it offers a 
metaphysics for this connection. The aim is an account of objects that allows them to 
possess the colours we see them as having, as their properties, while making these 
colours as dependent on their environment as our every day experience shows them to 
be. It is not naïve realism about colours that we are after, since this has proven to be 
too inflexible to accommodate all the colour variations and dependencies of which 
everyday colour phenomena make us aware. Nor is it dispositionalism about colours, 
which abandons the central message that colour perception delivers about the world. 
It is a position that retains the colourfulness of objects, while making the colours of 
these objects sensitive to various factors in the object's environment. 
Sharing some of the Primitivist's phenomenological intuitions, and contra 
Chalmers, the Constitutionalist holds that objects do have surface qualitative natures. 
Let us call a sensuous property222 of a surface the qualitative character of the surface 
that according to Primitivism is revealed in a colour experience. On Chalmers's 
description of Primitivism, "colours have an intrinsic `qualitative nature' that is 
revealed in some fashion by colour experiences ". Also, Maund says that it is "a 
`prime intuition' that colours are represented as qualitative, sensuous features" 
(Maund 2002). But on account of Chalmers's arguments from perceptual 
egalitarianism and inverted spectrum vision, and contra Primitivism, 
Constitutionalism does not hold that an object's surface has a single intrinsic 
qualitative character. Rather, according to Constitutionalism, objects possess surface 
microphysical properties; these properties interact with perceivers in various 
222 The term `sensuous' is used without any commitment to the mental. For the legitimacy of this use 
of the term see Maund (2002). 
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circumstances; under such conditions they are disposed to ground different qualitative 
features of surfaces, varying according to the circumstances. 
From science we have come to recognise that perception occurs in virtue of a 
causal interaction between a coloured object and a perceiver. This interaction takes 
place at the physical level between e.g. a red object and the perceptual system of the 
perceiver. This causal interaction is the ground for the occurrence of the perceptual 
experience of the perceiver; she sees the red apple. But further, it is a distinctive 
feature of Constitutionalism that the same causal interaction is also the ground for the 
realisation of a sensuous property of the red surface. Thus the experience of the 
perceiver and the sensuous property of the object are co- realised. 
The apple's surface `sensuously- reddens' in the world only while interacting 
with a perceiver. This is the core on which the Constitutionalist builds her account of 
sensuous properties, responding to Chalmers's criticisms of Primitivism. On 
Constitutionalism, objects have microphysical surface properties independently of 
perceivers. Colours are realised only for the duration of the interaction between the 
microphysical properties and the perceiver. Under normal perceptual conditions, the 
interaction of a red apple with a perceiver grounds the sensuous property red of the 
apple's surface. The perceiver's colour experience and the object's sensuous property 
are distinct from one another, but have co- extensive life spans, sustained by the 
physical causal interaction between object and perceiver. Thus the apple possesses 
the colour red when and only when the perceiver has the experience of the red apple 
in normal perceptual conditions. (Discussion of hallucinations follows, p. 190). 
When the apple is not perceived, in virtue of its surface microphysical properties it 
has the disposition to possess the colour red in normal perceptual circumstances. 
It follows that a sensuous property is not an experience in the perceiver. If it 
were, then the object's disposition to cause colour experiences in a perceiver would 
explain all there is to colour. But there is more to explain about colour than surface 
microphysics and the object's disposition to cause colour perceptions, as McGinn 
(1993: 261 -262) and Campbell (1996: 540), among others, have argued. The 
phenomenology of colour requires an ontology of colour to back it up. This 
motivated the Primitivists, and it also motivates the present account. 
So according to Constitutionalism, coloured objects do not appear in full 
sensuous -apparel all the time. They need specific external conditions to obtain in 
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order to realise their sensuous properties. It is only in the context of the causal 
interaction with a perceptual system that an object's surface can realise its sensuous 
properties. The perceiver's perceptual system, though external to the object, is a 
necessary realisation -ground for the sensuous properties of the object. To understand 
this dependence on external conditions, consider a car. It can reach its maximum 
speed on a flat road surface. The causal interaction between the car and the road is 
the realisation ground of the speed of the car. The flatness of the road is (in this case) 
a necessary external condition for the car to realise its speed potential in the course of 
the causal interaction between car and road. In the case of sensuous properties, a 
vision system is a necessary external condition for a sensuous property of a surface to 
be realised in the course of the causal interaction between object and perceiver. 
A sensuous property is a property of the coloured object's constitution, despite 
its dependence on external conditions for its realisation. Let us consider an example 
of another constitutive property which is grounded on a causal interaction with the 
environment. When some gas is released into a cubic container, the cubic shape of 
the volume of gas supervenes on the location of the individual gas molecules which 
are in causal interaction with the container. This shape of the volume of gas lasts 
while the gas's causal interaction with the external conditions persists. Yet, the cubic 
shape is a constitutive property for the volume of gas. In our case, the sensuous 
property is a constitutive property of the object's surface, although it is realised on the 
ground of, and for the duration of, the causal interaction of the microphysical 
properties of the object's surface with the vision system of the perceiver. 
The dependence of e.g. sensuous red for its realisation on the vision system of a 
perceiver does not make the sensuous property mental. For, as Peter Simons writes 
(1987: 316): 
The concept [of dependence] is modal ... the intended meaning of 
dependence /independence marks not a qualitative but a modal -existential 
difference: dependent and independent objects exist in different ways. (My 
emphasis). 
Therefore the dependence on the vision system does not require sensuous 
properties to be mental. The present account leaves open for the time being the 
question whether sensuous properties are physical, mental, or otherwise. An answer 
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to that question must be defered to another occasion. Primitivists take colours to be 
categorially primitive properties of objects - not physical, mental or dispositional.223 
Nor does the dependence of sensuous properties on the causal interaction 
between object and perceiver make those properties relational. Reasons were given 
above for the phenomenological implausibility of a position such as Shoemaker's 
relational sensuous nature of e.g. red; such a conception of sensuous nature does not 
bear any similarity to the way we perceive red - i.e. as a monadic property. Sensuous 
properties are non -relational. On the Constitutionalist's account, the sensuous -red of 
an apple supervenes on the physical causal interaction between the surface of the 
apple and the perceiver; more accurately, between the microstructure of the surface 
on the one hand and the perceptual environment on the other, which includes the 
conditions of the physical environment and the vision system of the perceiver. The 
causal interaction is of course relational, but its relationality does not transfer to the 
property at the supervening level. Sensuous red is a monadic property of the surface 
of the apple grounded on the apple's relation to the perceiver. It is not an intrinsic 
property of the surface of the apple, since it rests on the relation between the surface 
and the (external) perceiver and environment. 
Both the experience of the perceiver and the sensuous red of the apple 
supervene on the physical interaction between the apple and the perceiver which 
grounds them. The two supervening properties /activities (hereafter `properties' for 
short) are dependent on the subvening physical interaction for their realisation. But 
the relations between them (more precisely, among the three of them) are more 
complex than supervenience can capture. Supervenience itself involves the 
dependence of the supervenient on the subvenient properties which determine them; 
and the covariation of the supervenient properties with their subvenient ones. But 
this describes only the vertical relations between, on the one hand the experience and 
the sensuous property, and on the other hand the subvening physical causal 
interaction. In addition to the vertical relations there are horizontal relations between 
the two supervening properties (i.e. colour experience and sensuous property); these 
223 For example, McGinn (1996: 548): `Now we have, in addition to mental or physical properties (and 
combination thereof), a further set of basic properties that objects may instantiate - the colours.' `To 
the old question, "Are colours mental or physical, subjective or objective ? ", we must answer, 
"Neither: they constitute a third category, just as real as, but distinct from, mental and physical 
properties'. `Colours are primitive properties, not analysable in any other terms: `red' simply denotes 
the property of being red, not the property of being disposed to look red' (ibidem, 550). 
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relations are, of course, grounded on the vertical ones. The sensuous property and the 
experience are horizontally related by co- dependence, co- determination, and co- 
variation relations between them. 
The colour experience and the sensuous property are co- dependent, being co- 
realised in the perceptual process. Their co- dependence is why the experience and 
the sensuous property have coextensive life spans. In cases of hallucination, no 
sensuous property is realised since there is no coloured object. In such cases, the 
perceiver's experience is realised without a sensuous property being realised. Clearly 
the mechanism and the metaphysics of hallucinations are different from those of 
perception. The account I am proposing follows the disjunctivist position in allowing 
for indiscernible hallucinations and perceptions which have nothing in common in 
their constitution.224 On the perceptual mechanism, the experience is bound up with 
the sensuous property in the ways to be described in what follows. On the 
hallucination mechanism, the experience is independent of any sensuous property. 
The colour experience and the sensuous property are mutually qualitatively co- 
determined. The qualitative nature of the content of the experience is co- determined 
with the qualitative nature of the sensuous red. This relation between the two must be 
the basis for the Primitivists' claim that the colour experience reveals the qualitative 
nature of the colour. The physical interaction which grounds both the experience of 
red and the sensuous red supplies the common foundation for their qualitative co- 
determination. 
Finally there is covariation of the experience with the sensuous -property. Their 
covariation relation is different from their co- determination and co- dependence 
relations. Neither of these relations entails covariation. Consider the existential 
dependence of a daughter on her mother, and further, the qualitative determination of 
the daughter by the mother. No covariation between mother and daughter, in either 
direction, follows from these relations.225 The covariation between the qualitative 
nature of the content of the perceiver's experience and the qualitative nature of the 
sensuous property is horizontal. Previously we encountered vertical covariation - of 
224 E.g. Martin (2004: 37): `The disjunctivist theory of perception claims that we should understand 
statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to the disjunction that either one is 
perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are 
not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state in common to these 
various disjoint situations'. 
225 On the difference in the formal properties of dependence and covariation, see Kim (1999: 546). 
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the supervening (experience and sensuous property) and subvening (causal 
interaction) levels. 
The Constitutionalist must now address the following two questions: since 
perceptual experiences can continue (or even start) after the seen object has ceased to 
exist, can sensuous qualities exist without qualifying any object? Or is the object they 
qualify not the one we ordinarily take ourselves to be seeing? The Constitutionalist 
offers the following extended answers. 
The horizontal relations presuppose the co- realisation of the sensuous property 
and the perceiver's experience. Consider now the case where a perceived coloured 
object has ceased to exist when the perceptual experience occurs. Constitutionalism 
needs to say to which object possesses the sensuous property that is co- realised with 
the perceptual experience. Answer: the sensuous property still belongs to the 
coloured object that has ceased to exist. 
The Constitutionalist here follows Williamson in distinguishing between the 
logical and the concrete sense of `exist', and in associating property possession with 
the logical sense of `exist'. Williamson (2002: 245) writes: 
Whatever can be counted exists at least in the logical sense: there is such an 
item. Past objects are no counterexamples to the principle that having 
properties or relations entails existing in at least the minimal sense. ` Trajan 
does not exist' is true when `exist' is used in the nonlogical sense of 
concreteness, not when it is used in the logical sense. ... Trajan now stands in 
causal and semantic relations to various objects. He still has relations, but does 
not still exist. 
The (`posthumously' realised) sensuous property belongs to the object that 
ceased to exist, since the object still exists in the logical sense. The object can 
posthumously causally impact on the perceiver because it still exists in the logical 
sense. This situation arises only because of the time gap in the transmission of the 
causal efficacy of the coloured object to the perceiver. 
It might be objected that there is no horizontal covariation of the experience 
with the sensuous property, in view of the possibility of illusion. That is, if one can 
misperceive a colour, the qualitative character of the content of one's experience must 
be independent of the qualitative nature of the sensuous property realised. But 
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according to Constitutionalism, there is no illusion; there are no deviant causal chains 
in nature. The sensuous properties realised are different in varying perceptual 
environments even if the microphysical properties of a surface do not change. (The 
perceptual environment required for a sensuous property's realisation is a 
combination of the physical environment within which the perception takes place, and 
the perceiver's vision system itself.) It follows that we should introduce the notion of 
the sensuous nature of the surface of an object, which consists of the set of sensuous 
properties of that surface, each of which is realisable in different types of perceptual 
environment. 
We do of course distinguish, for pragmatic reasons, between normal and 
abnormal perceptual conditions. On the basis of this we deem some experiences 
illusory in so far as the perceptual causal chains are deviant in relation to the normal 
perceptual circumstances. But it is important to recognise that the everyday sensuous 
red we see in red apples and roses is no more `the sensuous nature' of the surface than 
the sensuous orange226 we might see looking at the same red apple when perceiving it 
under the influence of a drug. Sensuous orange is just the sensuous property that is 
realised when the apple is perceived under such conditions. And sensuous red is just 
the sensuous property that is realised when the apple is perceived under normal 
conditions. But there is nothing that privileges normal conditions of our environment 
and our vision system over other environments or vision systems that might have 
evolved or might be artificially created. Once we realise that our perceptual system 
and environment play a role in the realisation of the sensuous property of a coloured 
object even under normal conditions, then it follows that the only privileges normal 
conditions may enjoy over abnormal conditions are pragmatic, not related to how 
things are or are not. So any sensuous property that is realised in a perceptual setup, 
no matter how atypical, deviant, or abnormal the setup is, is the surface's sensuous 
property on a par with the property realised under normal conditions. We may 
suppose that you have inverted spectrum vision; or that you perceive the apple 
through a deviant causal chain; or that you are a mutation with respect to sensory 
apparatus in a post -nuclear -war era. (One can readily think of scenarios where you 
are in the majority, for the sake of vote counting.) All such circumstances realise 
226 A terminological clarification: sensuous orange is the colour of a surface realised when a normal 
perceiver sees e.g. carrot soup under normal perceptual conditions. 
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different properties of the surface's sensuous nature. As far as the surface's sensuous 
nature is concerned, there is egalitarianism regarding the veracity of the various 
perceptions resulting from these alternative setups.227 But as far as our pragmatic 
considerations go, there is the monarchy of the normal perceptual conditions, 
relegating other perceptions to illusion and the like. The convention of `a pragmatic' 
point of reference is not at odds with Constitutionalism. 
Finally, it follows from this account that there is no direct causal relation 
between the sensuous property of a surface and the experience of the perceiver. Yet 
we do believe that we see the colour of a surface. According to Constitutionalism, 
both the colour and the experience supervene on the subvening physical causal 
interaction between the surface and the perceiver. How then do we perceive the 
colour, if it is not the cause of the experience? The answer is that supervenient 
phenomena have causal potency even if they are not direct causes of other 
phenomena. Here the Constitutionalist follows Jaegwon Kim in explaining the causal 
efficacy of supervening phenomena in terms of the `causal processes taking place at a 
more basic physical level' (Kim 2003: 252). On Kim's line of reasoning, when a 
supervening property /activity S causes another supervening property /activity S *, this 
is so because S supervenes on a physical property /activity P, and similarly S* on P *, 
and P causes P *. For Kim, S has in this case a causal role to play with respect to S *, 
and it is not to be treated as a causally inert epiphenomenon. 
The relations in the perceptual case are more complex than this outline suggests. 
Following Kim, although the supervening sensuous property is not a full- blooded 
direct cause of the perceptual experience, it is causally relevant for the generation of 
the experience in that it supervenes on the cause -effect relation between the object's 
microphysical properties and the perceiver's vision system. In the foregoing 
discussion we saw that the co- dependent, co- determined, and co- varying sensuous 
property and experience were grounded on the same underlying conditions of the 
causal interaction. But this does not clash with the asymmetry of the cause -effect 
227 Chalmers uses an argument from perceptual egalitarianism, but only for normal and inverted - 
spectrum vision, as opposed to our present extension of the argument to cover illusion as well. 
Chalmers says that privileging normal versus inverted spectrum vision `imposes an asymmetry on 
what otherwise seems to be a quite symmetrical situation. ... The perceptual mechanisms themselves, 
involving light and brain, seem to be symmetrically well -functioning in both communities ... This 
view yields a serious sceptical worry: it seems that we have little reason to believe that we are in a 
community that normally perceives veridically as opposed to non veridically'. 
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relation of the object's microphysical properties on the vision system of the perceiver. 
Nor does it clash with the sensuous property qualifying the coloured object and the 
experience belonging to the perceiver. 
To see this, consider the following case. Your desktop is not exerting any force 
on anything when not pressured. This seems similar to an object which does not have 
any sensuous properties when unobserved. But when a vase drops on the desktop, 
two forces are generated from the causal interaction between the vase and the desktop 
- two forces that counterbalance each other: pressure, and counter- force. What is 
generated in the course of the causal interaction depends on the make up of the vase 
and of the desktop (internal conditions), but also on the particular energy distribution 
in their movements, their orientation relative to each other, etc. (external conditions). 
Yet the two forces do not supervene neutrally on the physical causal interaction of the 
vase and the desktop. Rather, they belong to the two objects respectively: the 
pressure is exerted by the vase and the counter -force by the desktop. Since each 
object's internal conditions, as well as its respective external conditions (which 
include the environment, but also the internal conditions of the other) determine how 
it becomes involved in the causal interaction, why is either of the two forces more the 
one object's rather than the other's? There seems to be parity of involvement, and so 
we would expect parity of belonging to the mutual interaction. The reason why the 
one generated force belongs to the vase and the other to the desktop is the 
contribution that each object makes to the nature of the generated item. For example, 
if the desktop had a different make up, given the same external conditions it might 
have become involved in the causal interaction with deformation or displacement. 
The counterforce results from the desktop's hardness - external conditions being 
equal. Had it been made of canvas, deformation would have also resulted. The role 
of the desktop's make up in determining the nature of the generated item in the causal 
interaction - the counterforce - anchors the counterforce on the desktop. The 
counterforce is grounded on the causal interaction, since it depends also on conditions 
external to the desktop; but it is anchored in the microphysical constitution of the 
desktop to which it owes its nature - external conditions being equal. 
Similarly in the case of colour. It is the make up of the object that determines 
that, given the external circumstances, it becomes involved with the generation of a 
sensuous property; while it is the make up of the perceiver that determines that, given 
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the external circumstances, it becomes involved with the generation of an experience. 
The role of the object's make up in determining the nature of the generated item in 
the causal interaction - the colour rather than the experience - anchors colour on the 
object, despite its dependence on the external circumstances (which include the 
environment, but also the perceiver's internal conditions). The colour is grounded on 
the causal interaction as a whole, but it is anchored on the microphysical constitution 
of the object to which it owes its nature as colour. 
The asymmetry of the subvening cause -effect relation enables one to distinguish 
between Constitutionalism and an epiphenomenal account of colours. The 
supervening sensuous property acquires its causal relevance in relation to the 
perceiver's experience from the cause -effect relation at the grounding physical level. 
Colours are not inert terminal effects of causal routes; rather, their causal relevance 
derives from the grounding physical causes in the surface microstructure of the object 
to which they belong. 
How Edenic is our world? In Eden there is only one sensuous property 
associated with a red surface. This is the `perfect redness' that is instantiated in all 
red objects whether they are perceived or not. In Eden sensuous red saturates the 
surface of an apple (behaving like a coat of paint on a surface which excludes at a 
given time other coats of paint). Sensuous orange cannot find a way onto that surface 
(without physical change of the surface), let alone all the other sensuous properties of 
a red surface that may be activated under various perceptual conditions. 
But what about our world? According to Constitutionalism, the surface of the 
apple is indeed red, because sensuous red is realised under normal perceptual 
conditions. Sensuous red and all the other sensuous properties of a surface are not 
figments of our imagination in a colourless world of science. Which sensuous 
property is realised on any given perceptual occasion cannot be determined by the 
microphysical properties of the surface alone, independently of the perceptual 
environment. And no one of them is genuine to the exclusion of the others, to be 
revealed to us by our preferred perceptual environment. Different perceptual 
conditions may obtain, simultaneously or diachronically, thereby enabling the surface 
of the apple to flash -out its various sensuous properties in different directions to 
different perceivers at the same or different times. No single sensuous property of a 
surface saturates the surface of an object. 
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Here is our world: it has coloured objects, like the red apple. Colours are 
grounded on the causal activity of the physical micro -structural properties of coloured 
objects' surfaces. When we see colours, we do not see micro - structural properties; 
nor do we see dispositions or relations. We see a red or yellow, etc., surface. The 
qualitative feature of the perceived surface, its redness, yellowness, etc., is one of a 
set of sensuous properties of the surface which comprise the surface's sensuous 
nature. Which sensuous properties of the surface we see depends on the perceptual 
environment. There are multiple dependence, determination, and variation relations 
among our perceptual experience, the sensuous properties of a surface, and the 
underlying physical causal interaction between the surface's microstructure and the 
perceiver's vision system, through the physical environment. None of these relations 
requires sensuous properties to be mental or relational. When unperceived, our world 
is like the `colourless' world of science, because perceptual environments are needed 
for the instantiation of sensuous properties. But no perceptual environment `reveals 
more truly' a surface's sensuous nature than any other. So most of the time, a 
surface's sensuous nature remains dormant; but when observed, it rises to its full 
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